INCOME TAX CLAIMS IN THE YEAR OF BANKRUPTCY:
A CONGRESSIONALLY CREATED QUAGMIRE
Gregory L. Germain1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIORITY AND DISCHARGEABILITY..........................2

II.

PRIORITY FOR INCOME TAX CLAIMS IN THE YEAR OF BANKRUPTCY ......................5
1.
The Lookback Rule. ...................................................................................6
2.
The 240 Day Rule. .....................................................................................7
3.
The Post-Petition Assessability Rule before the 2005 Act. .....................9
A.
Taxes “of a kind specified in section 523(a)1)(B) and (C).” .......9
i
Late Returns Filed More than Two but Fewer than Three
Years Before Bankruptcy.................................................10
B.
Pre-petition Taxes in the Year of Bankruptcy. ............................19
i
Corporate Taxpayers ........................................................23
ii
Individual Taxpayers Who Do Not Make The Split-Year
Election. ..........................................................................29
C
The Implication of the Post-petition Assessability Rule on
Prepetition Taxes in the Year of Bankruptcy...............................39
4.
The Post-Petition Assessability Rule after the 2005 Act. ........................41
5.
Administrative Priority Claims ................................................................43

III.

DISCHARGEABILITY OF YEAR-OF-BANKRUPTCY TAX CLAIMS. ............................46

IV.

TREATMENT OF YEAR-OF-BANKRUPTCY TAX CLAIMS IN CHAPTER PROCEEDINGS.
..............................................................................................................................49
1.
Treatment of Claims Against the Estate ..................................................49
A.
Chapter 11 Cases Prior to the 2005 Act......................................49
B.
Chapter 11 Cases Under the 2005 Act.........................................51
C.
The Estate’s Liability for Post-Confirmation Interest and Penalties
on Year-of-Bankruptcy Tax Claims.............................................53
D.
Chapter 12 and 13 Cases. ............................................................54
2.
Dischargeability of Year-of-Bankruptcy Tax Clams in Chapter
Proceedings. .............................................................................................58
A.
Chapter 11 Prior to the 2005 Act. ...............................................58
i.
Corporate Debtors............................................................58
ii.
Individual Debtors Who Make the Split Year Election ...59

1

Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University, College of Law. B.A. University of California, Santa
Cruz (1982), J.D. University of California, Hastings College of Law (1985), L.L.M. (Tax) University of
Florida, College of Law (2001). The author benefitted greatly from the assistance of his research assistants
at the Syracuse University College of Law, Richard Wallach, Rui O. Santos, and Kevin Roggow.

i

iii.

3.

V.

Individual Debtors Who Do Not Make the Split-Year
Election ............................................................................59
Chapter 11 after the 2005 Act..................................................................62
A.
Corporate Taxpayers ....................................................................62
B.
Individual Taxpayers ...................................................................63
C.
Using a Chapter 11 Plan to Delay Payment of Non-Dischargeable
Taxes ............................................................................................64
D.
Claims for Interest and Penalties on Non-Dischargeable Taxes in
Chapter 11....................................................................................66
E.
Chapters 12 and 13.......................................................................67

CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................73

ii

Whenever a debtor files bankruptcy on a date other than the first or last day of the
tax year, the debtor will potentially owe some taxes on income earned before bankruptcy
and some taxes on income earned after bankruptcy. For example, suppose that a debtor
files a bankruptcy petition on November 1, 2005, and owes $12,000 in taxes for the entire
2005 calendar year. Suppose also that the income upon which the taxes were imposed
was earned evenly during the year. Eleven months of the tax liability was incurred on
prepetition income, and one month of the tax liability was incurred on post-petition
income. How will the government’s claims for the unpaid tax liability be treated in
bankruptcy?
The answer to this question was surprisingly complex and confusing prior to the
new Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 20052 (the “2005
Act”),3 with courts reaching different results depending on whether the debtor was an
individual or a corporation, and whether the debtor filed for a liquidation under Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code, or sought to reorganize under Chapters 11-13 of the Bankruptcy
Code.
The 2005 Act made what appeared to be a minor change in the language of
section 507(a)(8)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code - the words “for a taxable year ending on or
before the date of the filing of the petition” were moved from subsection 507(a)(8)(A)(i)
to the flush language in subsection 507(a)(8)(A). The Senate Committee Report makes
no mention of the reason for moving the language.4 Indeed, the change appears to have
gone un-noticed by bankruptcy law experts discussing the new statute.5 Yet, the change
will impact virtually every debtor who files a bankruptcy petition, and may dramatically
impair the government’s ability to collect the taxes on prepetition income earned in the
year of bankruptcy. In the example stated above, a strong argument can be made that the
change in the statute should allow a debtor to convert what would have been an $11,000
claim that would be entitled to priority over most other general unsecured claims and
would be excepted from discharge, into an $11,000 general unsecured claim that could be
discharged without full payment.6
This article looks at the treatment of the government’s claims for taxes incurred in
the year of bankruptcy by analyzing the complex state of the law before the change made
by the 2005 Act, and then considering how those rulings may impact the law after the
2005 Act goes into effect for cases filed on or after October 17, 2005.7
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I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIORITY AND DISCHARGEABILITY.

One of the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy is to provide an individual debtor
with a fresh start. Bankruptcy provides a “fresh start” by creating a clear separation
between the debtor’s prepetition assets and liabilities and the debtor’s post-petition assets
and liabilities. Upon filing bankruptcy, a new entity known as the bankruptcy estate is
created.8 The bankruptcy estate becomes the owner of most of the debtor’s assets as of
the date of bankruptcy,9 and in turn the bankruptcy estate becomes liable for the debtor’s
debts existing as of the date of bankruptcy.10 In a Chapter 7 case, this new bankruptcy
estate is administered by an independent trustee,11 whose job it is to sell off the debtor’s
assets and to distribute the proceeds to creditors in accordance with the rules of priority.12
In the usual Chapter 7 case, an individual debtor’s personal liability for most13 prepetition
claims is discharged.14 The debtor thus receives a “fresh start” by being allowed to earn
money after the filing of the bankruptcy petition without subjecting those earnings to the
claims of most prepetition creditors.
Certain claims against the bankruptcy estate are entitled to “priority”15 under the
Bankruptcy Code. Priority claims must be paid in full from the proceeds generated from
the sale of the bankruptcy estate’s property before lower priority and non-priority claims
receive any distribution.16 Priority only directly impacts the rights of creditors vis à vis
each other to receive distributions from the bankruptcy estate.
The Bankruptcy Code contains two separate priority provisions for income tax
claims. First, the bankruptcy estate’s post-petition income tax liabilities are entitled to a
first priority (or, under the 2005 Act, a second priority17) as administrative expenses.18
As a general matter, administrative expense priority is given to creditors who render
value to the estate after the bankruptcy petition is filed.19 However, the Bankruptcy Code
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See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
Id.
10
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) (definition of “claim”), 502(b) (allowance of claims against the estate).
11
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-704.
12
11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(1) (“trustee shall . . . collect and reduce to money the property of the estate”), 726
(distribution of property of the estate to pay claims).
13
Some prepetition claims are not discharged. See discussion infra beginning at note 40.
14
11 U.S.C. §§ 727 (general rule for court to grant discharge), 524(a)(2) (discharge operates as an
injunction against any act to collect a discharged debt).
15
See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
16
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (“property of the estate shall be distributed – (1) first, in payment of claims of the
kind specified in, and in the order specified in, section 507 of this title.”)
17
Prior to the 2005 Act, administrative claims were entitled to a first priority. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)
(repealed 2005). However, the 2005 Act moved administrative clams to second priority behind spousal and
child support obligations. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1), (a)(2) (2005).
18
11 U.S.C. §§ 503 (defining “administrative claims), 5077(a)(1) (repealed 2005) (administrative claims
subject to first priority), 507(a)(2) (2005) (administrative claims subject to second priority).
19
Under the original Bankruptcy Code, a creditor received an administrative claim for rendering value to
the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (repealed 2005); Charles Jordan Tabb, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, §
7.9, p. 504 (Foundation Press, 1997) (“Administrative expenses should be allowed to the extent that they
will benefit the general creditors and the estate. . . . The fundamental prerequisites for most administrative
expenses therefore are (1) that the claim be incurred post-petition in a transaction with the estate, and (2)
that the claim benefit the estate”).
9
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grants administrative expense priority to any tax claim incurred by the estate,20 regardless
of whether the estate received a benefit,21 as long as the claim is not subject to eighth
priority.22
Second, under very complex rules that incorporate applicable non-bankruptcy law
and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, certain prepetition claims for income taxes
are entitled to an eighth priority.23 Tax claims entitled to eighth priority are excluded
from being treated as first priority administrative expenses.24 It is therefore necessary to
first determine whether the tax claims in issue are entitled to eighth priority, and if not to
then to determine whether the tax claims are entitled to first priority.
The priority rules are complicated by the cleavage between an individual debtor
and the bankruptcy estate. When an individual debtor files under Chapter 7,25 two
separate taxpayers are created – the post-petition debtor and the bankruptcy estate.26
Because of the fresh start, the post-petition debtor’s earnings are freed from the claims of
most prepetition creditors by the discharge.27 The debtor, not the estate, is solely
responsible for taxes on the debtor’s post-petition earnings.28 Similarly, the estate may
have post-petition earnings on the property of the estate, and those taxes are borne solely
by the estate.29 The individual debtor is not personally liable for taxes on the estate’s
earnings.30

20

The statute says that post-petition taxes entitled to eighth priority under section 507(a)(8) are not entitled
to first priority as administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). As is discussed below, a superficial
reading of section 507(a)(8) would appear to cover all post-petition taxes. See discussion infra beginning at
at note 135. However, the courts have correctly held that section 507(a)(8) only applies to prepetition tax
claims and not to post-petition tax claims. See infra at note 136. So why the reference to section 507(a)(8)
in section 503(b)? How could a prepetition tax claim constitute an obligation of the estate, when the estate
did not even exist prepetition to incur the tax debts? The answer to the riddle is that the government’s
claim for the prepetition portion of taxes in the year of bankruptcy technically arises at the end of the tax
year. See discussion infra at notes 155 and 210. Prior to the 2005 Act, section 502(i) of the Bankruptcy
Code was intended to treat the prepetition portion of taxes for the year of bankruptcy as if it were a
prepetition claim even if it were deemed to arise post-petition. See discussion infra at note 232. The claim
would be entitled to eighth priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code, and would not
be treated as a first priority administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).
However, under the change made by the 2005 Act, the prepetition taxes incurred in the year of
bankruptcy will no longer be entitled to eighth priority (except where an individual debtor makes a splityear election, or possibly files on the last day of the tax year). See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (flush language)
(2005). Section 502(i) will no longer apply to these taxes, because they no longer fall under section
507(a)(8). How these prepetition taxes will be treated under the 2005 Act is unclear. See discussion infra
beginning at page 41..
21
11 U.S.C. § 503(b). In addition, fines, penalties and reductions in credit relating to administrative taxes
are also entitled to administrative priority. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c).
22
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).
23
See discussion infra beginning at note 54.
24
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).
25
For simplicity, I have assumed that the debtor is voluntarily filing a bankruptcy case. The same rules
apply in an involuntary case if the bankruptcy court grants relief under Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h).
26
See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
27
11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
28
26 U.S.C. § 1398(e)(2). All references hereafter to 26 U.S.C. shall be to the “Internal Revenue Code” or
“I.R.C.”
29
See I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1).
30
I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2).
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To constitute an administrative expense subject to first priority, the tax liability
must be “incurred by the estate.”31 Tax liabilities of the debtor that were not “incurred by
the estate”32 are not entitled to priority as administrative expenses,33 and may not be
claims against the estate at all.34 This cleavage between the post-petition debtor and the
post-petition estate does not apply to entity taxpayers because they do not have a separate
existence from the estate.35
The proper analysis of year-of-bankruptcy claims depends on whether the taxes
on prepetition income are treated as prepetition taxes,36 or whether the taxes on
prepetition income are treated as post-petition taxes that are deemed to arise at the end of
the year.37 The courts have taken inconsistent positions on this fundamental question
depending on whether the taxpayer is an individual or a corporation.38 These inconsistent
positions are about to be magnified by a change in the 2005 Act, which eliminates the
possibility of relying on the eighth priority rules to avoid treating the taxes on prepetition
income either as first priority administrative expenses or as general unsecured claims.39
A separate question from priority is whether the government’s claims are
excepted from discharge.40 Claims excepted from discharge remain collectible from the
debtor’s post-bankruptcy earnings. There are several different ways in which tax claims
may be excepted from discharge. First, all tax claims entitled to eighth priority are
excepted from discharge.41 Second, if the debtor committed certain types of wrongful
conduct, the tax claims arising therefrom are excepted from discharge even though they
may not be entitled to priority.42 Finally, claims that did not exist prepetition are not

31

11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the bankruptcy estate and not the debtor is to be liable for taxes
on income “received or accrued” post-petition to which the estate is entitled. I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1).
Therefore, the allocation issue should properly focus on whether the income upon which the taxes are
imposed belongs to the estate (in which case the government has a claim against the estate and not the
debtor) or to the debtor individually (in which case the government’s sole claim is against the debtor).
33
Id.
34
See discussion infra beginning at note 192.
35
See I.R.C. § 1399.
36
This is what the courts have done with corporate taxes, relying on section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) to treat the
pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes as eighth priority taxes, which are excepted from discharge
under 523(a)(1)(A). See discussion infra beginning at note 151. The Internal Revenue Service has
consistently disputed this treatment, seeking to obtain first priority administrative expense treatment for
taxes on prepetition income. See infra at note 178.
37
This is what the courts have done with individual taxpayers who do not make the split-year election. See
discussion infra beginning at note 192.
38
Supra notes 36 and 37.
39
See discussion infra beginning at page 41.
40
See 11 U.S.C. § 523.
41
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).
42
The debtor does not receive a discharge if the debtor failed to file a required tax return, filed a required
tax return late and within two years of bankruptcy, filed a fraudulent return, or willfully attempted to evade
or defeat the tax in any manner. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)(B) - (C). Claims for taxes that are excepted from
discharge on one of these grounds are not entitled to eighth priority, apparently even if there is an
independent basis for eighth priority. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). With respect to year-ofbankruptcy taxes, only the tax fraud provisions could apply because the return would not be due at the time
of bankruptcy, and it would be unusual for tax fraud to occur before the return is due. Therefore, these
specific exceptions to discharge would only rarely be relevant to year-of-bankruptcy taxes.
32
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covered by the discharge, as the discharge only applies to prepetition claims.43 The
discharge therefore does not apply to most administrative expenses, because the expenses
were incurred post-petition. However, unlike most administrative expenses, tax claims
“incurred by the estate” and not entitled to eighth priority are treated as administrative
expenses44 irrespective of when the claims were incurred or accrued.
Unlike eighth priority claims which are always excepted from discharge,45 tax
claims that are entitled to first priority as administrative expenses may be dischargeable,
as there is no blanket discharge exception from discharge for first priority administrative
expenses.46 If there are insufficient assets in the estate to pay first priority administrative
expenses, and the discharge covered the administrative expenses, the government would
not be able to collect the unpaid balance if the post-petition obligation is subject to
discharge. However, the Chapter 7 discharge only applies to prepetition claims,47 so
post-petition administrative expenses would generally not be discharged in a Chapter 7
case. However, prepetition administrative expenses – if there is such a thing48 – would
be subject to discharge in Chapter 7. Moreover, the Chapter 11 discharge applies to preconfirmation obligations, and thus covers post-petition pre-confirmation administrative
expenses which are not paid as part under the plan of reorganization.49
Prepetition non-priority tax claims incurred in the year of bankruptcy would
generally be dischargeable.50 General unsecured creditors are thus at significant risk of
receiving less than full payment in bankruptcy cases.
The proper characterization of the claim is therefore essential to determine how
the claim will be treated in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, and whether the
claim will be collectible from the debtor’s post-petition assets and earnings. The
complex interplay between the priority and dischargeability rules creates many confusing
and complex issues that are considered below.
II.

PRIORITY FOR INCOME TAX CLAIMS IN THE YEAR OF BANKRUPTCY.

There are two basic ways in which income tax claims may be entitled to priority
under the Bankruptcy Code: (1) as first priority administrative expenses,51 and (2) as

43

See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (“a discharge . . . discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of
the order for relief”).
44
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B).
45
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).
46
See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (note the absence of provision excepting administrative priority claims from
discharge).
47
11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (discharge of claims “that arose before the date of the order for relief.”)
48
See discussion infra beginning at note 268 as to whether the government’s claim for the prepetition
portion of taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy under the 2005 Act will be entitled to first priority as an
administrative expense. The issue is whether the taxes on prepetition income are “incurred by the estate”
within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).
49
See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b)(1)(A). However, confirmation of the plan requires first priority administrative
expenses to be paid in cash in full on the effective date. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A). Therefore only
administrative expenses which are not properly claimed as part of the plan would be subject to discharge.
50
The claim would be excepted from discharge only if the debtor made a “willful attempt to evade or
defeat taxes” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(C).
51
11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(B); 507(a)(1).
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eighth priority claims.52 Because income taxes entitled to eighth priority are not entitled
to first priority as administrative expenses,53 one must first determine whether the
government’s claim for taxes is entitled to eighth priority before analyzing whether the
government’s claim is entitled to treatment as a first priority administrative expense.
The Bankruptcy Code grants an eighth priority under section 507(a)(8) to the
government’s income tax claims if they fall within any one54 of the following three rules:
(1) the lookback rule,55 (2) the 240 day assessment rule,56 and (3) the post-petition
assessability rule.57 Each of these three rules is highly complex, and each is considered
in order.
1.

The Lookback Rule.

The lookback rule gives a priority to taxes for which a return was last due within
the three year period before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.58 The due date of the
return, not the date that the taxes were incurred or the year for which the taxes were due,
is the key date for determining whether the taxes are non-dischargeable under the
lookback rule.59
While the lookback rule is written mechanically, the Supreme Court recently held
that the three year lookback period is, in essence, a statute of limitations, albeit one that
involves priority rather than enforceability of a claim, and can thus be equitably tolled
when the government is prevented from assessing taxes as a result of an earlier
bankruptcy case.60
The 2005 Act codifies and expands the Supreme Court’s determination that the
lookback period is tolled during a prior bankruptcy case. All of the statutory periods
during which a priority is granted for governmental claims, including the lookback
period, are suspended during the stay in a prior case plus 90 days.61 In addition, the
periods are suspended for any period, plus 90 days, during which the government is
prohibited from collecting the tax as a result of a debtor’s request for hearing or appeal.62
Even before the 2005 Act, the lookback rule contained language making it clear
that the rule applied only to tax years “ending on or before” the petition date.63 On its
52

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (granting priority to a tax incurred by the estate “except a tax of a kind
specified in section 507(a)(8)”).
54
The three provisions are written in the alternative (see the use of “or” in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)).
See also In re Vitaliano, 178 B.R. 205, 208 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); In re Etheridge, 91 B.R. 842,845
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that priority is to be granted if the taxes fall within any one of the three
rules); In re Easton, 59 B.R. 714, 716-17 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986); In re Coleman American Moving
Services, Inc., 20 B.R. 267, 269 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
55
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i).
56
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).
57
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).
58
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A.
59
Id.
60
In re Young, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002).
61
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (flush language) (2005).
62
Id.
63
Prior to the 2005 Act, the lookback rule granted priority for income taxes “for a taxable year ending on or
before the date of the filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, including extensions,
after three years before the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i).
53
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face, the lookback rule appeared not to apply to year-of-bankruptcy taxes incurred by
calendar year taxpayers who filed bankruptcy on any date other than December 31,
because the taxpayer’s calendar tax year would not have ended “on or before” the petition
date. Similarly, for fiscal year taxpayers, the lookback rule appeared not to apply to
petitions filed on any date other than the last day of the taxpayer’s fiscal year. However,
this appearance is false, because of the split-year election.
The Internal Revenue Code allows an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 or Chapter
11 case64 to elect to split the tax year in which a bankruptcy petition is filed into two
separate tax years – the first one ending on the date that the bankruptcy petition was
filed.65 If the debtor makes the split-year election, the taxes owing for the pre-petition
partial year of bankruptcy would fall under the language of the lookback rule, because the
partial tax year would have ended “on or before” the petition date.
Because only individuals in cases under Chapters 7 or 11 may make the split-year
election,66 and because it is optional,67 taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy by entity
taxpayers, such as corporations, by individuals in Chapter 12 and 13 cases, and by
individuals who do not make the split-year election68 will not be entitled to priority under
the lookback rule, unless the debtor happens to file bankruptcy on the last day of the
debtor’s tax year.
2.

The 240 Day Rule.

All taxes which are “assessed” within 240 days prior to bankruptcy are entitled to
priority.69 Taxes assessed more than 240 days before bankruptcy may also be entitled to

64

Debtors in Chapter 12 and 13 cases are not eligible to make the split-year election. This is because there
is no cleavage between the debtor’s and the estate’s post-petition income in Chapter 12 and 13 cases,
because the debtor is required to use its “projected disposable income” for three or five years to fund the
plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1325(b)(1)(B). Therefore, individuals in Chapter 12 and 13 cases are
treated much like corporations – unable to make a split-year election.
Under the 2005 Act, individual Chapter 11 debtors are also treated much like Chapter 12 and 13
debtors, in that they are required to use their projected disposable post-petition income for five years to
fund the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15). Congress did not consider the effect of the 2005 Act changes
on the right to make a split-year election. It would appear under the existing statute that this post-petition
income which the debtor is required to use to fund the plan would be taxable to the estate and not to the
debtor, since the income is subject to use by the estate. See I.R.C. §§ 1398(e)(1), (e)(2).
65
I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A)(i).
66
I.R.C. § 1398(a) (section applies “to any case . . . in which the debtor is an individual.”)
67
See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A) (“the debtor . . . may elect”); see also In re Prativadi, 281 B.R. 816, 819
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Haedo, 211 B.R. 149, 152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Johnson, 190 B.R.
724, 726-27 (Bankr. Mass. 1995); In re Mirman, 98 B.R. 742, 744-745 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re
Turboff, 93 B.R. 523, 525 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988). The election must be made prior to the due date for the
return, and the election once made is irrevocable. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(D). For individuals, the due date for
the return is “the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of the fiscal year.” I.R.C. § 6072(a). For
corporations, the return is due on “the 15th day of the third month” following the petition date. I.R.C. §
6072(b).
68
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i).
69
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii). A longer period of time applies if the taxpayer made an offer in
compromise within 240 days after an assessment is made. The statute extends the 240 day period by 30
days plus the time that the offer in compromise was pending, presumably because the Secretary would not
attempt to collect the tax while the offer was pending. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).
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priority if there was an offer in compromise in effect after assessment,70 if collection
during the 240 day period was stayed by a prior bankruptcy case,71 or possibly if the
government was prohibited from collecting the tax by applicable non-bankruptcy law
because of a request for hearing or appeal filed by the debtor.72
Taxes may only be assessed either when a tax return is filed showing an amount
due,73 or after a return is due if the government follows the procedures for making a socalled deficiency assessment.74
Since a taxpayer cannot file a return until after the end of the tax year,75 and since
a return is not due until after the end of the taxable year,76 an assessment cannot be made
70

The statutory language in effect prior to the 2005 Act was confusing, but the courts interpreted the
language to allow a lengthy extension of the 240 day period if the offer in compromise was entered into
within 240 days after assessment. See, e.g. In re Romagnolo, 269 B.R. 63, 66 (“Accordingly, when an
offer in compromise is submitted within 240 days of assessment, the 240 day period is extended 30 days
plus any time during which the offer-in-compromise was pending.”) ; Accord In re Mulcahy, 260 B.R.
612, 617 (Bankr. Mass. 2001) (taxes assessed 317 days before bankruptcy entitled to priority because offer
in compromise pending for 210 days and any assessment within 480 days of bankruptcy (240+210+30)
would have been entitled to priority); In re Chelena, No. 96-66521, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1720, *2-3; 80
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7562 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (adding 1,049 days to the statutory 240 day period
because of a longstanding offer in compromise). Under the 2005 Act, the 240 day period is extended by
the number of days during the 240 day period that an offer in compromise was pending or in effect, plus 30
days. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)(I) (2005). The changes made by the 2005 Act set the maximum period
at 510 days if the offer in compromise was in effect during the entire 240 day period preceding bankruptcy.
71
The Supreme Court held, in dicta, that the 240 day period would be tolled during the period in a prior
bankruptcy case that the government was stayed from collecting the taxes. In re Young, 535 U.S. at 44.
The 2005 Act codifies and extends the holding in Young. Under the 2005 Act, the 240 day period is
extended for 90 days plus the period during which the government was prevented by law from collecting
the taxes, if the prohibition occurred in the debtor’s prior bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (flush
language) (2005).
72
The 2005 Act provides that all tax priority periods are extended during the period that the government is
prohibited by applicable non-bankruptcy law from pursuing collection because the debtor is requesting a
hearing or filing an appeal. This language was likely drafted to protect the government from losing priority
status when taxpayers file appeals or court challenges in connection with collection due process cases
brought under I.R.C. sections 6320 and 6330.
73
I.R.C. § 6201(a)(1) (“The Secretary shall assess all taxes determined by the taxpayer or by the Secretary
as to which returns or lists are made under this title.”). This is known as a “self assessment” because the
taxpayer has permitted an assessment by admitting on the return the taxpayer’s obligation to pay the taxes
shown. In addition, the government may assess taxes even though not shown on a return as owing where
the taxpayer has made a simple computational error. See I.R.C. § 6213(b) (Secretary may assess taxes
arising out of mathematical or clerical errors without notice of deficiency, but taxpayer has right to request
prompt abatement).
74
See I.R.C. §§ 6213(a) (“[N]o assessment of a deficiency . . .and no levy or proceeding in court for its
collection shall be made . . . until the expiration of such 90 day period . . . nor, if a petition has been filed
with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final”), 6211(a) (“[T]he term
‘deficiency’ means the amount by which the tax imposed . . . exceeds the excess of – (1) the sum of (A) the
amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a return was made by the taxpayer and an
amount was shown as the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus (B) the amounts previously assessed (or
collected without assessment) as a deficiency, over (2) the amount of rebates, as defined in subsection
(b)(2), made.”)
75
The Tax Code does not actually say this – it merely says when is the last day for filing a return. See
I.R.C. § 6072(a). However, a taxpayer could not compute the amount of tax due until the end of the tax
year, and therefore could not file a return before the end of the year. See I.R.C. § 6012(a) (returns must be
filed by “individuals having for the taxable year income”).
76
I.R.C. § 6072(a) (Calendar year returns due April 15 of following year).
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until after the end of the taxpayer’s calendar or fiscal year. Therefore, the 240 day rule
cannot apply to taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, because the taxes could not have
been assessed prior to the petition date since the tax year had not ended before the
petition date.77
3.

The Post-Petition Assessability Rule before the 2005 Act.

For cases filed prior to the effective date of the 2005 Act,78 the post-petition
assessability rule granted a priority to taxes that were not assessed before, but were
assessable under applicable non-bankruptcy law after, the date that the bankruptcy
petition was filed, unless the taxes were “of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1)(B) or
523(a)(1)(C).”79 Taxes incurred for the year of bankruptcy could not be assessed prepetition,80 and were always assessable post-petition.81 Thus, all taxes in the year that
bankruptcy was filed (and indeed all taxes arising for future post-bankruptcy years)
would appear to fit within the technical language of the post-petition assessability rule,
unless the taxes were “of a kind” specified in the referenced provisions of section 523.
A.

Taxes “of a kind specified in section 523(a)1)(B) and (C).”

The first interpretative problem with the statute is determining what taxes are excluded
from eighth priority because they are “of a kind” specified in section 523(a)(1)(B) or (C).
Section 523 contains a list of claims excepted from an individual debtor’s discharge.82 A
debtor remains personally liable to pay claims excepted from discharge even though the
debtor receives a general discharge under the Bankruptcy Code.83 The referenced
subsections in Bankruptcy Code section 523 cover taxes excepted from discharge
because the debtor (1) failed to file a required tax return, (2) filed a required tax return
late and within two years of bankruptcy, (3) filed a false return, or (4) willfully attempted
to evade or defeat taxes.84 Thus, taxes excepted from discharge for one of these reasons
are not entitled to eighth priority under section 507(a)(8), even though the taxes are
assessable post-petition. Presumably, Congress did not want a taxpayer to get the benefit
of having the non-dischargeable claim reduced by priority distributions from the

77

Even if the split-year election is made, the partial tax year will not have ended before bankruptcy, and
there will be no way for the government to make an assessment prepetition.
78
Most provisions of the 2005 Act are effective on October 17, 2005. See supra note 7.
79
Id.
80
See supra notes 75 - 76.
81
The government has at least three years after the date the return for the taxes is due to assess taxes. See
I.R.C. § 6501(a). Note that if a return is filed before the due date, it is treated as filed on the due date for
purposes of determining the limitations period. I.R.C. § 6501(b)(1).
82
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (“[a] discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt”).
83
According to section 523(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, certain of the debts excepted from discharge are
automatically excepted from discharge, while others are excepted from discharge only if the creditor timely
obtains an order from the court determining that the debts are excepted. The tax debts listed in section
523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code are automatically excepted from discharge.
84
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (assessable post-petition other than 523(a)(1)(B), 523(a)(1)(C)),
523(a)(1)(B) (non-filed or late filed returns), 523(a)(1)(C) (willful attempt to evade or defeat taxes).
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bankruptcy estate where the taxes are assessable post-petition solely because of the
debtor’s misconduct.85
i.

Late Returns Filed More than Two but Fewer than
Three Years Before Bankruptcy.

The reference to taxes “of a kind” specified in the referenced subsections of
section 523 causes a number of interpretative problems. First, Congress made an error in
the drafting of the late-filed return language of section 523(a)(1)(A), which potentially
causes taxes which Congress intended to be dischargeable to be both entitled to priority
and excepted from discharge. Congress provided that taxes covered by a late return filed
more than two years before bankruptcy would not be excepted from discharge (i.e. would
be dischargeable).86 Congress likely did not want to punish taxpayers for filing late
returns – by making the tax claim non-dischargeable – if the government had at least two
full years before bankruptcy to collect the taxes.87
The law works as intended with respect to taxes covered by late returns filed
fewer than two years before bankruptcy – the taxes would be excepted from discharge.88
85

The statutory cross-reference to section 523(a)(1)(B) and (C) is much broader than it should be. For
example, if there is an independent basis for allowing taxes to be assessed post-petition (other than the fact
that the debtor failed to file a return, for example), why should the fact that the debtor failed to file a return
preclude priority? Congress likely meant that tax claims are not to be given priority solely because they are
assessable post-petition due to the fact that the debtor failed to file a return, filed a false return, etc. If there
is an independent basis upon which the taxes can be assessed post-petition, the government should not lose
priority because one of the grounds in section 523(a)(1)(B) or (C) provides an alternative basis for making
the assessment post-petition. This could be relevant to year-of-bankruptcy taxes if the prepetition portion
of the taxes were entitled to eighth priority. For example, the courts have held that the prepetition portion
of a corporation’s year of bankruptcy taxes is entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) – at least
before the 2005 Act. See discussion infra beginning at note 152. Under the statute, however, the
government would lose priority if the debtor happened to willfully attempt to evade or defeat taxes. See 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (reference to “other than a tax of a kind specified in . . . 523(a)(1)(C)”). Surely,
this result was not intended.
86
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) (general discharge does not discharge individual debtor from a tax for which
a return “was filed after the date on which such return was last due under applicable law or under any
extension, and after two years before the date of the filing of the petition.”) (repealed 2005). Minor
changes were made in the 2005 Act to cover situations in which a taxpayer is required to file or give a
report or a notice rather than a tax return. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2005).
87
The report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, upon which the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 was based, originally provided that taxes covered by a late return filed within three
years of bankruptcy would be non-dischargeable. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States, § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii), H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in App. B(c) Collier on Bankruptcy - 15th Edition Revised, App. Pt. 4 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The three
year period proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission would have matched the federal statute of limitations
period. However, the House version, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), changed the period from
three years to one year. Id. The Senate version, S.2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., as reported by the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the Senate Finance Committee (1978), adopted the three year period
recommended by the Commission. The conference committee (apparently in a compromise) changed the
period to two years. Id.
88
Since the return was filed late and after two years before the date of the filing of the petition, the taxes
would be excepted from discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A)(i). In addition, because the taxes are
excepted from discharge under section 523(a), the taxes would not be entitled to priority under the post-
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Similarly, the law generally89 works as intended with respect to most taxes covered by a
late return filed more than three years before bankruptcy – the taxes would not be
excepted from discharge because of the late filing of the return (and, unless another
independent exception to discharge applied, would be dischargeable).90
The problem arises with respect to taxes covered by a late return that is filed
more than two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy, because of the interplay
between the two-year rule in Section 523(a)(1)(B) and the post-petition assessability rule
coupled with the normal three-year period of limitations for assessment of a deficiency
contained in the Internal Revenue Code.91 Taxes covered by a late return filed more than
two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy would not be excepted from discharge
under section 523(a)(1)(B), because Congress intended to allow discharge when the
government had a full two years before bankruptcy to attempt to collect the taxes.
However, the taxes would still be assessable post-petition under the three year statute of
limitations contained in the Internal Revenue Code, which begins to run only when the
tax return is filed.92 The taxes would thus be entitled to priority under a conventional
reading of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) – because the taxes would be assessable post-petition
under applicable non-bankruptcy law, and would not be excepted from discharge under
sections 523(a)(1)(B) or (C). The Catch-22 is that all eighth priority taxes are nonpetition assessability rule. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). However, the taxes may be entitled to priority
under the lookback rule or the 240 day rule. See discussion supra beginning at note 58.
89
There are a number of situations in which taxes can be assessed under applicable non-bankruptcy law
more than three years after a return is filed. First, there is no statute of limitations on assessment if the
taxpayer files a fraudulent return, or willfully attempts to defeat or evade taxes. I.R.C. §§ 6501(c)(1),
6501(c)(2)). In such cases, the taxes would be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C)
anyway. Second, there is a six year statute of limitations if a return contains a “substantial omission of
income.” I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A). A substantial omission is an amount exceeding 25% of the gross income
reported. Id. Third, the assessment limitations period is tolled for the period plus 60 days during which the
Secretary is prohibited from making an assessment after the Secretary mails to the taxpayer the required
statutory notice of deficiency which is a prerequisite to assessment. I.R.C. § 6503(a). The Secretary is
prohibited from making an assessment for the 90 day period following the mailing of the notice. I.R.C. §
6213(a). In addition, if the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court to re-determine the proposed
deficiency during the 90 day period following the mailing of the statutory notice of deficiency, then the
Secretary is stayed from assessing a deficiency until a Tax Court’s re-determination becomes final. Id.
Thus, the three year period can be greatly extended by a taxpayer challenging a proposed assessment in the
Tax Court. Finally, the limitations period can be extended by agreement. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4). In any of
these situations, the taxes are assessable post-petition under applicable non-bankruptcy law for a reason
other than the late filing of the return. Because the taxes are assessable post-petition for a reason other than
the late-filing of the return, Congress may well have intended such taxes to be given priority and to be
excepted from discharge even though the late return was filed more than two years before bankruptcy.
90
As a general matter, if the late-filed return is filed more than three years before bankruptcy, the
government would be barred from making an assessment on or after the petition date by the applicable
three-year statute of limitations contained in the Tax Code, which begins to run upon the filing of the
return. See I.R.C. § 6501(a). If the statute of limitations on collection expires before the bankruptcy
petition is filed, the claim in bankruptcy would be disallowed in its entirety and would not be entitled to
priority in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8)(A) (only “allowed unsecured claims of governmental
units” are given priority) (emphasis added); 502(a)(1) (claims that are unenforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law are not “allowed.”).
91
The 3 year statute of limitations on assessment contained in the Internal Revenue Code begins to run only
when a return is filed. See I.R.C. § 6501(a).
92
I.R.C. § 6501(a) (government has at least three years from the time a return is filed to assess a
deficiency).
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dischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(A). Thus, although Congress provided that taxes
covered by a late return filed more than two years before bankruptcy would be
dischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(B)(ii), the boomerang effect of not being excepted
from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) is that the taxes are eligible for eighth
priority treatment under the post-petition assessability rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii),
and in turn are excepted from discharge under 523(a)(1)(A). Congress surely did not
intend by shortening the nondischargeability period for late-filed returns to two years to
grant a priority and make nondischargeable taxes subject to late returns filed more than
two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy.93 It appears that Congress simply
made an error by shortening the period in section 523(a)(1)(B) without addressing the
boomerang effect of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) and section 523(a)(1)(A).
The confusion created by Congress’ snafu did not go unnoticed by litigants and
the courts. In In re Doss,94 the debtors sought a determination that taxes owing on late
returns filed more than two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy were excepted
from discharge and not entitled to priority.95 The government argued that because the
taxes were more than two years old (and thus not covered by section 523(a)(1)(B)), they
were entitled to priority (and, because they were entitled to priority, the taxes were not
dischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(A)).96
To carry out the intent of Congress, the Doss court held that the taxes were not
entitled to priority and were dischargeable. However, the court’s explanation of its
decision only added to the confusion: “the clauses following the first comma [in
507(a)(8)(A)(iii)] modify and relate to the first clause.”97 This explanation is plainly
wrong – it is clearly the phrase before the comma that limits the language after the
comma. More importantly, the implications of the court’s ruling were ambiguous.
Indeed, some debtors argued on the basis of Doss that the post-petition assessability rule
in section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) only applied to late-filed returns.98
Using language almost as confusing as the Doss opinion itself, some courts
sought to distinguish Doss by suggesting that the Doss court had merely ruled that the
taxes were dischargeable, not that they were non-priority.99 In fact, however, the Doss
93

Indeed, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended not to grant a priority to taxes due solely
to the debtor’s conduct in filing a return late, not filing a return at all, or committing tax fraud. According
to the Senate Report: “The bankruptcy policy for this treatment is that it is not fair to penalize private
creditors of the debtor by paying out of the "pot" of assets in the estate tax liabilities arising from the
debtor's deliberate misconduct. On the other hand, the debtor should not be able to use bankruptcy to
escape these kinds of taxes. Therefore, these taxes have no priority in payment from the estate but would
survive as continuing debts of the case. (Not giving priority to a debt means that the creditor can still
collect part or all of the debt from the estate, but the creditor must do so as general creditor, sharing pro rata
with other general creditors).” S. REP. NO. 95-1106 at 22 (1978).
94
In re Doss, 42 B.R. 749, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984).
95
Id. at 750.
96
Id. at 751-52.
97
Id. at 754.
98
See In re Wines, No. 91-0433, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5574, *11, *23-24; Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶74,674
(S.D. Fla. 1992).
99
In re Longley, 66 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (“[t]he Doss court held that Section
507(a)(6)(A) contained its own exclusions; namely, taxes of a kind specified in Section 523(a)(1)(B), and
that merely because a tax was still “assessable” as of the date of the filing of the Title 11 petition did not
mean that a tax excluded from the nondischargeability provision of Section 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) was,
nonetheless, nondischargeable under Section 507(a)(6)(A)(iii).”).
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opinion clearly stated that the taxes were not entitled to priority.100 Other courts have
rejected the Doss court’s analysis outright rather than trying to distinguish it.101 For
example, the court in In re Torrente, rejected both the analysis and holding of Doss,
ruling that the taxes covered by a late filed return, which was filed more than two but
fewer than three years before bankruptcy, were entitled to priority under section
507(a)(8)(A)(iii), and were also nondischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(A).102 At least
one commentator has likewise misunderstood the issue.103 The problem identified in Doss
creates a significant conundrum.
Fortunately, there is an interpretative solution to the conundrum that carries out
Congress’ intent to make dischargeable taxes covered by late returns filed more than two
years before bankruptcy. The post-petition assessability rule says that taxes which are
assessable post-petition because they are “of a kind specified in sections 523(a)(1)(B)
and 523(a)(1)(C)” are not to be given priority, even though assessable post-petition under
applicable non-bankruptcy law.104 The courts (other than Doss) have been interpreting
the quoted phrase to mean taxes that are made non-dischargeable by the two referenced
subsections of section 523. Instead, they should look to the factual situations addressed
in the specified subsections of section 523. Taxes “of a kind specified” in Section
523(a)(1)(B) should be interpreted to mean taxes (1) for which a return was not filed, or
(2) for which a return was filed late, regardless of how late. The courts have erred by
ignoring the “of a kind” language and excluding from priority only tax claims that are
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(B).
Several appellate courts have considered the interpretation of similar “of a kind”
language contained in section 523(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, with mixed results.
Section 523(a)(1)(A) provides that taxes “of a kind” specified in section 507(a)(8) are
excepted from discharge, whether or not a proof of claim is filed or allowed. The Court

See also In re Treister, 52 B.R. 735, 739 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1985) (“The [Doss] court held that simply
because a tax was a priority tax under section 507 because still assessable did not mean that the tax was
automatically nondischargeable.”).
100
In re Doss, 42 B.R. at 753 (“The court thus concludes that the unassessed taxes for 1976, 1977 and 1978
are not entitled to priority status and shall be considered general unsecured claims.”).
101
See, e.g. In re Crawford, 144 B.R. 346, 347 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (“It is difficult to read Doss and
understand the interpretation of the relevant Code section”); In re Vitaliano, 178 B.R. at 208 (“[Doss]
involves a very dubious reading of the Bankruptcy Code. Although Doss has been widely cited by debtors
seeking discharge of tax debts, every court which has considered it has either distinguished it or criticized
it.”).
102
75 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
103
See Darrell Dunham & Alex Shimkus, Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343, 355 (1993)
(“[the Doss court] reasoned that, if the IRS's argument were accepted, then all tax returns filed within three
years of the commencement of the case would be within the scope of § 507(a)(7)(A)(iii). This, of course,
would render nugatory § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii)'s two-year provision.”) This is not a correct statement. Section
523(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code would not be rendered nugatory because it applies to make
nondischargeable (and 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) makes non-priority) taxes covered by late-filed returns which were
filed within two years of bankruptcy. Confusion only exists for taxes filed more than two and fewer than
three years before bankruptcy, because section 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) does not make these taxes nondischargeable and they are thus eligible for priority treatment under the post-petition assessability rule in
section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).
104
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
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of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in In re Victor was first to consider this language105. In
Victor, two sets of debtors confirmed Chapter 11 reorganization plans in which the
government held secured tax liens.106 The issue in Victor was whether the government’s
claim for post-petition pre-confirmation interest, known as “gap” period interest, on its
secured tax claims survived the confirmation of the plans, which did not provide for the
payment of gap period interest.107 The Victor panel first held that the government’s
claims for gap period interest were not entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8),
because only allowed unsecured claims are given priority under that provision, and the
government’s claim for gap period interest was neither allowed nor unsecured.108 The
Victor panel relied on an earlier bankruptcy court decision, In re Sproul,109 for the
proposition that only claims allowable under section 502 would be excepted from
discharge under section 523(a)(1).110
105

121 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1384.
107
Id. at 1383.
108
The court stated that the claim for post-petition interest was not allowed because the government had not
filed a proof of claim for, and had not objected to confirmation of the plan of reorganization which did not
provide for payment of, post-petition interest. See In re Victor, 121 F.3d at 1386. The government argued
that it could not have filed a claim for post-petition interest, because section 502(b)(2) disallows claims for
un-matured interest. The Victor panel reasoned that this disallowance would not apply to a secured claim
for post-petition interest, which is allowed under section 506(b). However, the Court suggested that the
government was required to file a claim for, and seek allowance of its claim for, gap period interest, and to
object confirmation of any plan that did not provide for payment of gap period interest if it wished to
pursue such a claim. Id. at 1387.
109
83 B.R. 359 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988). The debtors in Sproul owned farmland subject to a mortgage held
by the South Atlantic Production Credit Association ("PCA"). The PCA ultimately got relief from the
automatic stay and foreclosed on the property. After foreclosing, the PCA paid the accrued property taxes
which had become a priority lien against the property. The PCA then asserted an unsecured claim against
the debtors for the unpaid property taxes, arguing that it was a subrogee of the taxing authority. Section
502(b)(3) disallows property tax claims which exceed the value of the estate’s interest in the property.
Since the value of the debtor’s interest in the property was zero, section 502(b)(3) would disallow any
claim against the estate on account of the property taxes. Id. at 361. The PCA argued, however, that the
claim survived as a non-dischargeable personal liability of the debtor under section 523(a)(1), because the
claim was of the kind entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(B) (which grants a priority to “allowed
unsecured claims of governmental units” for property taxes incurred within one year before bankruptcy).
Id. The debtor argued that the property tax claims were not “allowed unsecured claims” because of the
section 502(b)(3) disallowance. Id. The PCA argued that section 523(a)(1)(A) excepts the claims from
discharge “whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed,” and therefore its claim should be
excepted from discharge. Id. The Sproul court properly held that the language in 523(a)(1)(A) applies only
to claims that are allowable, whether or not actually filed or allowed. Id. at 361 (“This legislative history
suggests that the language of the final version of § 523(a)(1)(A) relied on by PCA was intended to prevent
the discharge of tax claims which were never filed or filed late but which would otherwise have been
allowable, not tax claims which would have been disallowed even if they had been timely filed.”).
110
The Victor panel failed to consider whether the gap period interest was made “allowable” by section
502(i), which provides that tax claims arising after the commencement of the case which are entitled to
priority under 507(a)(8), are treated as if they arose before the commencement of the case. If section 502(i)
requires the post-petition interest to be treated as if it had arisen prepetition, then it would not constitute unmatured interest as of the petition date and would not be disallowed by section 502(b)(1). The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004), pointed out that the
Victor panel’s interpretation would render section 502(i) non-sensical, because section 502(i) references
claims entitled to priority under 507(a)(8), and 507(a)(2) references claims allowed under 502(a), creating a
chicken and egg cycle that could not be broken. Sproul could have been distinguished from the facts in
106
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The Victor panel then reasoned that since the interest claim was not entitled to
priority, it was also not excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A). Like the
courts considering the relationship between sections 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) and 523(a)(1)(B)
and (C), the Victor panel ignored the “of a kind” language in section 523(a)(1)(A),
discharging the government’s claim because the government failed to file and seek
allowance for the claim, notwithstanding the specific language in section 523(a)(1)(A)
excepting claims for discharge even if they are not filed or allowed. In its conclusion, the
Victor panel suggested that interest on secured tax claims would always be dischargeable,
a bizarre result that would treat under-secured tax claimants worse than unsecured tax
claimants.111
The two circuit courts to consider the issue after Victor have rejected its analysis
by focusing on the important “of a kind” language in section 523(a)(1)(A). In In re Gust,
the Court of Appeals adopted the opinion of the District Court awarding gap period
interest on a secured tax claim.112 The government in Gust held prepetition tax liens
against the debtor’s property to secure trust fund penalties owing for unpaid employment
taxes. The debtor filed a “no asset” Chapter 7 case, in which creditors were not required
to file proofs of claim,113 and the debtor thereafter obtained a general discharge. Two
years later, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 case and sought a determination that the
government’s tax liens did not attach to the debtor’s personal property (some of his
personal property, apparently, had been exempted in the original Chapter 7 case, and
some had been acquired later).114 The debtor cited Victor for the proposition that the
government’s secured tax claims were discharged in his prior Chapter 7 case because
only unsecured claims were entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8).115 The Gust
courts rejected the analysis in Victor, claiming that the Victor panel erred by focusing on
the type of “claim” rather than focusing on the type of “tax” at issue.116 This was a rather
confusing way of saying that when section 523(a)(1) refers to “tax of the kind and for the
periods specified in section . . . 507(a)(8),” it does not mean a tax claim entitled to
priority under section 507(a)(8). Rather, the statute means to refer to taxes of the general
Victor because 502(i) would not have saved the taxes disallowed under section 502(b)(3), because the
disallowance was based on value not timing.
111
Victor, 121 F.3d at 1390 (“We conclude §§ 523(a)(1)(A) and 507(a)(7) clearly authorize the exception
of tax debts and interest from dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) only when the governmental
entity holds an unsecured claim to that debt.”) .
It is important to note that the Victor panel did not discuss whether the government’s lien against
the property for the gap period interest survived. The government retained its lien under the plan, so the
lien would survive the Chapter 11 discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (property free and clear after
confirmation, except as otherwise provided in the plan). The government’s tax lien would cover accruing
post-petition interest under applicable non-bankruptcy law. Section 506(b) would allow the government’s
claim for post-petition interest against the property if the value of the property exceeded the claim (which
the court said it did). The discharge of the debtor’s personal liability under section 1141(d) would not
impair the government’s claim against the property. See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886);
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1992). One wonders whether the government failed to argue an
important theory supporting its right to recovery.
112
In re Gust, 239 B.R. 630 (S.D. Ga. 1999), aff’d 197 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1999).
113
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 2002(e), 3002(c)(5).
114
Gust, 239 B.R. at 631.
115
Id. at 632-33.
116
Id. at 633 (“Instead of focusing on the type of ‘tax’, the Victor court focused on the type of ‘claim.’ This
focus was in error.”).
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type discussed in section 507(a)(8). By so interpreting the inartful statutory language,
the Gust courts sought to avoid the absurd result of causing otherwise nondischargeable
taxes to be discharged simply because the government held security for its claim.117 Like
the panel in Victor, the courts in Gust did not discuss the effect of the personal discharge
on an existing secured claim.118
In Miller v. United States,119 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an
opinion written by a former Tax Court Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall,120 followed the Gust
court’s logic in holding that gap period interest on a secured tax claim is excepted from
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A), even though the tax claim would not be entitled to
priority under section 507(a)(8). The panel in Miller rejected the Victor court’s analysis
because it “would render superfluous the plain language of § 523(a)(1), which preserves
debts for particular types of taxes ‘whether or not a claim was filed or allowed.’”121 The
panel in Miller also pointed out that the “unsecured” language in section 507(a)(8) is not
rendered superfluous, because only unsecured claims would receive priority in
distribution from the estate.122 Secured claims would not be entitled to priority,123 but
117

See id. at 634 (“Gust's position contravenes this policy [of preventing the discharge of tax claims] and
would result in illogical outcomes. Under the Gust court’s reasoning, the tax debt would be nondischargeable only if the IRS had done nothing to secure the tax debt because it would be ‘unsecured’
under § 507(a)(8). Here, the Bankruptcy Court was correct in concluding that ‘Section 523(a)(1)(A)
addresses 'debt' arising from 'a tax', 'of the kind' specified in § 507(a)(8), not debt evidenced by a claim
described in § 507(a)(8).’").
118
The District Court in Gust cited In re Frengel, 115 B.R. 569, 571 (N.D. Ohio 1989), for the proposition
that tax claims are not rendered dischargeable by being secured. Gust, 239 B.R. at 633. Frengel, however,
dealt with whether a tax lien was discharged where the tax liability was clearly dischargeable (presumably,
outside of the priority period in section 507(a)(8)). The Bankruptcy Court in Frengel, citing to Long v.
Bullard and its progeny, discussed supra at note 111, held that tax liens are not discharged by a general
bankruptcy discharge – even where the debtor’s personal liability for the underlying claim is discharged.
Frengel, 115 B.R. at 570-71. Frengel did not involve a tax “of a kind” excepted from discharge under
section 507(a)(8). While Frengel would support the non-dischargeability of the government’s tax lien on
the property held by the debtor in Gust on the date of discharge, it does not support the holding in Gust that
taxes not given priority under section 507(a)(8) may nevertheless be taxes “of a type” covered by section
507(a)(8). The Gust courts failed to address the separate issue concerning the validity of the government’s
lien on the debtor’s property at the time the discharge was granted. This omission is curious in light of the
Court citation to Frengel.
The district court in Gust also cited In re Latulippe, 13 B.R. 526 (Bankr. D.V. 1981), which
considered whether a secured tax claim could be enforced against property exempted by the debtor in
bankruptcy. The Latulippe court rejected out of hand as illogical (and contrary to the legislative history of
the statute) the debtor’s suggestion that the tax claim was not excepted from discharge under 523(a)(1)
because it was secured. See Latulippe, 13 B.R. at 527 (“[I]t seems illogical that it was the intent of
Congress to make unsecured claims for taxes non-dischargeable while at the same time rendering a claim
for taxes dischargeable if the governmental unit has taken steps to enforce payment of an un-dischargeable
tax claim by imposing a lien on the taxpayer's property.”). After holding that the tax claim was excepted
from discharge, the Latulippe court held that the property remained subject to the government’s tax lien.
119
363 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2004).
120
According to her biography, Judge Hall served on the Tax Court from 1972-1981. See
http://www.appellate-counsellor.com/profiles/hall.htm.
121
Miller, 363 F.3d at 1007.
122
Id. at 1008-09.
123
Although not discussed in the opinion, secured claims would, of course, be entitled to priority in
distribution from the collateral. According to the theory advanced by the Miller panel, under-secured
claims would not be entitled to priority in distribution from the estate under section 507(a)(8).
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would nevertheless be excepted from discharge because they are claims “of the kind”
covered by the priority statute.
One problem with the opinions in Victor, Gust and Miller is that they all ignore
the Bankruptcy Code’s distinctive treatment of secured and unsecured claims. There is
no such thing as an under-secured claim under the Bankruptcy Code. Section 506(a)
bifurcates a single under-secured claim into two separate claims: a secured claim to the
extent of the value of the collateral, and an unsecured claim for the deficiency.124 In most
cases, a secured claimant will not need priority in distribution vis à vis unsecured
creditors because the secured claim is fully covered by, and will be paid in full either
from the sale of collateral or, with interest, under the plan of reorganization.125 Indeed, a
secured creditor is entitled to a special super-priority if the court erroneously over-values
the collateral in finding the secured creditor to be adequately protected.126 It is only with
respect to gap period interest – the interest which would accrue between the time of the
filing of the petition and the date of confirmation – that the under-secured creditor bears a
potential risk loss on its secured claim.127 There should have been no issue if the taxing
authority in Victor, Gust, and Miller had been over-secured – section 506(b) would have
allowed gap period interest, and the estate would have had to pay the entire claim either
from the sale of the collateral, or pursuant to the terms of a plan of reorganization.128 On
the other hand, if the taxing authority had been under-secured, the unsecured portion of
the claim should have been entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), and would have
been non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(1). The three courts erred by failing to
address the fact that an under-secured creditor has a plain vanilla unsecured claim in
bankruptcy for the portion of the claim that is not covered by the value of the collateral.
They also erred by failing to address that the secured portion of the claim would have to
be paid either from the sale of the collateral or under a plan. The issue in Victor, Gust,
and Miller should have concerned only the narrow question of the taxing authority’s
entitlement to gap period interest on the secured portion of the claim. In any case, the
Gust and Miller courts correctly focused on the “of the kind” language in section
523(a)(1) to hold that gap period interest on a secured claim would be excepted from
discharge under the “of a kind” language, even though the claim would not itself be
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8).129
124

11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property . . . is a secured claim
to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less than the amount of such
allowed claim.”).
125
Under the reorganization chapters, the secured claim must be paid in full with interest from the effective
date of the plan. See §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (payments must total, and where the claim is fully secured
must have a “value as of the effective date of the plan” equal to, the allowed amount of secured claim);
1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (same); 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (same). The Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541
U.S. 465,467 (2004), interpreted “value as of the effective date of the plan” to require the payment of
interest at the prime rate plus a premium for the additional risk that a loan to the debtor carries over the risk
of a loan to a prime-rate-qualified borrower.
126
11 U.S.C. § 507(b).
127
If the creditor is over-secured, the creditor is entitled to recover post-petition gap period interest. 11
U.S.C. § 506(b).
128
See note 125.
129
As a general matter, it would appear that both an under-secured creditor and an unsecured creditor
would be treated the same – both would not be denied the right to recover gap period interest as a claim
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The same theory that allowed the Gust and Miller panels to find that gap period
interest, which was not entitled to priority under section 507(a), could still be “of the
kind” entitled to priority under 507(a)(8), should be used in interpreting the “of a kind”
language in section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). That is, even though a claim for taxes covered by a
late return filed more than two but fewer than three years before bankruptcy would not be
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1)(B), the taxes could still be “of a kind”
specified in section 523(a)(1)(B). Using a proper interpretation of the statutory language,
taxes covered by a late return filed more than two years but fewer than three years before
bankruptcy would be dischargeable. The taxes would not be excepted from discharge by
section 523(a)(1)(B), because the late return was filed more than two years before
bankruptcy. The taxes would also not be entitled to priority under section
507(a)(8)(A)(iii), because the only reason the taxes are assessable post-petition is because
a return was filed late – hence the kind of taxes addressed in section 523(a)(1)(B). Had
the return been filed timely, assessment would have been barred under applicable nonbankruptcy law by the three year limitations period. Since the sole reason the taxes are
assessable post-petition is because the return was filed late, the taxes would not be
entitled to priority under the post-petition assessability rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).130
In turn, if the taxes are not entitled to priority, they would not be excepted from discharge
against the estate. This is because section 502(b)(2) generally disallows claims for un-matured interest, and
the section 506(b) exception applies only to over-secured creditors.
However, it could be argued that section 502(i) allows an unsecured tax claimant holding a
priority claim under section 507(a)(8) to recover gap period interest. Section 502(i) says that a claim that
does not arise until after the case (here, the claim for post-petition interest) will be treated under section 502
as if it had arisen before the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 502(i). Does this mean that gap
period interest will be treated as having arising prepetition, in which case it would not constitute
“unmatured” interest? If so, then unsecured tax creditors holding priority claims would be entitled to gap
period interest, while under-secured tax creditors would only be entitled to gap period interest on the
unsecured portion of their claims (the secured portion of their claims would not be entitled to priority under
507, and therefore would not qualify for prepetition treatment under section 502(i). I could find no cases
directly addressing this issue. The bankruptcy court in In re Patch Press, Inc., 71 B.R. 345 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1987), suggested in dicta (it was considering whether interest was recoverable on a post-petition tax
claim) that “[s]ince tax claims can accrue post-petition, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(i), it is not unreasonable that
interest should also accrue post-petition as part of the claim.” Id. at 350. If this is a correct interpretation
of section 502(i), then an unsecured claim that is entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8) would also be
entitled to accrue gap period interest, while the secured portion of an under-secured creditor’s claim would
not.
However, several courts have held that section 502(i) was intended to cover only taxes relating to
prepetition activities for which the liability is deemed under applicable non-bankruptcy law to arise postpetition. These courts rejected the argument that section 502(i) applies to treat post-petition taxes as if they
arose prepetition (even though post-petition taxes fit within the literal language of section 502(i)). See,
e.g. In re St. Louis Freight Lines, Inc., 45 B.R. 546, 549 (Bankr. E.D. Mi. 1984) (following Collier on
Bankruptcy’s suggestion that section 502(i) was intended to cover only prepetition taxes that are assessed
post-petition); In re Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 45 B.R. 917, 925 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984).
Similarly, if section 502(i) was not intended to cover gap period interest (the liability for which, like postpetition taxes, does not come into existence until post-petition), then the treatment of the secured portion of
an under-secured tax lien would be treated the same as any unsecured tax claim – gap period interest would
not be recoverable. This is the preferable result to accord similarly situated creditors with equal treatment
in distribution.
130
See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (three year rule). If a longer period of limitations applies for a reason other than
the late-filing of the return, then there is an independent basis for priority and non-dischargeability. See
discussion, supra, at note 90.
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under section 523(a)(1)(A). The result intended by Congress – that taxes covered by late
returns filed more than two years before bankruptcy would be dischargeable – is
achieved. The court in Doss thus got the rule right – the taxes should be dischargeable
and not subject to priority. Unfortunately, the Doss court did a poor job of developing a
proper rationale for its holding.
Congress’ use of vague cross-references in section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (and in
section 523(a)(1)(A)) has created unnecessary confusion about whether claims arising
from late-filed returns are entitled to priority. Under a correct interpretation of the “of a
kind” language, a claim for taxes which is assessable post-petition solely because the
debtor failed to file a return, or filed a late return, should not be entitled to priority under
section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii), regardless of when the late return was filed. In order to make
sense of the statute, the “of a kind” language should be interpreted as a reference to the
general category of taxes discussed in the referenced statute, rather than to whether the
taxes in fact meet the specific test in the referenced statute.131
B.

Pre-petition Taxes in the Year of Bankruptcy.

On its face, all taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy – both prepetition and
post-petition – appear to be covered by the post-petition assessability rule of section
131

A second oddity caused by the vague reference in section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) to taxes “of a kind specified”
in section 523(a)(1)(C) concerns taxes for which the debtor substantially understated income. If the debtor
intentionally understated income, the government’s claim would likely be excepted from discharge under
section 523(a)(1)(C), which excepts from discharge tax claims with respect to which the debtor filed a
fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat the taxes. Since the claim is excepted from
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(C), it would likewise not be entitled to priority under the post-petition
assessability rule. But if the debtor unintentionally understated its income – no “fraud” or a “willful attempt
to evade or defeat” the taxes – then the taxes would not be excepted from discharge under section
523(a)(1)(C). Since not excepted from discharge, the taxes would be entitled to priority under the postpetition assessabilty rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) if assessable post-petition. The Tax Code provides for
a longer six year period of limitations on assessments when the debtor makes a “substantial
understatement” of income, even though the debtor lacked any wrongful intent in making the
understatement. See I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A). A “substantial understatement” occurs if the understatement
exceeds 25 percent of the income reported. I.R.C. § 6662(e)(1)(A). Thus, the statute would treat tax claims
arising from the debtor’s innocent error better vis à vis other creditors than tax claims arising from the
debtor’s intentional fraud. Worse, even though the unintentional understatement is not excepted from
discharge under 523(a)(1)(C), the claim would still be excepted from discharge through the back door of
section 523(a)(1)(A) (which excepts from discharge all claims entitled to priority). The Court in In re Zeig,
206 B.R. 974, 977 (Neb. 1997), allowed a debtor who had embezzled money to discharge the tax claim
under a Chapter 13 plan without providing for any payments on the claim. The government argued that the
result was perverse because the debtor would have had to pay the claim in full if the debtor’s “substantial
understatement” had been unintentional – the debtor would have been required to provide for full payment
of a priority claim in a Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). The Court nevertheless held for the
debtor. Zeig, 206 B.R. at 977 (“[T]he government argues that the bankruptcy court's decision produces a
perverse result in that debtors can benefit from their fraud and avoid paying their income tax debt. While
this may be the effect of the bankruptcy court's ruling . . . the bankruptcy code has produced similar
seemingly inequitable results. . . . [I]n those instances, Congress corrected the inequity. . . . [I]f the law
needs to be changed, Congress must change the law. That is not the job of the courts.”). There is, of
course, no good reason for giving the government a priority claim over other creditors if the debtor
commits an unintentional understatement within seven years of bankruptcy, but not to give priority if the
understatement was intentional. This is yet another example of the problems caused when Congress
references another body of law without understanding the implications of its reference.
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507(a)(8)(A)(iii). Taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy could not have been
assessed132 before the bankruptcy petition was filed, since the amount is only
determinable at the end of the tax year, and the taxes would be assessable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law after bankruptcy, since the three-year statute of limitations
on assessment does not even begin to run until, at the earliest, the due date of the return
for the taxes.133 Under this literal reading of the statute, post-petition taxes would never
be entitled to first priority as administrative expenses, because such taxes would always
132

A different issue was presented by the use of the term “assessed” with respect to property taxes. Under
some state laws, a property tax assessment is made before the taxes become a lien against the property and
the owner becomes liable for payment. Prior to the 2005 Act, property taxes “assessed” prepetition (and
not more than one year before bankruptcy) were entitled to eighth priority (11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(B), and
were thus not entitled to priority as administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(B)(i). The debtor
argued in In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., 270 F.3d 994 (6th Cir. 2001), that property taxes
incurred by the estate for a post-petition were not entitled to be treated as administrative expenses because
the taxes had been assessed under New York law prepetition. The panel struggled with the statutory
language and the obvious intent that the post-petition taxes be administrative expenses, ultimately adopting
a federal definition of “assessed” that focuses on the debtor’s liability for the taxes. Most other courts
considering the property tax issue adopted similar reasoning. See In re King, 961 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.
1992) (tax is not "assessed" until fixed and final); In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 124 B.R. 488, 494 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1991) ("assessed" refers to the date taxpayer's liability is determined, not prior date fixing value
of property); In re Kamstra, 51 B.R. 826, 833 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985) (same); In re Stroud, 37 B.R. 735,
741-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (assessed when taxed due, not when lien arises); In re Scrap Disposal, Inc.,
24 B.R. 178, 180 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) aff'd, 38 B.R. 765 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) ("assessment" occurs
when liability arises); In re Davis, 11 B.R. 621, 622-23 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) ("assessment" requires the
fixing of a tax liability, not merely valuing property). Earlier, several courts had focused on the date the
lien attaches. See In re Prairie Mining, Inc., 194 B.R. 248, 257 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995); In re Grivas, 123
B.R. 876, 881 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991); In re Point Rest. & Oyster Bar, 86 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1988). See also In re Members Warehouse, Inc., 991 F.2d 116, 118-19 (4th Cir. 1993) (adopting state law
definition of “incurred.”). While the courts differed on when precisely property taxes are “assessed” for
purposes of section 507(a)(8)(B), the court in In re Solomon Financial. Services., No. 91-4-3084, 1996
Bankr. LEXIS 1915 *9 (Bankr. Md. 1996), who of course followed the majority view, could find only one
published decision in which a court had found taxes to have been "assessed" on the date that the value of
the property was fixed – In re T & T Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 156 B.R. 780 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
In the 2005 Act, Congress ended the debate by amending section 507(a)(8)(B). Instead of using
the word “assessed,” Congress substituted the word “incurred,” thus properly focusing on the period to
which the taxes related. The property tax imbroglio may have been foremost on Congress’s mind when
moved up from section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) language granting priority only to taxes for years ending
prepetition. See discussion infra after note 265.
The proper definition of the word “assessed” is when the tax liability is reflected in the taxpayer’s
records as owing and becomes due and payable. I.R.C. §§ 6201, 6203 (recording in records). See Bull v.
United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); see also I.R.C. § 6331(a).
The problem of interpreting a poorly written statute to carry out the logical intent of Congress was
recently discussed by Judge Posner in In re Handy Andy Home Improvement Centers., Inc., 144 F.3d 1125,
1127 (7th Cir. 1998). The issue in Handy Andy was whether a landlord would be entitled to an
administrative claim for prepetition property taxes reimbursable under the lease by the tenant. Posner held
that the statutes must be viewed in context rather than in a hyper-technical way. See also Heathcon
Holdings, LLC v. Dunn Indus., LLC, 320 B.R. 86, 93 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (following Handy Andy in
requiring allocation of amounts accruing both prepetition and post-petition); but see In re Montgomery
Ward Holding Corp., 268 F.3d 205, 211 (3rd Cir. 2001) (applying what the court called a “bright line
test”).
133
See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (general rule that government has three years from the time a return is filed to
assess a deficiency). But returns filed before the due date for the return do not start the limitations period
running. See I.R.C. § 6501(b)(1) (return filed before due date is treated as filed on due date).
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be entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), and would thus be specifically excepted
from the definition of an administrative expense.134
This literal interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with the legislative
history,135 and has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.136 Those courts who offered
any reasoning at all to support their holding that Congress intended only prepetition taxes
to be covered by the post-petition assessability rule simply found that any other result
would be “absurd.”137
There is a way to reach the conclusion that taxes on post-petition income are not
entitled to priority under the post-petition assessability rule, without resorting to namecalling. Eighth priority is given only to “allowed unsecured clams.”138 This is a
reference to the claim allowance provision in section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code –
which provides for the allowance of claims that are in existence as of the petition date.139
As a general matter, claims that first arise for bankruptcy purposes after the petition date
are not “allowed claims” under section 502,140 and are thus not entitled to priority under
section 507(a)(8). Unlike section 502, which provides for “allowed claims,” post-petition
claims under section 503(a) and (b) are referred to as “administrative expenses.” The
134

11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (taxes incurred by the estate are administrative expenses “except a tax of a
kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title.”).
135
United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932, 934 (D. Kan. 1984) (“’The actual, necessary costs and expenses
of preserving the estate, including wages . . . rendered after the commencement of the case, and any taxes
on, measured by or withheld from such wages . . . are allowable as administrative expenses.’ S.Rep. No.
95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5852; H.R.Rep. No.
95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 355, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6311. The Senate
Report, supra, further states that ‘[i]n general, administrative expenses include taxes which the trustee
incurs in administering the debtor's estate.’”).
136
See, e.g. In re Westholt Mfg., Inc., 20 B.R. 368, 371 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (“a tax given priority status
under section 507(a)(6) and predicated on pre-petition liability incurred by the debtor before the filing of
the petition should not be promoted to a first priority administrative expense merely because it is assessed
after the petition is filed. On the other hand, actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate . . . should not be denied administrative status merely because in character the claims resemble
claims for taxes described in section 507(a)(6)”), aff’d United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932, 934 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1984) (stating that taxes are “incurred” when they accrue); In re L.J. O'Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d
1146, 1151 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We believe that subsection (iii) can be read, like the other subsections of
507(a)(7)(A), to address only prepetition taxable activity or events”); In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64
F.3d 1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting government’s argument that the panel’s interpretation of
507(a)(8)(A)(iii) would apply to all post-petition taxes: “[W]e will not presume Congress intended an
absurd result. . . . Taxes for periods which occur entirely post-petition are afforded an administrative
expense priority under § 503(b)(1)(B). Congress certainly did not intend for taxes earned entirely postpetition to be ‘relegated’ to seventh level priority”) (citations omitted); In re EMC Indus., Inc., 27 B.R. 696
(Bankr. D. S.C. 1983).
137
See, e.g. Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64 F.3d at 1303, quoted supra at note 136; see also In re O.P.M.
Leasing Servs., Inc., 68 B.R. 979, 983-84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
138
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
139
Section 502(b) provides that, after the filing of an objection, the court will allow claims after
determining “the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of
the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). Claims that did not exist as of the date of the filing of the petition would
not be allowed in any amount, because nothing was owing as of the petition date. This is to be
distinguished, of course, from claims which exist prepetition, but are not ripe for payment or enforcement
(such as contingent claims, unliquidated claims and unmatured claims). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (definition
of claim).
140
Id.
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priority granted by the post-petition assessability rule in section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) only
applies to “allowed claims” not to “allowed administrative expenses.”
This analysis begs the question about whether the taxes incurred in the year of
bankruptcy constitute prepetition tax claims or post-petition tax claims. The division is
easy if an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 or 11 case elects to make the split-year
election. When the election is made, the debtor’s tax year for the year of bankruptcy is
split into two tax years, consisting respectively of a prepetition “year” and a post petition
“year.”141 If the election is made, the taxes owed for the pre-petition partial “year” are
treated as Section 507(a)(8) pre-petition priority taxes,142 and taxes owed for the postpetition partial “year” are treated as 507(a)(1) administrative expenses if the benefit of
the income redounded to the estate, or as personal obligations of the debtor if the benefit
redounded to the debtor as part of the debtor’s “fresh start.”143
The complexity arises if the split year election is not (or, in the case of corporate
entities144 or individual debtors in Chapter 12 or 13 cases,145 cannot be) made. In cases
where the election is not or cannot be made, it is necessary to determine whether the
taxes for the year of bankruptcy are first priority administrative expenses, eighth priority
unsecured claims, somehow divisible between the two, or non-priority general unsecured
claims.
Income taxes that are entitled to eighth priority are automatically excluded from
being treated as first priority administrative expenses.146 Income taxes incurred in the
year of bankruptcy can only be entitled to eighth priority if the post-petition assessability
rule applies, because the other two priority-granting rules cannot apply to year-ofbankruptcy taxes when the split year election is not made. The lookback rule147 could
never apply to income taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, absent a split year
election or a petition filed on the last day of the tax year, because, by its terms, the rule
only applies to taxes “for a taxable year ending on or before the filing of the petition.”148
Unless the debtor files on the last day of the tax year, the year in which the petition is
filed will not have ended on or before the petition date. Similarly, income taxes incurred
in the year of bankruptcy could not have been assessed before bankruptcy under the 240141

I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2).
The taxes for the prepetition “year” of filing would be entitled to priority under both the lookback rule
(11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i)) and the post-petition assessability rule (11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii)). The
lookback rule would apply because the prepetition year terminated “on” the petition date, and the return for
the year would be due after the 3 year lookback period (indeed, the return would be due after the petition
was filed). The post-petition assessability rule would apply because the period of assessment would not
even begin to run until the return for the tax year is due. See supra note 133.
143
By definition, the taxes owing for the post-petition tax year were not incurred prepetition. To be
administrative expenses, the taxes must have been “incurred by the estate.” If the estate is “entitled to the
income” then the estate is taxed on the income (I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1)) and the debtor is not taxed on the
income (I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2)). If the estate did not get the income, then nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
would allow the government to have a claim against the estate for repayment.
144
Only individuals are eligible to make a split-year election. I.R.C. § 1398(a).
145
The election can only be made by debtors in Chapter 7 or 11 cases. Id.
146
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).
147
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i).
148
Prior to the 2005 Act, this language was in the lookback rule itself. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)(8)(A)(i)
(repealed 2005). After the 2005 Act, this language was moved to 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)(8)(A), and applies to
the lookback rule, the 240 day rule, and the post-petition assessability rule. As is discussed below, the
change only has an impact on the post-petition assessability rule.
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day rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).149 Therefore, the post-petition assessability rule of
section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) is the only provision in section 507(a)(8) that could apply to
income taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy (unless the debtor makes a split-year
election or files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year).
Does the post-petition assessability rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) apply to make
priority all or part of the taxes owing for the year of bankruptcy? First, as discussed
above, taxes on post-petition income should not be covered by the post-petition
assessability rule, because the taxes do not constitute “allowed unsecured claims.”150 So
the real question is whether taxes on income earned prepetition in the year of bankruptcy
will be covered by the post-petition assessability rule of section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).
Prior to the 2005 Act, courts applied different rules for corporations and for
individuals who did not make the split year election in deciding whether taxes on income
earned prepetition in the year of bankruptcy were covered by section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).
i.

Corporate Taxpayers.

The courts have consistently held that the obligation of corporate taxpayers151 to
pay taxes on income earned prepetition is covered by the post-petition assessability
rule,152 and is therefore not entitled to priority as an administrative expense.153 The issue
was considered at length by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re PacificAtlantic Trading Co. (“PATCO”).154 The PATCO panel considered whether corporate
income taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy would be treated as first priority
expenses of administration or as eighth priority claims under the post-petition
assessability rule. The debtor in PATCO did not operate post-petition, and therefore it
appeared that all income taxes owing for the year of bankruptcy were attributable to prepetition earnings. After carefully reviewing the legislative history, the PATCO panel first
determined that Congress intended all taxes for the year of bankruptcy be treated as
“incurred” on the last day of the taxable year.155 The Ninth Circuit panel’s focus on the
149

An assessment cannot be made until after the tax return for the year is due. See I.R.C. §§ 6201(a),
6213(a).
150
See supra beginning at note 132.
151
Note that, unlike an individual taxpayer, a corporate taxpayer does not receive a discharge under
Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1). This is because corporate taxpayers, unlike individual taxpayers, cease
to exist following liquidation in Chapter 7. The corporate taxpayer’s assets are sold, creditors are paid from
the proceeds, and only an inactive corporate shell remains. Individual debtors, on the other hand, continue
to live their lives and need the fresh start provided by the discharge.
In a Chapter 11 case, a corporate debtor may continue to operate after confirmation of a plan of
reorganization, and therefore needs the fresh start that a discharge provides. The Chapter 11 discharge for
corporations is broader than the Chapter 11 discharge for individuals. Corporations are able to discharge
obligations that would not be dischargeable to an individual. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(d)(1), 1141(d)(2)
(excepting from an individual debtor’s Chapter 11 discharge debts not dischargeable under section 523).
However, under the 2005 Act, the Chapter 11 discharge will not discharge corporate debtors from tax debts
arising out of fraudulent returns or willful attempts to evade or defeat taxes. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(6)(B)
(2005).
152
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).
153
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).
154
64 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1995).
155
Id. at 1301 (“The pertinent legislative history clearly demonstrates that the drafters of § 503(b)(1)(B)(i)
intended that a tax on income should be treated as "incurred" on the last day of the taxable period.”). The
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legislative history is curious,156 as nothing in the statute suggests that taxes accruing
prepetition in the year of bankruptcy should be treated as “incurred” at the end of the tax
year.157 The panel then held that although the taxes were deemed to have been “incurred”
by the estate post-petition, the taxes also fell within the literal wording of the postpetition assessability rule,158 and would therefore be an eighth priority claim and not
entitled to first priority as an administrative expense.
The government objected that the panel’s reading of the post-petition assessability
rule would treat all taxes incurred by the estate post-petition as eighth rather than first
priority – including taxes for years beginning after the petition date. Although the
government’s argument was logical, the PATCO panel called the argument “absurd.”159
The panel stated that it was following two other bankruptcy court opinions160 in holding
panel recognized that a New York bankruptcy court in In re O.P.M. Leasing Services., Inc., 68 B.R. 979,
983-84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), had previously concluded that taxes in the year of bankruptcy are incurred
as they accrue. The Panel rejected the O.P.M. Court’s interpretation because it had not considered
legislative history which, the panel believed, indicated an intent to adopt a definition of “incurred”
contained in the version of the Bankruptcy Code adopted by the Senate Finance Committee. The definition
proposed by the Senate Finance Committee was not included in the final version of bill which became law.
Nevertheless, the House and Senate managers discussing the final bill stated an intent to adopt the deleted
portion of the Senate Finance Committee’s version. As stated by the PATCO court: “final statements of
both House and Senate sponsors, Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini, reflect that Congress
intended that the compromise bill adopt the substance of the Senate Finance Committee's definition of
‘incurred.’” PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1300. Of course, it would be just as easy to conclude (regardless of what
the House and Senate managers intended), that by omitting the language from the bill, Congress intended
the accrual result determined by the bankruptcy court in O.P.M.. After all, if they intended to follow the
Senate Finance Committee’s definition, why was the language omitted? Both sides are attempting to
determine the meaning of Congress’ omission, which is a fruitless task. The legislative history is
ambiguous.
156
See discussion infra beginning at note 237 regarding the propriety of using legislative history to create an
ambiguity in the statute.
157
See In re Garfinckels, Inc., 203 B.R. 814, 820 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1996) (“Setting aside this court's concerns
about the dubious nature of [the PATCO panel] relying on unenacted proposed legislation.”); cf. United
States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (courts should look beyond the text of a statute
only in "rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds
with the intentions of its drafters") (citations omitted).
158
PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1302 (“The tax at issue, however, fits on its face within the narrow parameters set by
§ 507(a)(7)(A)(iii). Since § 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) is satisfied, PATCO's liability for the 1988 taxes is excepted
from § 503 and given seventh priority.”)
159
Like the taxes in the year of bankruptcy, taxes for an entirely post-petition year were not assessed before
and are assessable after the petition date. The PATCO panel rejected the government’s argument that,
under the panel’s theory, taxes for an entirely post-petition year would also fit within the post-petition
assessability rule: “We will not presume Congress intended an absurd result. . . . Taxes for periods which
occur entirely post-petition are afforded an administrative expense priority under § 503(b)(1)(B). Congress
certainly did not intend for taxes earned entirely post-petition to be "relegated" to seventh level priority
status. PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1303.
160
Id. at 1303-04 citing In re Interco, Inc., 143 B.R. 707 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992), aff’d sub nom. In re L.J.
O’Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995), discussed supra note 159, and In re O.P.M. Leasing
Services., Inc., 68 B.R. 979 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Interco, the court issued two orders regarding
priority claims. One order set a bar date for creditors holding priority claims other than administrative
claims to file proofs of claim with the court. The other order stated that administrative claimants were not
required to file claims by the priority claim bar date. The Missouri Department of Revenue did not file a
proof of claim for the year of bankruptcy, claiming that all of the taxes for the year of bankruptcy were
entitled to administrative priority. The Interco court ultimately split the baby, holding “that the taxes
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that income taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy would be treated as eighth priority
under the post-petition assessability rule.161 After determining that the post-petition
assessability rule applied to taxes for a prepetition period that are deemed to have been
incurred post-petition, it was a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation to hold
that the taxes were not entitled to administrative priority.162 The PATCO panel did not
adequately reconcile its ruling that the tax claim accrued post-petition (at the end of the
year) with its ruling that the taxes would be treated as a pre-petition eighth priority
claim.163
A few days after PATCO was filed, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
filed an opinion in In re L.J. O'Neill Shoe Company.164 Unlike the panel in PATCO, the
O’Neill Shoe panel did not address whether taxes on prepetition income would be
deemed to have been incurred post-petition.165 Like PATCO, however, the court held that

attributable to income earned prepetition receive the seventh level priority status described in Section
507(a)(7), and the taxes attributable to income earned after the petition date receive first priority
administrative expense status under Section 503(b)(1)(B).” Interco, 143 B.R. at 714. The court did not
indicate how the prepetition and post-petition tax liability (which, after all, is based on the application of
marginal rates) should be computed. The bankruptcy court’s decision in Interco was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the 8th Circuit in In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe, 64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995), discussed supra
note 159.
The O.P.M. court reached a similar allocation result by focusing on when the activity giving rise
to the tax liability occurred. If the activity occurred prepetition, then the taxes would be covered by
507(a)(8)(A)(iii) and would not be entitled to administrative priority. If the activity giving rise to the taxes
occurred after the petition date, then the taxes would be “incurred” by the estate and would be subject to
administrative priority. The only authority cited by the court for focusing on the activity giving rise to the
tax liability are cases involving tax years entirely prepetition or entirely post-petition. See O.P.M., 68 B.R.
at 983-84.
161
Id. at 1304 (“In conclusion, we hold that PATCO's 1988 income tax liability for income earned prior to
the granting of the order for relief and the appointment of the Trustee on October 31, 1988 does not qualify
as an administrative expense. Even though the taxes were "incurred by the estate" on December 31, 1988,
the plain meaning of the phrase "not assessed before, but assessable, under applicable law or by agreement,
after, the commencement of the case," persuades us that the 1988 tax claim fits squarely within the
definition of § 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) and is therefore not an allowable administrative expense.”)
162
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).
163
An additional issue in PATCO was whether the government’s priority tax claim was barred because the
government’s proof of claim was filed late. The panel in PATCO held that the claim was not barred
because, at the time, section 502 contained no provision for disallowing claims solely because the claims
were filed late. PATCO had followed the earlier holding of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
In re Vecchio, 20 F.3d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1994), that late filed priority tax claims were not barred by the
Bankruptcy Code and thus could not be barred by the Bankruptcy Rules. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit rejected the analysis of the Vecchio and PATCO panels, holding that Bankruptcy Rule 3002,
which requires creditors to file proofs of claim by the bar date, constitutes a separate substantive rule of law
sufficient to disallow the government’s late-filed priority claim. In re Chavis, 47 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir.
1995). The issue became moot for cases filed after Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), which added to the Bankruptcy Code a provision
disallowing most late-filed claims.
164
64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995).
165
Id. at 1149 (“We need not accept the debtors' invitation to reach the difficult question of whether the
portion of the tax attributable to prepetition income was "incurred by the estate," because like the courts
below, we conclude that the prepetition portion of the claim was for a tax of a kind specified in section
507(a)(7).”).
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prepetition taxes in the year of bankruptcy are covered by the post-petition assessability
rule, and are therefore excluded from discharge.166
The difficult problem for the O’Neill Shoe panel was addressing the government’s
argument that the court’s interpretation of the post-petition assessability rule would apply
it to all post-petition taxes. Like the panel in PATCO, the lower courts in O’Neill Shoe
had dismissed the government’s argument as “absurd.” The O’Neill Shoe panel,
however, expressed concern with the lower courts so easily dismissing the analogy as
“absurd.”167 To solve the interpretative dilemma, the O’Neill Shoe panel noted that the
other two provisions in section 507(a)(8) – the lookback rule168 and the 240 day
assessment rule169 – only apply to pre-petition conduct. Even though, prior to the 2005
Act,170 the post-petition assessability rule contained no such language, the O’Neill Shoe
panel suggested that Congress must have intended the post-petition assessability rule to
likewise apply only to taxes on prepetition income.171 While this may be a sensible
reading of Congressional intent, it is certainly not a reading mandated by the language of
the statute. Unlike subsections (i) and (ii) of section 507(a)(8)(A), which specifically
referred to, or could only applied to, tax liabilities for years ending prepetition,172
subsection (iii) made no such reference. The doctrine of Expresio unius est exclusio
alterius173 would lead to the opposite of the result suggested by the panel in O’Neill
Shoe.174
Moreover, the O’Neill Shoe panel did not wholly incorporate the theory used in
the lookback and 240 day rules. Had it done so, prepetition taxes incurred in the year of
bankruptcy would not be covered by section 507(a)(8) at all, since the lookback rule and
the 240 day rule only apply to taxes for years ending prepetition.175 While the O’Neill
Shoe panel’s partial incorporation of the lookback rule’s language into the post-petition
assessability rule solves the interpretative problem of entirely post-petition taxes falling
within the post-petition assessability rule, full incorporation would, as discussed below
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Id. at 1150.
L.J. O’Neill Shoe, 64 F.3d at 1150 (“We nevertheless agree with MDOR [the taxing authority] that the
‘plain meaning’ reading provided by the lower courts presents some conceptual difficulties and structural
inconsistencies in this case.”).
168
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i).
169
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).
170
The 2005 Act contains an amendment causing all three rules in section 507(a)(8) to apply only to taxes
for years arising post-petition. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2005) (flush language).
171
L.J. O’Neill Shoe, 64 F.3d at 1150 (“We believe that subsection (iii) can be read, like the other
subsections of 507(a)(7)(A), to address only prepetition taxable activity or events.”) .
172
See supra notes 147 - 149.
173
Literally, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581
(6th ed. 1990) ("[w]hen certain . . . things are specified in a law . . . an intention to exclude all others from
its operation may be inferred."). The doctrine is normally used with respect to lists, but similar reasoning
would apply where one part of a statute mentions an exclusion while another part does not.
174
The argument would be that by expressing that subsection (i) only applies to taxes for years ending
prepetition and not expressing a similar limitation in subsection (iii), Congress did not intend the limitation
to apply under subsection (iii). See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 n.9 (2004) (quoting 2A
N. Singer, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06, at 194 (6th ed. 2000) (“the usual rule [is]
that 'when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another,
the court assumes different meanings were intended.’”).
175
See supra notes 147 - 149.
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with respect to the 2005 Act,176 cause a more serious problem of excluding all taxes in
the year of bankruptcy from eighth priority treatment.
Other courts have followed PATCO and O’Neill Shoe in holding that taxes owing
by corporate debtors in the year of bankruptcy are to be split between the prepetition and
post-petition period, with the prepetition taxes entitled to eighth priority and the postpetition taxes entitled to first priority.177 Despite the holding of three circuit courts, the
Internal Revenue Service has continued to claim that all taxes incurred in the year of
bankruptcy are post-petition claims entitled to first priority as administrative expenses.178
In a series of scholarly articles published in the American Bankruptcy Institute
Law Review in 2001, three experts suggested various approaches for treating year-ofbankruptcy taxes in the corporate context. Professor Jacob L. Todres argued that
corporate taxes in the year of bankruptcy should be apportioned between the prepetition
period and the post-petition period based on time, ignoring whether the income being
taxed was in fact earned prepetition or post-petition.179 Professor Todres argued that the
time-based approach is consistent with the tax rules in other areas,180 and is consistent
with the language of I.R.C. section 1398, which allows only individuals to make the splityear election.181 Professor Todres agrees with PATCO that all straddle-year taxes were
“’incurred by the estate’ since a tax is always deemed incurred on the last day of the
taxable year.” 182 According to Professor Todres, the PATCO result is consistent with
both the Bankruptcy Code and the annual year concept of tax law. Professor Todres did
not explain how some taxes deemed to arise prepetition (namely, a portion of the taxes
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See discussion infra beginning at page 41.
See In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 116 F.3d 1391, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997); In re Quid Me
Broadcasting, Inc., No. 95-03876, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7581, *14-15, 78 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5039
(W.D.N.Y. 1996). See also In re Bayly Corp., 163 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s claim against the debtor for under-funding its pension plan was
not an obligation “incurred by the estate” within the meaning of section 503(b)(1)(B), and therefore panel
did not address whether the obligation constituted a “tax.” The panel suggested that it would follow OPM
Leasing rather than PATCO if the obligation was a tax by treating it as “incurred” when the liability
accrued rather than when the tax year ended. ) Id. at 1209.
178
See Memorandum for Associate Area Counsel, 2002 IRS CCA LEXIS 67, *11-13 (2002) (“[o]ur
position is that no provision of section 507(a)(8) includes the prepetition portion of income tax liability for
the straddle year”).
179
Jacob L. Todres, Tax Filing Year in Bankruptcy: Corporate Bankruptcy: Treatment of Filing Year
Income Tax – A Suggested Approach, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 523 (2001).
180
Professor Todres identifies five situations in which taxes must be apportioned: (1) an “S” corporation
shareholder’s interest in the corporation is terminated mid-year, (2) an “S” corporation’s status is
terminated mid-year, (3) a corporation that has gone through a change of control mid-year wishes to carryback net operating losses, but is limited by I.R.C. section 382 from carrying-back post-change-of-control
losses, (4) a corporation that enters or leaves a consolidated group mid-year cannot have post-departure tax
items attributed to the group’s consolidated return, and (5) a partner’s interest in a partnership is terminated
mid-year. Id. at 543-545. In the first three situations, the default rule is to allocate the year-end tax items
based on time, but in certain cases the parties can elect to close the tax year at the time of change. Id. The
opposite rule applies in the fourth situation: the default year requires the corporation to lose the tax year at
the time of change, but an election is available in certain circumstances to allocate. Id. In the fifth
situation, the Internal Revenue Code allows either allocation, closing the books, or any other method of
allocation that is reasonable.
181
Id. at 549.
182
Id. at 554. Professor Todres does not consider the effect of 11 U.S.C. section 502(i) on this conclusion.
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from the year of bankruptcy) could come within the language of the post-petition
assessability rule, while all other post-petition taxes would not.
Attorney Graham Stieglitz argued that the government’s claim for taxes should be
deemed to arise for bankruptcy purposes when the income giving rise to the claim was
earned, rather than at the end of the year when the tax claim arises under applicable nonbankruptcy tax law.183 Stieglitz thus rejects the interpretation made by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in PATCO and accepted by Professor Todres. Stieglitz
bases his argument on the definition of a “claim” under bankruptcy law, focusing on a
series of famous bankruptcy law tort cases that struggled with the question of whether the
claimant had a right to payment on the petition date.184
Professor Jack F. Williams summarized the two other articles, and suggested that
Congress decide whether income taxes incurred by a corporation in the year of
bankruptcy should be entirely treated as administrative expenses, should be divided
between the prepetition and post-petition periods based on mandating the filing of
separate returns, or should be allocated on the basis of time.185
Thus, under existing law, there is a split of opinion as to whether the
government’s claim for taxes on prepetition corporate income should be deemed to have
been incurred prepetition or post-petition. Regardless of the answer to this question,
however, every court to consider the issue has held that the claim for such taxes is not
entitled to administrative expense priority because the post-petition assessability rule
applies and relegates the taxes to eighth priority. The Internal Revenue Service has never
accepted the case law, and has continued to insist that corporate tax claims in the year of
bankruptcy be treated as first priority administrative expenses.186
Similarly, none of the cases has directly ruled on how the taxes incurred in the
year of bankruptcy are to be apportioned between the prepetition and post-petition
periods. Professor Todres has correctly identified two possible apportionment methods –
the “closing of the year” method in which the tax liability for transactions which occurred
prepetition would be determined separately from the tax liability for transactions which
occurred post-petition, and the allocation-based-on-time method in which the final year
of bankruptcy tax liability is apportioned based on the length in time in the prepetition
and post-petition periods.187 The former method would be inconsistent with the Internal
Revenue Code’s theory excluding corporations from making a split year election, because
the allocation would require the taxpayer to prepare two tax returns to identify the tax
effect of the income earned prepetition. Therefore, apportionment based on time is more
consonant with the statutory rules. Apportionment based on time also answers the
government’s argument that any apportionment would treat corporate taxpayers as if they
183

Graham Stieglitz, Mini-Symposium: Tax Filing Year in Bankruptcy: Stuck in the Middle Again! How
to Treat Straddle-Year Income Taxes in a Corporate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 467 (Winter 2001).
184
The bankruptcy court’s definition of a “claim” is discussed infra beginning at note 218. A stronger
argument in favor of Mr. Stieglitz’s view can be made by focusing on contract cases, which are more
directly relevant to tax liabilities than are the tort cases upon which Stieglitz relies. Id.
185
Jack F. Williams, Mini-Symposium: Tax Filing Year In Bankruptcy: Bifurcation for Claim Filing
Purposes of a Corporate Tax Year That Straddles the Petition Date, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463
(Winter 2001).
186
See supra note 178.
187
See discussion supra notes 179 - 182.

28

were eligible to make the split-year election. Unlike a split-year election, apportionment
based on time does not attempt to account separately for prepetition and post-petition
activity. For example, a non-electing debtor who filed bankruptcy at the end of March,
and owed $10,000 in taxes for full calendar year would owe one-quarter of the taxes
($2,500) for the pre-petition period, and three-quarters of the taxes ($7,500) for the postpetition period. The government would have a $2,500 claim entitled to eighth priority
under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii), and a $7,500 claim entitled to first priority as an
administrative expense. This would be true even if all of the activity giving rise to the tax
occurred prepetition. Under the closing-of-the-year method, all of the taxes in this event
would be subject to eighth priority, and none would be eligible for treatment as first
priority administrative expenses. An allocation based on time would harmonize the
statutory provisions while making an appropriate distinction between creditors who make
a split year election (and thus allocate pre- and post-petition taxable activity), and those
who do not make the election.
While allocating year-of-bankruptcy taxes based on time best harmonizes the
existing statutory rules, Congress should consider changing the law to require all
taxpayers to split the year of bankruptcy into two taxable years. There would be
significant advantages to mandating a split-year return. Most importantly, a split-year
return would eliminate confusion as to the amount and treatment of prepetition and postpetition claims. The existing system, which allows individual taxpayers in Chapter 7 and
11 cases to elect whether they wish to split their returns or not, likely results in lower tax
revenues, because debtors can be expected to make the election only when it will reduce
their tax liabilities. Similarly, if prepetition and post-petition claims are prorated on the
basis of time, the claim amounts will not properly reflect prepetition and post-petition
economic activity. The only disadvantage of requiring a split-year election is that debtors
will be required to do the extra work of preparing two partial-year tax returns. Under
existing law, individual taxpayers are already strongly incentivised to make the split-year
election,188 and all taxpayers must prepare segregated prepetition and post-petition
financial records in order to comply with the rules of bankruptcy procedure.189 Therefore,
the additional expense from mandating a short-year tax return would likely not be very
significant. On balance, mandating a split-year return makes the most sense because it
would accurately tax and treat prepetition and post-petition activities, would minimize
manipulation, and would not impose an undue burden on taxpayers who are already
required to maintain segregated financial records. By mandating separate tax returns for
the prepetition and post-petition period, the priority given to the government’s claims
would accurately reflect the debtor’s economic activity, would limit opportunities for tax
manipulation, and would not impose a significant hardship on debtors..
ii.

Individual Taxpayers Who Do Not Make The SplitYear Election.
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See discussion infra beginning at note 245.
See, e.g. Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(1) (debtor must file schedules of assets, liabilities, current income
and expenditures; 2015(a) (requiring debtors to file, among other things, monthly operating reports and
reports of disbursements); 11 U.S.C. § 704(8) (required monthly operating reports).
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The courts have applied an entirely different set of rules to individual debtors who
do not make the split-year election. Instead of holding that the prepetition taxes are
entitled to eighth priority under the post-petition assessability rule,190 the courts have
consistently held that the prepetition taxes do not constitute a claim against the estate at
all, and the debtor is solely liable for them.191 The courts considering this issue have
relied on a statement in a committee report to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, which
suggests that the entire tax liability for the year of bankruptcy is to be treated outside of
bankruptcy, and should not be a liability of the estate: “If the debtor does not make the
[section 1398 split-year] election, no part of the debtor's tax liability from the year in
which the bankruptcy case commences is collectible from the estate, but is collectible
from the individual debtor.”192 Many courts have followed this legislative history in
holding that the bankruptcy estate has no liability for taxes of an individual debtor
incurred in the year of bankruptcy if the debtor does not make the split-year election.193
190

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii).
See, e.g. In re Haedo, 211 B.R. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (if debtor does not make the split-year election
“the entire liability for the year of the bankruptcy filing is a claim against the debtor but is not collectible
from the estate”); In re Prativadi, 281 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Johnson, 190 B.R.
724, 726 (Bankr. Mass. 1995) (“The Debtors' failure to make the election under section 1398 leaves the
IRS with a post-petition tax claim against the Debtors individually, with no claim whatsoever against their
bankruptcy estate for any part of the 1992 tax liability”); In re Pflug, 146 B.R. 687, 689 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1992); In re Moore, 132 B.R. 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re Mirman, 98 B.R. 742, 744-745 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1989); In re Turboff, 93 B.R. 523, 525 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); see also In re Canon, 130 B.R.
748, 751 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (“The United States contends that the Trustee is not entitled to the 1988
refund because the estate has no liability for the Debtor's 1988 taxes. However, liability for unpaid taxes is
not at issue here because withholdings made both prepetition and post-petition satisfied the tax liability for
the year in which the Debtor filed his Chapter 7 petition. Furthermore . . . a trustee has a right to demand an
apportioned share of the refund if the debtors are entitled to a refund for the tax year in which the petition is
filed.”); accord In re Weir, No. 85-40456-7, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 778, *9, 71 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 4724
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1990).
However, in In re Wood, 240 B.R. 609 (C.D. Cal. 1999), the district court applied a different rule
in a Chapter 11 case. First, the Wood court stated in accordance with the other cases involving non-electing
individuals that the prepetition taxes for the year of bankruptcy would not constitute a claim against the
estate. The debtor argued that since the taxes were due prior to the confirmation of the plan, and the
government had failed to obtain payment through the plan, the taxes were dischargeable in Chapter 11. To
avoid having the taxes be discharged, the court first suggested that the taxes would be entitled to first
priority treatment as administrative expenses, and thus would be excepted from discharge. “There is no
question that the tax liability would be a nondischargeable debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).” Id at 613
n.36. The two rulings conflict with each other. If the estate is not liable for the taxes, then the taxes cannot
constitute administrative expenses. To be administrative expenses, the taxes must be “incurred by the
estate.” See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). Moreover, administrative expenses are not excepted from
discharge under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)(B) (covering only “taxes entitled to
priority under 507(a)(8)); § 1141 (discharge of claims arising priority to confirmation, except taxes of an
individual excepted from discharge under section 523(a)). The court used conclusionary language to
obfuscate the statutory rules in order to prevent the debtor from discharging under Chapter 11 taxes that
would not be dischargeable under Chapter 7. A consistent application of the rule stated in the legislative
history – that the taxes are not an obligation of the estate, but instead are a personal obligation of the debtor
arising at the end of the tax year – should have resulted in the discharge of the taxes not dealt with under
the plan.
192
S. Rep. No. 96-1036 at 26, 1980-2 C.B. 620, quoted in In re Prativadi, 281 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. W.D.
N.Y. 2002); In re Johnson, 190 B.R. 724, 727 (Bankr. Mass 1995). This was the Senate Report issued in
connection with the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389.
193
See supra note 191.
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The court’s treatment of prepetition taxes in the year of bankruptcy is wrong for a
number of reasons. First, the courts have treated this legislative history as if it were itself
law, without explaining how this result can be reached under the existing statutory
provisions. Indeed, there is no solid basis under the existing statutory rules for the
disparate treatment of corporations and individuals who do not make the split-year
election with respect to prepetition taxes. Individuals in Chapter 7 and 11 cases who do
not make the split-year election, and individuals in Chapter 12 and 13 cases and
corporations who are ineligible to make the split year election, are treated as having their
taxable year determined without regard to the filing of the bankruptcy case.194 The only
difference between the treatment of non-electing individuals and corporations is that
there is cleavage between an individual debtor and the estate in Chapter 7 and 11 cases as
to post-petition taxes,195 while there is no cleavage between individual debtors in
Chapters 12 and 13 and corporate debtors on the one hand, and the estate on the other
hand, as to post-petition taxes.196 This is because there is no separate identity between a
Chapter 12, Chapter 13 or corporate debtor and the estate, while there is a separate
identity between an individual debtor in Chapter 7 and 11 and the estate.197 An
individual receives a fresh start under Chapter 7 and 11, and may thus have income and
deductions separate from the estate. A corporation (or an individual in Chapter 12 or 13),
on the other hand, has no separate existence. While there is a basis for different treatment
of post-petition obligations, nothing in the statute198 requires special treatment for nonelecting individual Chapter 7 or 11 taxpayers with respect to prepetition items.
Second, the language in the cited legislative history could be applied equally to
corporations who do not make the split-year election (because they are ineligible to do
so) and individuals who are eligible but choose not to elect.
Third, disallowing a claim against the estate for prepetition taxes is bad policy.
The prepetition income that is being taxed (to the extent it has not been dissipated) is
property of the estate. Disallowing a claim against the estate puts the government at a
disadvantage vis à vis other unsecured creditors in recovering a distribution from the
estate. In Chapter 7 cases, the government might not care about losing a claim against
the estate because the debtor remains personally liable for payment of the taxes because
only prepetition “claims” are discharged,199 and by definition the tax liability is not being
treated as a prepetition “claim.” However, the government could well suffer a loss if the
debtor had no post-petition assets or non-exempt earnings from which to pay the taxes.
Fourth, disallowing a claim against the estate creates confusion under the Chapter
11 discharge. The discharge under Chapter 11 applies to claims against the debtor arising
194

See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(1).
See I.R.C. § 1398(e).
196
I.R.C. § 1399.
197
See In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 443 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994), citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-833 at 19 n.2
(1980) (“The individual may obtain new assets or earn wages after transfer of the pre-bankruptcy property
to the trustee and thus derive income independent of that derived by the trustee from the transferred assets
of the bankruptcy estate as in chapter 7 and exempt property may be used to make payments to creditors,
and hence the bankruptcy law does not create the same dichotomy between after-acquired assets of the
individual debtor and assets of the bankruptcy estate as in chapter 7 or chapter 11 cases.”).
198
I.R.C. § 1398; 1399.
199
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (discharge applies to prepetition “debts,” which are defined in section 101(12 )
as liability on a “claim.”).
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prior to the date that the plan of reorganization was confirmed (and thus includes postpetition claims arising prior to confirmation).200 If, as the cases hold, the government has
no prepetition “claim” against a non-electing individual debtor’s bankruptcy estate,201
and, furthermore, the government is not entitled to an administrative expense priority
because the taxes were not “incurred by the estate,”202 then the debtor should be able to
discharge the post-petition non-priority taxes under a plan of reorganization.203 Surely,
such a result was not intended.
Presumably, the courts would support their decision disallowing any tax claim
against the estate of a non-electing individual debtor for the year of bankruptcy by
arguing that the statute says that the debtor has a single tax year, and that under
applicable non-bankruptcy tax law the claim for taxes is deemed to have been “incurred”
at the end of the year – post-petition.204 Because the “claim” is deemed to arise postpetition, no claim is allowed under section 502. Although there is nothing in the Tax
Code itself that says that taxes are deemed to have been “incurred” at the end of the tax
year, it is of course true that a year’s tax liability cannot be determined until the year is
completed.205 The corporate cases have not been consistent in determining when taxes
are incurred. In support of its conclusion that taxes for the year of bankruptcy were
200

11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
See supra note 191.
202
See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1)(B).
203
For example, assume a debtor files bankruptcy in June, 2005, and owes $60,000 in taxes for the 2005
year, half of which was attributable to prepetition income. If the debtor is able to confirm a plan in
December 2006 that provides for 20% distribution to unsecured creditors, can the debtor discharge the
$30,000 prepetition tax liability by paying only $6,000? It would appear under the courts’ rulings that the
government has no prepetition claim against the estate on account of taxes on income earned prepetition.
Similarly, none of the taxes on prepetition income was incurred “by the estate,” since the estate did not
exist prepetition, and thus the government would not be entitled to recover administrative expenses on
account of the prepetition taxes. Since the government is not entitled to a priority claim, it would appear
that the liability could be discharged under Chapter 11 – something Congress certainly did not intend.
There are several coherent ways around the problem, however. Under the so-called “best interests
of creditors” test, the plan can be confirmed only if non-accepting creditors receive at least as much in
value as they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date of the plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). If a new Chapter 7 case were to be filed on the effective date of the plan, the
prepetition taxes would be entitled to priority under 507(a)(8) (since the claim would have arisen
prepetition), and thus the creditor would be entitled to full payment of the claim (albeit over six years).
Thus, by making no distribution on account of the claim, the plan fails the best interests of creditors test.
Alternatively, the court could find that the plan fails the good faith tests. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(2), (a)(3).
The courts that have considered this issue have simply ruled that the plan could not be confirmed without
paying the claims in full. See In re Johnson, 190 B.R. 724, 728 (Bankr. Mass. 1995); In re Wood, 240 B.R.
609, 613 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (stating, without any analysis, that “There is no question that the tax liability
would be a nondischargeable debt” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)).
204
Interestingly, some of the courts applying the legislative history in the individual context have rejected
the notion that the prepetition taxes in the year of bankruptcy were incurred at the end of the year. See In re
Johnson, 190 B.R. at 726 (“Although the term "incurred" is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, the clear
weight of authority holds that federal income taxes are incurred at the time they accrue as opposed to the
time payment is due for section 503(b)(1)(B) purposes.”).
205
See Todres, supra note 179, at 533 (“From a tax standpoint, it normally makes no sense to attempt to
determine how much tax was incurred in a portion of the tax year, since the tax consequences are
dependent upon what happens during the remainder of the taxable year”); PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1299 (noting
that “the statutory language is unclear [as to when a tax claim arises, so] we look to legislative history to
glean Congress' intent”).
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“incurred” on the last day of the tax year, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
PATCO relied on statements about the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1978 made by the
House and Senate managers after the conference amendments were completed.206 These
statements reflected language contained in the Senate Finance Committee’s report on an
earlier draft of the bill, which included a provision specifying that income taxes were to
be deemed “incurred” for bankruptcy purposes at the end of the tax year.207 The Senate
Finance Committee’s language to which the statements referred was deleted at the
conference level and did not become part of the Bankruptcy Code.208 The PATCO panel
relied on the statements as if the deletion was an oversight. With equal force, one could
argue that the deletion of this language suggests an intent by Congress that the taxes not
be treated as “incurred” at the end of the tax year. There is simply no clear authority for
treating prepetition taxes in the year of bankruptcy as being “incurred” at the end of the
year.209 Indeed, the majority of the courts to consider the issue have rejected the PATCO
panel’s analysis by holding that taxes are “incurred” as they accrue.210
Interestingly, the court in In re Johnson,211 one of the cases following the
legislative history by disallowing any claim against the bankruptcy estate for taxes owing
by a non-electing individual,212 held that taxes are incurred as they accrue (rather than at
the end of the year). The debtor in Johnson filed a petition under the reorganization
provisions of Chapter 11, and did not make the split-year election. The debtor sought to
treat the prepetition taxes owing for the year of bankruptcy as eighth priority taxes under
the post-petition assessability rule, rather than as first priority administrative expenses,
because debtor could confirm a plan to pay eighth priority taxes over six years,213 while
the debtor would have had to pay first priority administrative expenses in cash on the
206

PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1300.
S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 346(a) (1978) (as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee), reprinted in Collier on Bankruptcy, Appendix Volume 3 at VII (15th ed. 1995)
(“[A] tax on or measured by income or gross receipts for a taxable period shall be considered incurred on
the last day of the taxable period.”).
208
PATCO, 64 F.3d at 1300.
209
In a so-far unsuccessful attempt to obtain first priority administrative expense treatment for corporate
taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, the government has consistently argued that taxes are incurred at
the end of the tax year. See supra note 178. As is discussed below, if the government’s argument is
successful but the taxes are not accorded administrative expense priority under applicable bankruptcy, the
government will be relegated to having a dischargeable general unsecured claim.
210
See, e.g. In re Redmond, 36 B.R. at 934 (“For purposes of determining when the taxes were incurred, it
is the date the taxes accrued rather than the date of assessment which controls.”); In re Hillsborough
Holdings Corp., 156 B.R. at 320, aff’d on other grounds, 116 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 1997); In re O.P.M.
Leasing Services, Inc., 68 B.R. 983-84 ; see also In re Interco, Inc., 143 B.R., 714 (“Congress . . . directed
that certain claims which were technically incurred post-petition should nevertheless be excluded (at least
in part) from first level priority status to reflect their prepetition connections.”).
211
In re Johnson, 190 B.R. at 726.
212
Because the claim was not dischargeable, the court held that the debtor was required to pay the claim in
full under the plan (even though the government had no claim against the debtor’s estate). Johnson, 190
B.R. at 728 (“[T]his Court finds that the Debtors' 1992 tax liability to the IRS can only be collected from
the Debtors or from their post-petition income for services performed after the filing of the Chapter 11.
Moreover, the Debtors' Chapter 11 plan must provide for payment of these taxes, as their payment is
integral to the feasibility and good faith requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129.”) (citations omitted).
213
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (repealed 2005). Under the 2005 Act, eighth priority taxes must be paid in
regular installments over five years following the date the petition was filed, unless the debtor treats other
nonpriority unsecured creditors in a more favorable way. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(C) (2005).
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effective date of the plan.214 The Johnson court agreed with the debtor that the taxes
were “incurred” as they accrued, but rejected the argument that the taxes therefore were
covered by the post-petition assessability rule. The Johnson court held instead that the
split year election rules somehow mandate that the taxes incurred in the year of
bankruptcy not constitute a claim against the estate.215 The Johnson court did not explain
why treating the prepetition taxes as eight priority claim would thwart the split-year
election rules. Presumably, the court believed that granting an eighth priority would treat
electing and non-electing debtors the same way – a belief that is not well grounded.216
Ultimately, the Johnson court held that the taxes were personal obligations of the debtor
that could not be restructured under the plan. The Johnson court did not consider that its
ruling would appear to make the taxes dischargeable, since confirmation of a Chapter 11
plan discharges all claims against the debtor arising prior to the confirmation date and not
dealt with by the plan.217
More importantly, the Johnson court’s analysis wrongly focuses entirely on the
label attached to the claim by the tax law, and ignores the Bankruptcy Code’s definition
of a “claim.” A “claim” is broadly defined in the Bankruptcy Code to include any right
to payment, even if unliquidated, contingent and unmatured.218 The legislative history
says that Congress intended this language to be interpreted in the broadest possible
way.219 While applicable non-bankruptcy law determines whether a claimant has a
substantive right to payment, the timing of the claim for bankruptcy purposes is a
question of federal bankruptcy law, and is not governed by the label attached to the claim
by non-bankrutpcy law.220 In tort cases, some courts have focused exclusively on
214

See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A).
Johnson, 190 B.R. at 727 (“the cases cited by the Debtors [for the proposition that the prepetition taxes
in the year of bankruptcy fall within the post-petition assessability rule] are corporate cases, not individual
cases, or do not involve income taxes, and section 1398 is inapplicable to corporations. The allocation
scheme advocated by the Debtors circumvents their failure to make the election afforded them by section
1398(d)(2). Therefore, in the context of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases involving individual debtors, such
an allocation scheme contravenes the provisions of the Tax Reform Act.”).
216
See discussion supra after note 187.
217
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (Confirmation of a plan “discharges the debtor from any debt that arose
before the date of such confirmation.”).
218
11 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5)(A).
219
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 at 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. Rep. No. 95989 at 21-2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08 (“By the broadest possible definition
and by the use of the term throughout [the Bankruptcy Code] . . . the bill contemplates that all legal
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the
bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.”)
220
See Ralph R. Mabey & Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville: A Critique by the National Bankruptcy
Conference's Committee on Claims and Distributions, 42 BUS. LAW. 697, 704 (1987) (“state law labels
established for an entirely different purpose should not be determinative of when a claim arose for purposes
of its treatment in bankruptcy,” citing Thomas A. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
48-49 (1986)). Only the Third Circuit has suggested that state law labels of when a claim “accrues” should
be controlling in Bankruptcy. In the now infamous case of In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 335-36
(3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985), the panel held that an accounting firm could not assert
an equitable indemnity claim against the debtor for providing the accounting firm with false information
until a claim giving rise to indemnity is brought against the accounting firm. The panel also held that
because the indemnity “claim” did not arise under state law prepetition, the accounting firm was not
prevented by the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)) from suing the debtor. The Third Circuit has
continued to apply Frenville despite severe criticism from academics and other circuits. See Jones v.
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whether the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred prepetition.221 Most courts have
required a showing that the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred prepetition, and that
a sufficient relationship existed between the claimant and the debtor/tortfeasor so that it
would be fair to expect the debtor to discover the injury and file a proof of claim in the
bankruptcy case.222 Attorney Graham Stieglitz has concluded that the government has a
“claim” for taxes owing prepetition in the year of bankruptcy under either the conduct
test or the relationship test.223
While the tort cases are instructive, possibly of more relevance are the contract
cases. A bankruptcy “claim” is deemed to arise in contract cases when the contract is
entered into, even though no breach has occurred and even though the damages from a
future breach would be difficult to determine. In a famous case under the
reorganizations provisions of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,224 the debtor
had guaranteed that its affiliated corporations would perform their obligations under
long-term real property leases. The issue in the case was whether landlords had “claims”
against the debtor under the guarantees when the tenants were not in default at the time of
bankruptcy, and might never default. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized that in a regular liquidation proceeding under the 1989 Act, the creditors
would not have had prepetition dischargeable claims, because in liquidation proceedings
under the 1898 Act claims had to be “provable,” and unliquidated claims were not
Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 206 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court held [in Frenville] that in most
circumstances a "claim" arises for bankruptcy purposes at the same time the underlying state law cause of
action accrues. We are cognizant of the criticism the Frenville decision has engendered, but it remains the
law of this circuit.”)
Courts in all of the other circuits have either specifically rejected Frenville or have adopted
theories inconsistent with Frenville. See, e.g., In re Parker, 313 F.3d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
Frenville); In re Jastrem, 253 F.3d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting Frenville); In re Andrews, 239 F.3d
708, 710 n.7 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The Third Circuit has taken a narrower view of "claim," but this approach
has been universally rejected.”) (citation to Frenville omitted); In re Manville Forest Prods., 209 F.3d 125,
129 (2d Cir. 2000) (claim will be deemed to have arisen pre-petition if "the relationship between the debtor
and the creditor contained all of the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation – 'a right to
payment' – under the relevant non-bankruptcy law"); Butler v. NationsBank, N.A., 58 F.3d 1022, 1029 (4th
Cir. 1995) (“we have explicitly declined to follow the reasoning of Frenville, stating, ‘We have found no
court outside the Third Circuit which has followed the reasoning and holding of Frenville,’”citing Grady v.
A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260 (1988)); In re Piper Aircraft
Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1576 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Frenville); In re Hemingway Transp., 954 F.2d
1, 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (“more recent decisions consistently have declined to accept the Frenville reasoning
and its failure to accord full breadth to the term "claim"); Signature Combs, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.
Supp. 2d 1028, 1033-34, 1038 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (rejecting Frenville); Am Int'l v. Datacard Corp., 146
B.R. 391, 405-06 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (rejecting Frenville); In re Transp. Sys. Int'l, 110 B.R. 888, 894 (D.
Minn. 1990) (rejecting Frenville).
221
See Grady, 839 F.2d 198 at 201 n.4 (plaintiff who used defective Dalkon Shield manufactured by
debtor pre-petition had a “claim” in bankruptcy even though plaintiff did not know she was sick at time of
bankruptcy).
222
See, e.g., Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. Ill. 2000); Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d at 1577 (“an
individual has a § 101(5) claim against a debtor manufacturer if (i) events occurring before confirmation
create a relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact, or privity, between the claimant and the debtor's
product; and (ii) the basis for liability is the debtor's prepetition conduct”); In re Parks, 281 B.R. 899, 90203 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002).
223
See Stieglitz, supra at note 183, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV at 484-490.
224
In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum, 106 F.2d 22 (2nd Cir. 1939).
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“provable.”225 However, claims that existed as of the petition date were dischargeable
under the reorganization provisions of Section 77B of the 1898 Act, even though they
were not provable.226 The Second Circuit panel held that the claim arose when the
contract was entered into, even though the claim was not ripe under applicable nonbankruptcy law.227 The Bankruptcy Code incorporated a definition of a “claim” similar to
the definition used in Section 77B of the 1898 Act.228 It is generally accepted now that
contract claims are deemed to arise for bankruptcy purposes when the contract was
executed.229
Tax liability is more like contract liability than tort liability. The debtor knows
when it earns income that it will have to pay taxes on that income. A known obligation
to pay taxes on the income exists when the income is earned, even though the amount of
tax may depend on future events, and the due date for payment is in the future. These
factors simply mean that the tax claim is unliquidated and unmatured. But the obligation
to pay has been incurred when the income is earned: the fact triggering tax liability (the
incurrence of income) had incurred, and the taxpayer is aware of the obligation to pay
taxes on earned income. Although the obligation to pay is set by law rather than contract,
the contract cases are more apt because the obligation to pay becomes fixed when the
income is earned, and does not depend on future events or discovery to ripen into an
obligation. The difficult problems in tort cases – the existence of harm caused by the tort
and the fairness of requiring the victim to identify both the injury and the identity of the
tortfeasor at the time of bankruptcy – do not exist with respect to income taxes. The
taxpayer knows upon earning income of the obligation to pay taxes, and knows to whom
the taxes will be owed. Because the government has an unliquidated and unmatured right
to payment when the income is earned, a claim exists for bankruptcy purposes and should
be respected. Treating a tax claim on income earned prepetition as if it arose post225

Id. at 26 (“The claims based on the debtor's guaranties were wholly contingent and indeterminate in
amount, there having been no default under the leases and no predictable prospect of a default. In ordinary
bankruptcy such claims would not be provable or dischargeable to any extent. In re F. & W. Grand 5-10-25
Cent Stores, 2 Cir., 70 F.2d 691.”).
226
Id. (“In a proceeding under section 77B, however, they are claims subject to reorganization. . . .
"'[C]reditors' shall include for all purposes of this section and of the reorganization plan, its acceptance and
confirmation, all holders of claims of whatever character against the debtor or its property . . . whether or
not such claims would otherwise constitute provable claims under this title.")
227
Radio-Keith-Orpheum, 106 F.2nd at 26.
228
11 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5)(A) (“The term ‘claim’ means . . . right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.”) .
229
See In re Manville Forest Prod. Corp., 209 F.3d at 129 (“Under contract law, a right to payment based
on a written indemnification contract arises at the time the indemnification agreement is executed”); In re
Houbigant, Inc., 188 B.R. 347, 358-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[A] contractual indemnification claim
exists as a contingent claim against the indemnitor as of the date the indemnification agreement is
executed."); see also In re Hemingway Trans., Inc., 954 F.2d 1, 9 n.9 (1st Cir. 1992); see also In re M.
Frenville Co., 744 F.2d at 336 (3d Cir. 1984) (In distinguishing equitable indemnity claims from
contractual indemnity claims, the panel stated: “Such a surety relationship is the classic case of a
contingent right to payment under the Code -- the right to payment exists as of the signing of the
agreement, but it is dependent on the occurrence of a future event. When parties agree in advance that one
party will indemnify the other party in the event of a certain occurrence, there exists a right to payment,
albeit contingent, upon the signing of the agreement"); In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 954 F.2d 1, 9 n.9
(1st Cir. 1992).
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petition at the end of the tax year does violence to the principles underlying the
bankruptcy claims process.
Finally, most courts have failed to consider the purpose of section 502(i).230
Section 502(i) says that tax claims that are deemed to “arise” post-petition, and are
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8), are to be treated for allowance or
disallowance as if they had arisen prepetition.231 Section 502(i) was intended to cover tax
claims for prepetition activities that are not deemed to “arise” until post-petition.232 The
prepetition portion of the government’s income tax claim for the year of bankruptcy is
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii), because the taxes are assessable postpetition.233 Prior to the 2005 Act,234 Section 502(i) should have treated the government’s
claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes as an allowed prepetition
claim, even though the taxes technically may have arisen under applicable nonbankruptcy law post-petition – at the end of the tax year.
However, the only court to consider the effect of section 502(i) in this context, In
re Mirman,235held that section 502(i) should be ignored because it is contrary to the
statement in the committee report that the government should have no claim against the
estate of a taxpayer who does not make the split year election for year-of-bankruptcy
taxes.236 In essence, the court held that a statement from a committee report trumps the
plain wording (and the legislative history) of the statute.
While the proper role of legislative history in judicial decision making has been
the subject of substantial debate,237 the Supreme Court has made it clear that statements
230

The only court to consider 502(i) in connection with a non-electing individual debtor is In re Mirman.,
98 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), discussed infra note 235.
231
11 U.S.C. § 502(i).
232
See In re St. Louis Freight Lines, Inc., 45 B.R. at 549 (following Collier on Bankruptcy’s suggestion
that section 502(i) was intended to cover only prepetition taxes that are assessed post-petition); In re
Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 45 B.R. at 925; see also In re Miller, 363 F.3d at 1009, discussed
supra beginning at note 119 (suggesting that the Victor court’s analysis ignores the plain meaning of
section 502(i), which is to treat a prepetition tax claim which is deemed to arise post-petition under
applicable non-bankruptcy law as an allowed prepetition claims).
233
See discussion supra beginning at note 132.
234
Under the 2005 Act, eighth priority will only be given to tax claims for years that end prepetition. See
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (flush language) (2005). Therefore, the only tax claims in the year of bankruptcy
that can possibly be eligible for eighth priority treatment will be the prepetition portion of taxes owing by
an individual debtor who makes a split-year election, and taxes owing by debtors who file bankruptcy on
the last day of the tax year. In both cases, the taxes will arise prepetition not post-petition, and therefore
502(i) will not be needed. It therefore appears that section 502(i) has been turned into dead wood with
respect to income taxes.
235
98 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
236
Id. at 745 (holding that section 502(i) only applies if the debtor makes the split-year election. Note,
however, that section 502(i) would not apply to the prepetition claim against a debtor who makes the splityear election, because the tax claim for the prepetition portion of the year would arise pre-petition, not postpetition).
237
For some time, the justices of the Supreme Court have debated the proper role of legislative history in
judicial decision making. For example, in Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993), the Supreme Court
cited legislative history to support its conclusion that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940
tolled the time period for a military officer to redeem property from foreclosure while the officer was in
military service, regardless of whether the military service hindered the officer’s ability to redeem the
property. In overruling the state courts, the Supreme Court found that the statute on its face was
“unambiguous, unequivocal, and unlimited” in tolling the redemption period. Id. at 518 (Scalia, J.
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in legislative history that are not incorporated into a statute are not to be treated as law.
For example, in United States v. Gonzales,238 a federal statute provided that a defendant’s
federal sentence for using a firearm during the commission of a drug crime not run
concurrently with any other sentence given in connection with the drug crime. A
legislative committee report said that it was the intent that the federal firearm sentence be
served first before any other sentence.239 Nothing in the actual statute addressed the
order in which sentences were to be served.240 Lower courts used the legislative history
to suggest that Congress meant to set the order in which defendants would serve multiple
federal sentences (after all, the federal government had no control over the order of state
sentences), and therefore it was appropriate to order that the defendant’s federal sentence
for using a firearm in connection with the drug crime be served concurrently with the
defendant’s state sentence for the drug crime.241 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the statute was clear on its face in prohibiting concurrent sentences of any kind, and
that it was inappropriate for the lower courts to consult legislative history to create an
ambiguity that did not exist in the statute itself.242
The same analysis applies to the treatment of tax claims against non-electing
debtors. The courts are improperly relying on a statement in a committee report as to
how tax claims against debtors who do not make the split-year election are to be treated.
The statute enacted by Congress does not speak to the treatment of tax claims against
non-electing debtors. Moreover, the treatment suggested in the committee report is
inconsistent with the general treatment of “claims” in bankruptcy. As in the Gonzales
case, the statement in the committee report should not be relied on as law when Congress
never enacted the statement into law. There is simply no proper basis for the suggestion
that the statement in a committee report reflects Congressional intent when the issue was
not addressed in the statute. Legislative history may properly be used to resolve statutory
concurring). The Supreme Court then proceeded to review snippets of legislative history suggesting that
Congress intended to provide blanket protection for military officers while on active duty. Id. at 514-515.
Justice Scalia wrote a lengthy concurring opinion criticizing the Court for discussing legislative history at
all, since the statute on its face was clear and unconditional. Id. at 518 (Scalia, J. concurring). In Justice
Scalia’s view “[t]he language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what Congress meant then
Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to correct it.” Id. at 528. Justice Scalia noted that an
examination of the legislative history might lead to the conclusion that Congress did not intend for the
statute to be enforced as written , and suggested that any attempt to determine what Congress and the
President intended would be disingenuous – the Court would only be citing the authority supporting its
conclusion and ignoring contrary authority. See id. at 526-27, 519 (Scalia, J., concurring). The justices
engaged in similar debates over the role of legislative history in other cases. See, e.g., Bank One Chicago.,
N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264 (1996).
238
520 U.S. 1 (1997).
239
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upon by the Court of Appeals, reads: ‘The Committee intends that the mandatory sentence under the
revised subsection 924(c) be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other
offense.’ S. Rep., at 313-314.”).
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sentence buried in the legislative history: that the firearms sentence must run first. We therefore follow the
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ambiguities,243 but it should not be used to create new law never enacted by Congress.
The cases holding, on the basis of a statement in a committee report that was not reflected
in the statute, that the government has no claim against the estate on account of
prepetition taxes owing in the year of bankruptcy are not correctly reasoned. As a matter
of policy, the estate benefits from any income earned during the pre-bankruptcy period,
because that income becomes property of the estate (to the extent it still exists on the date
of bankruptcy),244 and so the government, like every other creditor, should have a claim
against the estate on account of that pre-petition income. As the corporate cases have
held, the statute’s provision of a single tax year does not prevent the bifurcation of the
claim for priority purposes.
The only reason that the inconsistent treatment between corporate and individual
cases has not caused havoc within the bankruptcy system is that the rulings have created
a strong incentive245 for individual debtors to elect to split the year of bankruptcy,
creating an eighth priority claim for the pre-petition portion of the of taxes for the year of
bankruptcy under the post-petition assessability rule.246 Since most debtors presumably
elect to split the year of bankruptcy, the system works for individual debtors the same
way as for corporate debtors. However, as discussed below,247 it is unclear how these
precedents will be applied to cases filed after the effective date of the 2005 Act.
C.

The Implication of the Post-petition Assessability Rule on
Prepetition Taxes in the Year of Bankruptcy.

The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980248 solved the problem of how to treat taxes
incurred in the year of bankruptcy by individual taxpayers who make a split-year
243

Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (“First, this Court has repeated with some frequency:
‘Where . . . resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look
first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear." ,
quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (estate entitled to all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as
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Debtors who make the split-year election obtain the benefit of having the estate liable to pay their prepetition tax liabilities. By making the estate liable, and providing the government with an eighth priority
claim, there is a significant chance that the estate will use funds which would otherwise go to pay the
debtor’s other prepetition creditors to pay the debtor’s non-dischargeable tax liabilities. Debtors thus have
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otherwise to other creditors to satisfy the debtor’s own non-dischargeable obligation.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). Note that taxes on the debtor’s post-petition earnings will be an
administrative claim against the estate if the estate benefits from the income (see I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1)), as it
will under the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act in most reorganization cases (see infra note 414).
The government would not have a claim against the estate for taxes on the debtor’s income in the usual
Chapter 7 case, because the debtor’s post-petition income is not property of the estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(6) (earnings on estate property attributable to debtor’s post-petition services are not property of
the estate); Tabb, supra note 19 at 299 (“anything the debtor earns before bankruptcy is fair game for
payment to the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy creditors, and comes into the estate, but the debtor’s earnings after
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election.249 However, it caused great confusion over the proper treatment of claims for
year-of-bankruptcy for all other taxpayers.250 The courts added to the confusion by
treating non-electing individuals differently from corporations, even though there is
nothing in the statute to justify the disparate treatment.251 The courts were wrong to rely
on an unenacted statement in a committee report to hold that the government has no
claim for year of bankruptcy taxes against the bankruptcy estate of a non-electing
individual.252 The statement in the committee report is not law, because it was never
reflected in a statutory enactment.253 The Bankruptcy Code makes it clear that claims for
taxes on prepetition income are prepetition “claims,” even though the claims are deemed
to arise under applicable non-bankruptcy law post-petition, at the end of the tax year (or
possibly even when the return is due).254
Therefore, the government should have a claim against the bankruptcy estates of
both corporate and non-electing individual debtors for the pro-rata portion of the year-ofbankruptcy taxes properly allocated on the basis of time to the prepetition period.255 The
prepetition claim should be treated as an “allowed claim” under section 502(i),256 and
should be given eighth priority under the post-petition assessability rule.257 The claim
should not be entitled to first priority as an administrative expense for two reasons: (1)
the claim is entitled to eighth priority and therefore is excluded from the definition of an
administrative expense,258 and (2) the claim was not “incurred by the estate” since the
estate did not exist when the income was earned and the tax claim accrued for bankruptcy
purposes.259 Because the claim is entitled to eighth priority, the claim should be excepted
from discharge in an individual Chapter 7 case.260
The prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy tax claims against taxpayers who
make the split-year election should work the same way, but the amount of the claim
should be calculated differently. Instead of allocating the year’s taxes to the prepetition
period on the basis of time, the claims against electing individual taxpayers will be
computed on the basis of a separate return.261 For example, if a debtor filed bankruptcy
on July 1, exactly half of the year will have occurred prepetition and half post-petition. If
a non-electing debtor owed $100,000 of taxes for the year, the government would have a
$50,000 eighth priority claim for the prepetition portion of the year. However, if the
249
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taxpayer made the split-year election, the taxpayer’s liability would be computed on the
basis of a separate return. If the taxpayer owed $70,000 in taxes for the first half of the
year and $30,000 of taxes for the second half of the year, the government’s eighth
priority prepetition claim would be $70,000 rather than $50,000. With the split-year
election, the debtor’s claims will accurately reflect the actual income earned by the debtor
pre-petition, rather than reflecting an average portion of the debtor’s annual income
allocated to the prepetition time period. There is, thus, a distinction between the
treatment of electing and non-electing taxpayers, but it is not nearly as significant as
treating the entire year-of-bankruptcy tax liability as a post-petition obligation of the
debtor and not an obligation of the estate.
4.

The Post-Petition Assessability Rule after the 2005 Act.

The most fundamental change made by the 2005 Act concerning income tax
claims was a seemingly innocuous shift of language from section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) to the
flush language of section 507(a)(8)(A). The language in question previously made it
clear that the lookback rule only applied to tax years that ended prepetition. Thus, taxes
in the year of bankruptcy could only fall within the lookback rule if the debtor made a
split-year election or if the debtor filed bankruptcy on the last day of the debtor’s tax
year.262 In all other cases, the tax year will not have ended on or before the date of
bankruptcy.
The movement of the language in the 2005 Act will have no effect on the
lookback rule, because the language was previously set forth in the lookback rule.
However, the movement of the language sets forth new rules that apply to the two other
provisions of section 507(a)(8) - the 240 day rule, and the post-petition assessability rule.
While a new requirement has been added to the 240-day rule, it will not change the rule,
because the 240-day rule only applied to taxes assessed prepetition.263 Since the tax year
must end in order for taxes to be assessed, the change made by the 2005 Act will not
effect the 240-day rule 264
However, the change made by the 2005 Act will have a substantial impact on the
post-petition assessability rule. Like the lookback rule, after the 2005 Act the postpetition assessability rule will only apply to year-of-bankruptcy taxes if the debtor makes
a split-year election or files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year. In all other cases,
the tax year will not have ended “on or before the petition date,” and the post-petition
assessability rule will not apply. In all other circumstances, year-of-bankruptcy taxes will
not be entitled to eighth priority. The statutory change thus overrules the theory upon
which the corporate cases, discussed beginning on page 23, are based.265
It is not clear why Congress changed the statute. One possibility is that the court
wanted to clarify that the post-petition assessability rule would not apply to taxes for
years commencing post-petition. However, the courts have consistently held that the

262

See discussion supra beginning at note 58.
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) (applies to “taxes assessed within 240 days . . . before the date of the
filing of the petition).
264
See discussion supra beginning at note 75.
265
See supra notes 161, 166, 177.
263

41

post-petition assessability rule would not apply to purely post-petition tax years.266 Did
Congress simply intended to codify this rule? If so, Congress erred also by eliminating
priority for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes. The codification of the
post-petition-year rule could have been made by simply saying that taxes for years
beginning post-petition would not be covered by the post-petition assessability rule.
Requiring the tax year to end pre-petition goes further by eliminating year-of-bankruptcy
taxes from the application of the rule.267
A second possibility is that the change was made at the behest of the government,
which has consistently argued that year-of-bankruptcy taxes should be treated as postpetition obligations – indeed, should be treated as first priority post-petition
administrative expenses.268 However, the statute does not specify that all claims for taxes
owing for the year of bankruptcy will be entitled to first priority as administrative
expenses, but merely that the taxes will not be subject to eighth priority. Will the
elimination of eighth priority accomplish the government’s objective of turning the
prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes into first priority administrative
expenses?
The corporate cases applied the post-petition assessability rule to grant eighth
priority, rather than first administrative expense priority, to the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes. However, they were not consistent in rationalizing their
rulings. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in PATCO accepted the
government’s argument that an entire year’s tax claim arose at the end of the tax year, but
held nevertheless that the claim for the prepetition portion of the year’s taxes constituted
a eighth priority claim under the post-petition assessability rule.269 The PATCO panel did
not attempt to distinguish the long line of authority holding that the post-petition
assessability rule applies only to prepetition taxes.270 One would expect the government
to argue that Congress intended the 2005 Act, by preventing the use of the post-petition
assessability rule for year-of-bankruptcy taxes, to overturn PATCO and treat all of the
taxes in the year of bankruptcy as if they had been “incurred by the estate,” and thus as
first priority administrative expenses. Using the PATCO panel’s theory, the government
may well succeed in arguing for administrative expense priority since the post-petition
assessability rule no longer applies to prevent administrative priority.271
However, the PATCO panels’ conclusion that the prepetition portion of year-ofbankruptcy taxes was incurred by the estate has not been universally accepted. Both the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in O’Neill Shoe272 and the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit in Hillsborough Holdings273 explicitly refused to decide whether the
prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes were incurred by the estate, holding
simply that the taxes were covered by the post-petition assessability rule and thereby
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excluded from first priority administrative expense treatment.274 The cases involving
individual debtors, in rejecting administrative priority for the prepetition portion of yearof-bankruptcy taxes, have held that the prepetition taxes were not “incurred by the
estate.”275
While the government may have thought that eliminating eighth priority would
make the entire year’s tax claim an administrative expense, a proper reading of the
statutory rules and longstanding bankruptcy policy suggests a different result. There is a
great weight of bankruptcy authority suggesting that the government’s “claim” 276 – here,
the right to the payment of taxes on income earned prepetition – accrues when the income
is earned, even though the amount is unliquidated and the claim is unmatured.277 Using
the proper analysis of a bankruptcy “claim,” the government’s right to payment arose
when the debtor earned the income. Since the bankruptcy estate was not in existence
when the debtor earned the prepetition portion of the year-of-bankruptcy taxes, that
liability could not have been “incurred by the estate.” Thus, the government should have
a prepetition claim for taxes owing on prepetition income. Using the proper definition of
a bankruptcy claim, Congress, by eliminating the possibility of using the post-petition
assessability rule, has turned the government’s eighth priority claim,278 which was
automatically excepted from discharge,279 into a dischargeable general unsecured claim.
5.

Administrative Priority Claims.

As a general matter, two different taxpayers are created when a petition is filed280
by an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 case: the debtor and the bankruptcy estate. The
debtor’s post-petition earnings do not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate,281 and
those earnings are not available to pay prepetition creditors. The debtor is responsible
for filing a tax return and paying any taxes on the debtor’s post-petition income if that
income does not belong to the estate.282
274
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The bankruptcy estate of an individual debtor is comprised of most of the debtor’s
property existing on the petition date.283 Certain rights of an individual debtor acquired
after the petition are also included in the estate, to limit the individual debtor’s ability to
time the receipt of assets to avoid having those assets used to pay creditor claims.284 An
individual debtor is allowed to remove certain exempt property from the estate.285 In a
Chapter 7 case, the trustee is required to liquidate the remaining property of the estate
into cash,286 and to distribute the proceeds to creditors in accordance with the rules of
distribution.287
Non-individual debtors are treated differently, because they have no separate
existence from the bankruptcy estate. A corporate debtor therefore is not entitled to
remove exempt property from the estate,288 and does not receive a discharge under
Chapter 7,289 because it will cease to exist after all of its assets are liquidated, and the
proceeds are paid to creditors. The entire corporate existence is reflected in the
bankruptcy estate, and all of the corporation’s property as of the petition date is included
in the bankruptcy estate.
The cleavage between the separate existence of the individual debtor and the
bankruptcy estate, and the lack of cleavage between the corporate debtor and the
bankruptcy estate, is reflected to some extent in the tax law. For individual debtors, the
taxable income of the estate is to be computed separately and paid by the trustee.290 The
income of the estate consists of the income to which the estate is entitled if it was
“received or accrued” after the bankruptcy case.291 The income of the debtor consists of
the income to which the bankruptcy estate is not entitled.292 An individual debtor in a
Chapter 7 or 11 case can make a split-year election to treat the year of bankruptcy as two
years (a prepetition and a post-petition year).293 If the election is not made, the debtor’s
taxable year is determined without regard to the bankruptcy case.294 For non-individual
debtors (corporations and partnerships), and for individual debtors under Chapter 12 or
13, no separate taxable entity results for entity taxpayers.295 The statute thus reflects the
separate existence of the individual debtor in Chapter 7 and 11 cases.
For all taxpayers, income earned by the estate on property of the estate is taxable
to the estate.296 All of the income earned post-petition by entity taxpayers and individual
283
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taxpayers in Chapter 12 and 13 cases become property of the estate and thus are taxed to
the single entity – the debtor. In individual Chapter 7 and 11 cases, taxes on the debtor’s
post-petition income is taxed to the debtor if the debtor does not have to turn that income
over to the estate for use to pay creditors. Any income earned by the estate, and any
income which the debtor has to turn over to the estate, will be taxed to the estate and not
to the debtor.297
Under a change made the 2005 Act, an individual debtor will be able to confirm a
Chapter 11 plan over the objection of a creditor only if the debtor either pays the claim in
full with interest, or the value of property distributed under the plan exceeds the debtor’s
projected gross income during the 5-year period after the first plan payment is made
under the plan.298 If the property of the estate does not vest in the debtor under the plan,
and the debtor proposes to use post-petition income to pay creditors during the term of
the plan, that income should be taxable to the bankruptcy estate and not the debtor. It
remains to be seen how this provision will be interpreted and apply.
Claims for taxes owing by the estate on post-petition income should be entitled to
first priority as administrative expenses. The statute provides that any tax “incurred by
the estate” which is not entitled to eighth priority is an administrative expense.299 Prior to
the 2005 Act, the courts consistently excluded taxes on post-petition income from eighth
priority treatment, giving them first priority administrative expense status, although no
court has provided sound reasoning for the exclusion.300 As explained earlier in this
paper,301 the government’s claim for taxes on post-petition income should not constitute
an “allowed claim” in bankruptcy,302 and should therefore be excluded from eighth
priority under the post-petition assessability rule.303 In the 2005 Act, Congress clarified
(in this respect) the eighth priority rules by making them applicable only to tax years
ending before the petition date.304 Therefore, it is now crystal clear that taxes on the
estate’s post-petition income will be entitled to administrative priority. Note, however,
that taxes on an individual debtor’s Chapter 7 or 11 post-petition income will not
constitute a claim against the estate at all if income belongs to the debtor and not to the
estate.305
It is less a question of whether administrative priority is to be granted to some
prepetition taxes. The government has long contended that prepetition taxes in the year
of bankruptcy should be treated as first priority administrative expenses.306 The
government has argued that all taxes in the year of bankruptcy first arise at the end of the
297
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tax year, and therefore are “incurred by the estate.”307 The courts have consistently
rejected the government’s interpretation, finding in corporate cases that the prepetition
portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes are covered by the post-petition assessability rule,308
and finding in the individual cases (where the debtor does not make a split-year election)
on the basis of a statement in a committee report to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 that
all taxes in the year of bankruptcy are an individual obligation of the debtor and not an
obligation of the estate.309 The situation is even more confused after the 2005 Act,
because the basis for the corporate cases – the application of the eighth priority postpetition assessability rule – no longer applies to year of bankruptcy taxes.310 While the
cases are poorly reasoned, they reach the correct result. Taxes on prepetition income
should not be given first priority as administrative expenses because the tax claim arises
prepetition,311 and therefore the taxes were not “incurred by the estate.”
Prior to the 2005 Act, the statute granting administrative priority failed to specify
whether secured claims were covered by the statute.312 The 2005 Act makes it clear that
secured claims for post-petition taxes are entitled to first priority as administrative
expenses.313
III.

DISCHARGEABILITY OF YEAR-OF-BANKRUPTCY TAX CLAIMS.

There are three separate questions that must be answered in the affirmative before
one can determine that a claim has been discharged in bankruptcy. First, the debtor must
receive a discharge. Under Chapter 7, only individual debtors are eligible to receive a
discharge.314 Corporate and partnership debtors are not eligible to receive a Chapter 7
discharge. Moreover, even eligible individual debtors can be denied a discharge entirely
for committing certain wrongful acts either a short time before or after bankruptcy.315 In
addition, discharges can be denied if the debtor previously received a discharge within a
certain period of time.316
Second, the discharge must by its terms apply to the claim. A Chapter 7
discharge only applies to claims “that arose before the date of the order for relief” or
claims that are treated under section 502 as if they had arisen before the order for
relief.317 The Chapter 7 discharge by its terms does not apply to claims which come into
existence post-petition, unless section 502 specifically treats the claim as arising
prepetition. Of particular relevance for income tax claims in the year of bankruptcy is
section 502(i) of the Bankruptcy Code, which should require the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes to be treated as a prepetition allowed claim, even if applicable
307
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non-bankruptcy law the claim would treat the claim as arising post-petition.318 If the
claim arose prepetition (or is treated by the section 502 as having arisen prepetition), the
claim is subject to the discharge order even if no proof of claim was filed by the creditor
and even if the claim was not allowed as part of the bankruptcy distribution process.319
Thus, as a general matter, prepetition claims will be subject to the discharge order while
most post-petition claims will not be subject to the discharge order.
Finally, even if the debtor receives a discharge and the claim is covered by the
discharge order, the particular claim may still be excepted from discharge. Section 523
of the Bankruptcy Code lists nineteen types of claim that are excepted from discharge.320
There are three basic types of claims excepted from discharge. The first type is claims
arising out of the debtor’s bad conduct, such as claims against the debtor for fraud,
embezzlement, willful and malicious injury, and drunk driving.321 Most of these claims
are excepted from discharge only if the creditor timely seeks and obtains an order from
the Bankruptcy Court excepting the claims from discharge.322 Second, claims that the
debtor knew about and failed to list in the bankruptcy schedules are not discharged.323
These claims are automatically excepted from discharge. Finally, certain claims are
automatically excepted from discharge because of the nature of the claim or the claimant.
This includes certain claims for things like spousal support, student loans, criminal
restitution, and, most importantly for this article, certain tax obligations.324
Claims for taxes are excepted from discharge if the debtor failed to file a required
tax return,325 filed a required tax return late and within two years of bankruptcy,326 or
committed tax fraud.327
In addition, two types of taxes are excepted from discharge due to the timing of
the taxes, rather then the debtor’s tax liability resulting from bad acts. First, taxes entitled
to priority under sections 507(a)(2)328 are automatically excepted from discharge.329
Section 507(a)(2)330 grants a priority to so-called involuntary gap period taxes – taxes
arising after the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition and before the order for
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relief.331 These gap period tax claims are treated as allowed prepetition claims,332 given
second priority,333 and are also excepted from discharge.334
Second, all taxes entitled to eighth priority are excepted from discharge.335 Taxes
are entitled to eighth priority if covered by the lookback rule, the 240 day rule, or the
post-petition assessability rule, discussed earlier.336 Prior to the 2005 Act, the courts
correctly held that the government’s claims for taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy
were not discharged. However, the rulings were not correctly analyzed.
The issue of dischargeability with respect to corporate taxes in Chapter 7 does not
arise, because corporations do not receive aChapter 7 discharge.337 The issue does arise,
however, with respect to individuals. Prior to the 2005 Act, the courts correctly held that
the government’s tax claims against individuals who made the split-year election would
not be discharged because those claims were entitled to eighth priority under both the
post-petition assessability rule and the lookback rule, and thus were excepted from
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A).338 The 2005 Act should not change this result,
because the prepetition short year will still fall within the language of both the lookback
and post-petition assessability rules, because, by definition, the short tax year will have
ended on the petition date.339
This leaves the claims against non-electing individuals. Prior to the 2005 Act, the
courts should have applied the post-petition assessability rule to the government’s claims
for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes.340 Instead, however, the courts
wrongly treated the government’s claim as a post-petition personal obligation of the
debtor and not as an obligation of the estate. 341 The courts reached the correct result that
the taxes were excepted from discharge, but for the wrong reason.
For cases subject to the 2005 Act, the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy
taxes incurred by non-electing individuals should be dischargeable, unless the debtor files
bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year. The 2005 Act has eliminated eighth priority
for these taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, unless the tax year ends on the petition
date (as it does only if the debtor makes the split year election or files on the last day of
the tax year).342 Since the prepetition portion of taxes in the year of bankruptcy would
only be excepted from discharge if entitled to eighth priority (or incurred during the gap
period), the non-priority taxes for the prepetition portion of the year of bankruptcy should
be dischargeable. Eliminating the possibility of eighth priority has turned eighth priority
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non-dischargeable taxes into dischargeable general unsecured claims. Taxes for the postpetition portion of the year of bankruptcy should not be covered by the discharge.343
However, the courts may continue to follow the erroneous decisions holding that
the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes incurred by non-electing individual
debtors arises post-petition, and is only a personal obligation of the debtor and not of the
estate.344 If the courts continue to follow these cases, which rely on a statement in a
committee report that is not reflected in the statute,345 the government’s tax claim will
remain outside of bankruptcy and will not be affected by the changes made in the 2005
Act.
A third possibility is that the courts will adopt for non-electing individuals the
theory applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in PATCO346 to corporate taxpayers
– that the prepetition taxes incurred by a debtor in the year of bankruptcy are deemed to
arise post-petition, and are thus incurred by the debtor.347 If the court adopts the PATCO
panel’s reasoning, the prepetition portion of taxes in the year of bankruptcy will be
entitled to first priority as an administrative expense, because the 2005 Act eliminated the
possibility of applying the post-petition assessability rule to the taxes. The 2005 Act has
thus thrown into limbo whether taxes owing by non-electing individuals for the
prepetition portion of the year of bankruptcy will be dischargeable.
IV.

TREATMENT OF YEAR-OF-BANKRUPTCY TAX CLAIMS IN CHAPTER
PROCEEDINGS.
1.

Treatment of Claims Against the Estate.
A.

Chapter 11 Cases Prior to the 2005 Act.

Unlike Chapter 7 where claims are paid in peri passu from the proceeds generated
by the liquidation of the estate’s property, claims against the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
estate are paid in accordance with the terms of the debtor’s confirmed plan of
reorganization.348 The debtor’s plan must meet a number of requirements in order to be
confirmable. For example, first priority administrative expenses must be paid in cash on
the effective date of the plan, unless the holder of the claim accepts different treatment.349
Similarly, unless the government agreed otherwise, eighth priority tax claims350 must be
paid in deferred cash payments over a period not exceeding six years from assessment of
the tax.351
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The use of the term “assessment” created some confusion. Year-of-bankruptcy
taxes could not have been “assessed” prepetition,352 and the automatic stay prevents the
commencement of most collection actions post-petition.353 However, special statutory
rules allowed the government to assess unpaid prepetition taxes at any time after a
bankruptcy petition is filed, without complying with the normal deficiency procedures.354
Therefore, the sooner the government made the assessment, the shorter the period over
which the debtor could pay the claim following confirmation of a plan.
The government’s claims for the pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes
for both electing individual debtors and corporate debtors were treated as eighth
priority,355 while the post-petition portions were treated as first priority administrative
expenses.356 However, the cases holding that the government has no claim against the
bankruptcy estate of non-electing individual taxpayers for year-of-bankruptcy taxes357
posed quite a theoretical problem in Chapter 11 cases because of the broader discharge.
At least theoretically, the government would have no claim against the estate, and the
debtor would still be able to discharge the taxes since they arose prior to confirmation of
the plan.358
The Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court in In re Johnson359 followed the Chapter 7
cases holding that the government had no claim against the estate of a non-electing
individual debtor for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes.360 However, to
prevent the debtor from being able to discharge those taxes as part of the debtor’s
Chapter 11 plan, the court held that the debtor’s plan could be confirmed only if the
debtor provided in the plan for payment of the taxes.361 The court did a poor job of
explaining why the plan had to provide for payment of the debtor’s personal post-petition
tax obligations if the estate had no liability for them.362
352
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The Johnson court reached the right result for the wrong reason. The government
should have had an eighth priority nondischargeable claim for the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes.363 Because individual Chapter 11 cases are quite rare,364 there
are only a couple of other published opinions discussing the problem with the Chapter 11
discharge created by the courts treating the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy
taxes incurred by non-electing individual debtors as a personal obligation of the debtors
rather than as a claim against the bankruptcy estate.365 The problem was caused by the
courts erroneously relying on an unenacted statement in a committee report to deny the
government a claim against the bankruptcy estate.366 Prior to the 2005 Act, the courts
would not have had to twist the statutory language367 to prevent the debtor from
discharging the taxes in Chapter 11 if they had recognized that the government is entitled
to a claim against the debtor’s estate for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy
taxes. Using the proper analysis, the government’s claim (prior to the 2005 Act) would
have been entitled to eighth priority,368 and as such would have been excepted from
Chapter 7 discharge.369 Claims excepted from discharge under Chapter 7 are likewise
excepted from an individual debtor’s discharge in Chapter 11.370
B.

Chapter 11 Cases Under the 2005 Act.

The 2005 Act has made a number of changes in the treatment of the government’s
eighth priority tax claims under Chapter 11. The debtor must pay eighth priority tax
claims in “regular installment payments,”371 over five years from the date of the order for
were not owed by the estate. How could the nonpayment of taxes that were not owed by the estate
constitute a continuing loss to the estate?
363
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relief rather than six years from assessment,372 and must in all cases pay postconfirmation interest.373 A new statutory provision enacted by the 2005 Act requires the
debtor to pay the rate of interest specified by applicable non-bankruptcy law.374 In
addition, the 2005 Act requires that the treatment of the claim be “not less favorable than
the most favored nonpriority unsecured claim provided for by the plan.”375 Thus, for
cases filed after the effective date of the 2005 Act, the government’s claim is well
protected in Chapter 11. The only potential loss to the government is interest during the
so-called “gap period” accruing between the filing of the petition and confirmation of the
plan.
However, the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes will no longer be
entitled to eighth priority under the 2005 Act.376 Instead, the taxes will either be treated
as first priority administrative expenses,377 as general unsecured claims,378 or as postpetition claims against the debtor and not as claims against the estate at all.379 In the first
situation, the government will be protected since administrative expenses must be paid in
cash on the effective date.380 If the obligation is not treated as a claim against the estate,
as suggested by the non-electing individual cases, then the issue of dischargeability will
once again loom large. Dischargeability is discussed below.381 If the prepetition portion
of year-of-bankruptcy taxes is treated as a general unsecured claim, as it should be treated
under the statutory rules after the 2005 Act changes,382 then the government will be in the
same position as any other general unsecured creditor.
General unsecured creditors are principally383 protected in Chapter 11 by the bestinterests-of-creditors test, which requires the debtor to show that objecting creditors will
receive at least as much in value under the plan as they would receive in a liquidation.384
In addition, unless the class in which the government’s claim is placed votes to accept the
plan,385 the debtor either must pay the claim in full or retain no interest in the estate’s
property after confirmation.386
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The 2005 Act contains substantial new restrictions on an individual debtor’s
ability to confirm a Chapter 11 plan387 These restrictions were enacted to prevent debtors
who have the ability to pay their debts out of future income from discharging them in
bankruptcy. The problem with Congress’s theory is that the debtor’s projected
disposable income is based on the debtor’s past earnings, rather than future earning
capacity, and on standardized expenses, both of which may not be reflective of the
debtor’s actual ability to pay. Under the new provision, if any general unsecured creditor
objects to the plan, the individual debtor must show that the value of property being
distributed under the plan exceeds the debtor’s projected disposable income during the 5
year period following the first plan payment.388 If the value of the debtor’s projected
disposable income during the five year period would exceed the value of the distributions
to be made under the plan, and the plan does not provide for full payment of the claim
with interest, the plan cannot be confirmed. Note that unlike Chapter 13 (but like
Chapter 12), the rule does not require the debtor to actually use post-petition income to
fund the plan. Rather, the rule merely provides that the distribution under the plan
exceed what would be distributed out of the debtor’s projected disposable income. If the
value of the property of the estate exceeds the debtor’s projected disposable income over
the five-year period, it would appear that a plan could be confirmed using only estate
property and estate earnings, without using any of the debtor’s future income, to pay
creditors.
Whether the new rule will have any impact on tax claims depends on whether the
courts treat the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy
taxes by non-electing individual debtors as a dischargeable general unsecured claim, as
they should, or, as they did in the past, whether they treat the government’s claim as a
personal nondischargeable obligation of the debtor that had to be provided for under the
plan even though the government had no claim against the bankruptcy estate. In the
former case, the debtor’s projected disposable income test would have to be met to
confirm a plan to pay the government less than full payment of its claim. In the latter
case, the government would be entitled to full payment regardless of the test to be
applied.
While confirming a Chapter 11 plan will not be easy, the government will bear a
substantial risk that some portion of its claim for the prepetition portion of year-ofbankruptcy taxes will go unpaid if it has only a general unsecured claim against the estate
for those taxes. By eliminating the possibility of eighth priority under the post-petition
assessability rule, the 2005 Act exposes the government’s claim against an individual
debtor for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes to discharge if the debtor’s
tax liability is properly treated as a “claim.”
C.

The Estate’s Liability for Post-Confirmation Interest and
Penalties on Year-of-Bankruptcy Tax Claims.
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Prior to the 2005 Act, the statute governing eighth priority claims did not contain
the magic language that would require the payment of post-confirmation interest on the
tax claim.389 This did not necessarily mean, however, that the debtor could confirm a
plan to pay eighth priority tax claims over six years without interest. To confirm a plan
of reorganization, the debtor also must show that the plan meets the so-called “bestinterests-of-creditors” test. The “best interests” test requires the plan proponent to show
that the property to be distributed to an objecting creditor under the plan has at least as
much “value as of the effective date of the plan” as the creditor would have received in a
Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date of the plan.390 If the priority claim
would have been paid in full from a Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date
of the plan, then the debtor should be required to pay post-confirmation interest on the
claim at a fair market rate in order for the proposed plan payments to have a “value as of
the effective date of the plan” – or in financial terms a present discounted value – equal to
the cash payment that would have been made in the hypothetical Chapter 7 case. If the
priority claim would not have been paid in full in the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation,
then the debtor must only pay the amount of interest necessary for the present value of
the payment stream to equal or exceed the distribution that would be made in a Chapter 7
case. Therefore, the debtor may or may not be required to pay interest depending on the
value of the Chapter 11 payment stream in comparison with the distribution that would be
made in the hypothetical Chapter 7 case.
Prior to the 2005 Act, if the debtor was required to pay market-rate post-confirmation
interest in order to meet the best interests of creditors test, the rate of interest would
presumably be determined under the Supreme Court’s “prime plus” formula, under which
the prime rate is used as the base rate, and the creditor can seek to prove its entitlement to
a premium to compensate for the additional risk of the loan to the debtor.391 Ultimately,
the Bankruptcy Court would determine the appropriate interest rate on a case-by-case
basis, without regard to the applicable non-bankruptcy rate.392 Where the debtor is not
required to pay market rate interest (because the priority claim would not be paid in full
in the hypothetical Chapter 7 case), the debtor could propose the lowest rate that would,
using mathematical discounting formulas, result in the payment stream having a greater
present value than the hypothetical Chapter 7 distribution.
D.

Chapter 12 and 13 Cases.

Like creditors in Chapter 11, creditors in Chapter 12 and 13 cases are paid in
accordance with the terms of the debtor’s confirmed plan of reorganization, rather than
from the proceeds generated by selling off the estate’s property. Creditors holding
priority claims receive special protection in Chapter 12 and 13 cases. In order to be
confirmed, a Chapter 12 or 13 plan must provide for full payment of priority tax claims
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over the life of the plan.393 This rule applies to both first priority administrative expenses
and eighth priority taxes. The plan term is generally three to five years.394 A debtor who
fails to demonstrate the ability to pay all priority tax claims in full over the plan term will
be unable to confirm a Chapter 12 or 13 plan,395and the bankruptcy case will likely be
converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed.396
The first question that must be considered is whether the government’s claims for
taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy will be entitled to priority. As with corporate
debtors, individual Chapter 12 and 13 debtors are not eligible to make a split-year
election. Will the courts follow the corporate cases in treating the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes as an eighth priority claim,397 or will they will follow the nonelecting individual debtor cases in treating the claim as a personal obligation of the debtor
and not an obligation of the estate?398 Only a few published opinions have addressed the
issue.
The Bankruptcy Court in In re Michaelson399 felt bound by the Court of Appeals’
corporate precedent in O’Neill Shoe Company,400 holding that the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes would be entitled to eighth priority under the post-petition
assessability rule. In the opinion, however, the Michaelson court suggested that it
disagreed with the Court of Appeals’s decision in O’Neill Shoe, and went on to throw up
its hands as to how the year’s tax claim should be divided between the prepetition and
post-petition period. The Michaelson court denied the debtor’s motion to treat estimated
tax payments as the amount of the eighth priority claim, but did explain how the
prepetition portion of the claim should be determined, leaving the debtor in limbo.401
In an unpublished opinion, the bankruptcy court in In re Wilkoff,402 agreed with
the Michaelson court that estimated taxes were irrelevant, but disagreed with the
Michaelson court’s holding that the government’s claim for the pre-petition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes would be entitled to eighth priority. Instead, the Wilkoff court
held that the government’s claim for taxes in the year of bankruptcy arises post-petition,
noting that other courts were in disagreement about whether the claim arises at the end of
the tax year or when the tax return is due. Since in either case the claim in Wilkoff would
393

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(a)(2) (“[P]lan shall . . . provide for full payment, in deferred cash payments, of
all claims entitled to priority under section 507, unless . . . (B) the holder of a particular claim agrees to
different treatment of such claim”), 1322(a)(2) (same).
394
11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1322(d) (plans under Chapter 12 and 13 cannot exceed 3 years without court
approval, or 5 years with court approval).
395
The debtor must show that a plan is feasible in order to confirm the plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(11),
1225(a)(6), 1325(a)(6).
396
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112 (b)(1)(2) (repealed 2005), 1112(b)(4)(m) , 1208(c)(3) – (5), 1307(c)(3), (5).
397
See discussion supra beginning on page 23.
398
See discussion supra beginning on page 29.
399
200 B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr. Minn. 1996).
400
64 F.3d 1146, 1151 (8th Cir. 1995), discussed supra beginning at note 164.
401
Michaelson,, 200 B.R. at 868 (“[T]he Debtors must first identify their 1995 prepetition income. Then, it
seems, the Debtors must show how pre and post-petition deductions, exemptions, credits, etc., affected that
income to produce a calculated portion of their 1995 income tax liability. The question, more precisely, is:
how can the Debtors relate their 1995 tax liability to their prepetition income without bifurcating the tax
period? Perhaps, the answer is that they cannot.”). The Michaelson court did not consider allocating the
year’s taxes pro-rata based on time. See discussion supra beginning at note 178 .
402
No. 98-34354, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124, *18, 24-27, 87 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2266, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶50,289 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).

55

have arisen post-petition, the court simply held that the claim arose post-petition.403 The
Wilkoff court therefore applied section 1305(a), which allows but does not require the
government to file a claim against the bankruptcy estate for taxes that “become payable”
post-petition.404 The Wilkoff court held that since the government did not file a claim
under section 1305(a), the debtor could not treat the claim under its plan.405 The Wilkoff
court also held that the Chapter 13 discharge did not apply to the government’s year-ofbankruptcy tax claim against the debtor personally, since by not electing to file a claim
under section 1305(a), the government did not have an “allowed claim,” and only
“allowed claims” are covered by the Chapter 13 discharge.406 The Wilkoff court thus
treated the question of whether the taxes “become payable” as determinative of when the
“claim” arises for bankruptcy classification and priority purposes. Apparently under the
Wilkoff court’s analysis, the government would have the option either to file a proof of
claim for taxes arising prepetition, which claim would be treated as an eighth priority
non-dischargeable claim, or to not file a claim and have the taxes be deemed nondischargeable post-petition obligations that cannot be treated under the plan.407
While the Wilkoff court’s holding may be consistent with the holdings made in the
non-electing individual debtor cases,408 it is not consistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s
definition of a “claim.”409 A better reconciliation of the statutory language would be to
apply section 1305(a) only to post-petition claims which become payable prior to
confirmation. Prepetition claims which become payable post-petition should be treated
as allowed prepetition claims under the general rules of section 502, and priority would
be determined under the normal rules of section 507. Certainly, nothing in the language
of section 1305(a) suggests that claims which would already be subject to section 502
somehow lose their status as “claims” simply because the government elects not to file a
proof of claim.
If the Wilkoff case is followed after the 2005 Act becomes effective, there is little
chance that the government will ever elect under section 1305(a) to file a claim for
income taxes due in the year of bankruptcy. By eliminating eighth priority for the
prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes, the 2005 Act turns what should have
previously been an eighth priority claim that had to be paid in full over time into a
dischargeable general unsecured claim. If Wilkoff is followed, the debtor, by not making
the split-year election, would cause the government’s claim to be treated as if the
bankruptcy case were never filed. The government would lose any claim against the
403

Wilkoff, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124 at *10-12.
Id. at *10; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1305.
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Wilcoff, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 124 at *23-24 ( “Since the IRS is an entity holding a claim for ‘taxes that
become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending,’ it had the option of filing a proof of
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debtor’s bankruptcy estate on account of the year-of-bankruptcy tax liability, but the
claim itself would be enforceable against the debtor immediately, and would not be
affected by the debtor’s bankruptcy discharge. Surely the government would prefer to be
treated as a super-creditor, unimpaired by the bankruptcy and able to collect its claim in
full immediately after confirmation, rather than as an ordinary general unsecured creditor
holding a dischargeable claim.
If this is what Congress intended by section 1305, it should have done a better job
of excepting the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes from the general
definition of a “claim.” The holding in Wilkoff would make it much more difficult for
debtors with significant year-of-bankruptcy tax liabilities to perform under a confirmed
plan, because it does not appear that the post-petition obligation to pay the taxes will be
factored into the debtor’s expenses in computing the debtor’s “projected disposable
income,” all of which must be used to pay creditors under the plan.410 The loss of eighth
priority is irrelevant under Wilkoff, because the court held that the government’s tax claim
would be protected from discharge even without eighth priority.
If the courts follow the holding of Michaelson, on the other hand, the loss of
eighth priority411 will have a substantial impact on the government’s rights. As a general
unsecured creditor for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes, the
government will be entitled to share with other unsecured creditors in the funds available
under the plan for distribution to general unsecured creditors.412 In all cases, the debtor
must meet the best-interests-of-creditors test by showing that rejecting creditors receive
as much in value as they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation on the effective date.413
In addition, the debtor must either pay the claim in full or use all of the debtor’s
“projected disposable income” for the three to five year term of the plan to pay creditors
(or under Chapter 12 provide creditors with as much in value).414 Debtors who do not
have enough “projected disposable income” to pay all general unsecured claims over the
plan period should be able to confirm a Chapter 12 or 13 plan that pays only part of their
year-of-bankruptcy taxes. The balance of the claim should be dischargeable.
The pre-2005 Act case law puts the government in a precarious position with
respect to cases arising after the 2005 Act becomes effective. Under the theory used by
the court in Wilkoff, the government should not file a claim because doing so will turn a
non-dischargeable claim into a dischargeable one. Under the theory used by the court in
Michaelson, the government’s failure to file a proof of claim should enable the debtor to
discharge the taxes.415
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See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(1)(B) (requiring that “all of the debtor’s projected disposable income” during
the plan period be “applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan”), 1325(b)(2) (defining
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A secondary question is whether the debtor must pay post-confirmation interest
on priority taxes treated under the plan. This issue only applies to administrative priority
post-confirmation taxes, and, prior to the 2005 Act, to prepetition taxes entitled to eighth
priority.416 While the Chapter 12 and 13 statutes do not explicitly require the payment of
post-confirmation interest on priority claims,417 a best-interests-of-creditors test similar to
the one in Chapter 11418 does require the payment of post-petition interest if the creditor
would have received full payment in a Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective
date of the plan.419 However, the debtor may be able to confirm a plan without paying
priority creditors interest if the value of the plan’s payment stream equals or exceeds the
distribution that the government would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on
the effective date. Moreover, there is no requirement for paying post-petition preconfirmation interest (except on secured claims).420
2.

Dischargeability of Year-of-Bankruptcy Tax Clams in Chapter
Proceedings.
A.

Chapter 11 Prior to the 2005 Act.

The Chapter 11 discharge provisions are more complex than the Chapter 7
discharge provisions, in large part because the courts have set entirely different rules for
corporate debtors and non-electing individual debtors.
i.

Corporate Debtors.

Corporate debtors generally421 receive a discharge in Chapter 11, even though
they are excluded from receiving a discharge under Chapter 11.422 Prior to the 2005 Act,
corporate debtors could even discharge debts that would be excepted from an individual
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After the 2005 Act, the only way that year-of-bankruptcy taxes will be entitled to eighth priority is if the
debtor files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year. Chapter 12 and 13 debtors are not allowed to make
the split-year election. I.R.C. § 1398(a). Therefore, all taxes in the year of bankruptcy were not incurred in
a tax year ending on or before the petition date, unless the debtor files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax
year. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A). Eighth priority will therefore rarely apply to year-of-bankruptcy taxes
in Chapter 12 and 13 cases.
417
11 U.S.C. ¶ 507 (a)(8)(A) (no requirement to pay “value as of effective date equal to the allowed amount
of the claim”).
418
See discussion supra at note 390.
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In re Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Hardy, 755 F.2d 75, 76 (6th Cir. 1985)
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Corporate debtors do not receive a discharge if the plan provides for the liquidation of all or
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U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2005). If a corporate debtor has post-confirmation operations or does not liquidate, it
is entitled to a Chapter 11 discharge upon confirmation of the plan. § 1141(d)(1).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)(1)–(2).
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debtor’s discharge.423 Therefore, even though, as the courts have properly held, the
prepetition portion of the government’s year-of-bankruptcy corporate tax claim was
entitled to priority under the post-petition assessability rule,424 it technically remained a
dischargeable obligation under the Bankruptcy Code. The discharge, however, was of
little moment if the government properly filed a claim and demanded the treatment to
which it was entitled, because the government’s eighth priority tax claim for the
prepetition portion of the year’s taxes had to be paid in full under the plan.425 However,
because the obligation was discharged to the extent not provided for in the plan,
questions regarding entitlement to and the rate of interest to be paid on the delinquencies
were important.426
ii.

Individual Debtors Who Make the Split Year
Election.

Dischargeability questions are also quite straight forward for individual debtors
who make the split-year election.427 Taxes excepted from discharge under section 523 of
the Bankruptcy Code are also excepted from an individual debtor’s Chapter 11
discharge.428 If the debtor makes the election, the government’s claim (both prior to and
after the 2005 Act) for taxes owing for the prepetition partial-year will be entitled to
eighth priority,429 and thus will be excepted from discharge under section 523.430 The
government’s claim will also, therefore, be excepted from the Chapter 11 discharge.431
iii.

Individual Debtors Who Do Not Make the SplitYear Election.

The issues are more complex for non-electing individuals. Even before the 2005
Act, claims that would be excepted from the Chapter 7 discharge were also excepted
from an individual debtor’s Chapter 11 discharge.432 Thus, under a correct reading of the
Bankruptcy Code,433 the prepetition portion of the government’s tax claims against
individual debtors should be excepted from discharge.434
423
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Unfortunately, the courts have not granted eighth priority to the government’s
claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes owed by non-electing
individual debtors.435 Instead, most courts held that the entire tax claim for the year of
bankruptcy (both the portion that related to prepetition income and the portion that
related to post-petition income) was to be treated as a post-petition personal obligation of
the debtor, and not an obligation of the estate, where an individual debtor failed to make a
split-year election.436 The dischargeability problem was avoided in Chapter 7 because
the courts held that the entire year’s claim “arose” post-petition,437 and the Chapter 7
discharge only applied to prepetition claims.438 However, the Chapter 11 discharge is
broader than the Chapter 7 discharge, applying to “any debt that arose before the date of
. . . confirmation.”439 Where the tax year ends post-petition, but prior to confirmation, it
would thus appear, under the theory adopted by the courts in cases involving non-electing
individuals, that the taxes for the year of bankruptcy would arise before confirmation and
be dischargeable. Thus, the government could not collect the taxes from the debtor
because they would be discharged by confirmation of the plan, and the government could
not collect the taxes from the estate because the courts held that the estate is not liable for
the taxes.
The only courts to consider the issue, however, did not rule that the taxes were
uncollectible. In In re Wood,440 an individual Chapter 11 debtor sought to prevent the
government from collecting prepetition year-of-bankruptcy taxes. The debtor had
attempted to treat the claim under its plan of reorganization, even though the government
had not filed a proof of claim. The district court began by stating that there was no

Rather, the courts have held that the taxes arise post-petition and do not constitute a claim against the
estate. Under this theory, the claims are also not discharged because the claims arise after the petition date.
Interestingly, this theory would expose the claims to discharge under Chapter 11, because the claims were
not excepted from discharge under section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code. Since the Chapter 11 discharge
applies to claims arising after the petition date but prior to confirmation, these erroneous rulings create the
potential for discharging tax claims that should not be dischargeable. The district court in In re Wood, 240
B.R. 609, 613 (C.D. Cal. 1999), first held that the prepetition portion of taxes incurred in the year of
bankruptcy did not constitute a claim against the estate. Then to avoid the problems with the Chapter 11
discharge, the Wood court held that the same claim was entitled to first priority as an administrative
expense. Id. Since administrative expenses have to be paid in cash in full on the effective date of the plan
(11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)((9)(A)), there was no way for the debtor to discharge the tax liability. However, it
makes no sense for the same tax claim not to be a claim against the estate for priority purposes, while at the
same time being a claim against the estate for treatment as an administrative expense. The Wood court’s
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to eighth priority under the post-petition assessability rule. See discussion supra beginning on page 39. In
turn, claims entitled to eighth priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) are excepted from discharge
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A). All claims against individual debtors that would be excepted from the
Chapter 7 discharge have always been excepted from the Chapter 11 discharge as well. 11 U.S.C. §
1141(d)(2).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
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11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
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question but that the taxes were excepted from discharge under section 523.441 The court
did not explain how the taxes would be excepted from discharge under section 523, but in
a footnote cited to section 523(a)(1)(A).442 The district court then held that the entire
year’s taxes arose post-petition because the debtor did not make a split-year election.443
According to the district court:
Wood's failure to make the election "leaves the IRS with a post-petition tax claim
against [Wood] individually, [but] with no claim whatsoever against the
bankruptcy estate for any part of the [1995] tax liability."444
The Wood court did not explain how the taxes could be excepted from discharge under
section 523(a)(1)(A), which only applies to prepetition eighth priority claims, after it had
just ruled that the government had no claim whatsoever against the estate, and only a
post-petition claim against the debtor.445
The district court’s opinion in Wood is internally inconsistent and illogical. If the
government’s entire year-of-bankruptcy tax claim is deemed to arise post-petition, and is
deemed to constitute only a personal obligation of the debtor and not an obligation of the
estate, it cannot be excepted from discharge under section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code,
because section 523 only applies to prepetition claims. Moreover, if the claim is not
excepted from discharge under section 523, it would appear to be subject to the Chapter
11 discharge if the claim “arose”446 prior to the confirmation date. The district court in
Wood avoided the discharge question only through sloppy analysis and conclusionary and
incorrect references to the Bankruptcy Code. While Congress likely did not intend to
allow Chapter 11 debtors to avoid paying taxes incurred in year of bankruptcy, the theory
adopted in the non-electing individual cases – that all year-of-bankruptcy taxes arise at
the end of the tax year – is difficult to reconcile with the statutory language to achieve the
result of excepting the taxes from discharge. 447 The problem is that the underlying
theory is wrong – prepetition taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy should be treated as
prepetition “claims.” The theory adopted by the courts cannot be reconciled with the
441

Id. at 612 (“There is no question that Wood's federal income tax liabilities are nondischargeable under
11 U.S.C. § 523.”).
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case law defining when a “claim” exists for bankruptcy purposes,448 and applying the
statutory rules would appear to make the government’s claim for taxes incurred
prepetition in the year of filing dischargeable and uncollectible in a Chapter 11 case.
3.

Chapter 11 after the 2005 Act.

The 2005 Act has made a number of changes to the Chapter 11 discharge
provisions that create greater uncertainty about the dischargeability of year-of-bankruptcy
taxes. The most important change is that Congress has eliminated the possibility of
treating as eighth priority the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of year-ofbankruptcy taxes.449 The impact of this change on corporate and individual debtors is
discussed below. Congress has also changed the timing of the Chapter 11 discharge for
individual debtors, and has enacted new provisions to except certain tax claims from
broad corporate discharge.
A.

Corporate Taxpayers.

Because corporate debtors could previously discharge in Chapter 11 debts that
would be excepted from discharge if the debtor had been an individual,450 the exception
from discharge for eighth priority claims under section 523(a)(1)(A) did not apply to
corporate Chapter 11 debtors.451 In corporate Chapter 11 cases, the main protection for
the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes was its
eighth priority. The debtor could not confirm a plan without providing for the full
payment of the eighth priority claim.452
Since the Chapter 11 discharge applies only to obligations that are not set forth in
the plan,453 the debtor’s obligation under the plan to pay the claim in full would not be
discharged. Thus, if the government properly filed a proof of claim and demanded the
treatment accorded by Chapter 11 to the claim, the government’s rights would in general
be protected.
By eliminating eighth priority treatment for the prepetition portion of the
government’s claim for taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, Congress has likewise
eliminated the protection previously granted to the claims as a result of the priority.454

448

See discussion supra beginning at note 228.
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Without priority, the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of year-ofbankrutpcy taxes should be treated as a general unsecured claim.455 General unsecured
claims do not have to be paid in full under the plan; indeed with the right facts a debtor
should be able to confirm a plan providing for no distribution to general unsecured
creditors.456 The portion of the claim which is not to be paid under the plan will be
discharged.457 The principal effect of the 2005 Act on the dischargeability of year-ofbankruptcy tax claims does not, therefore, occur as a direct result of a change to the
dischargeability rules. Rather, it is the change in the priority rules which causes taxes
that were previously required to be paid in full under the plan to become dischargeable.
The 2005 Act also contains a new provision directly changing the dischargeability
rules. New section 1141(d)(6)(B) excepts from the corporate discharge traditional tax
fraud claims.458 The provision applies to fraudulent returns and willful attempts to
“evade or defeat such tax.”459 These provisions will likely apply to earlier years’ taxes
rather than to taxes in the year-of-bankruptcy, because such actions taking place postpetition would likely result in dismissal or conversion of the bankruptcy case.460
B.

Individual Taxpayers.

The changes made by the 2005 Act should not have a significant impact on those
who make a split-year election. If the split-year election is made, the taxes for the
prepetition “year” of filing will be entitled to eighth priority under both the lookback rule
and the pre-petition assessability rule, and will be excepted from discharge under section
523(a)(1)(A). The changes made by the 2005 Act clarify the requirement to pay postconfirmation interest on the claim,461 and require that the applicable non-bankruptcy rate
of interest be utilized.462
The 2005 Act may have a more significant impact on individual debtors who do
not make the split-year election. Under the 2005 Act, the government’s claims against
individual debtors who do not make the split-year election for the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes would no longer be entitled to eighth priority.463 If the courts
had properly applied the post-petition assessability rule to these claims prior to the 2005
Act, the change would result in the government’s claim for prepetition year-ofbankruptcy taxes losing all priority and becoming dischargeable. As a general unsecured
creditor, the government would receive on account of its claim for the prepetition portion
apply existing bankruptcy law concerning when a “claim” exists for bankruptcy purposes, rather than
creating a separate doctrine for tax cases.
455
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of year-of-bankruptcy taxes only the payments called for by the plan, which could be
substantially less than full payment.
However, prior to the 2005 Act, the courts did not accord eighth priority to the
government’s claim for the pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes. Instead, the
courts held in non-electing individual Chapter 7 cases that the government had no claim
against the estate,464 and held in the few Chapter 11 cases that discussed the issue, using
faulty reasoning, that the claims had to be paid under the plan and were excepted from
discharge under section 523(a)(1)(A).465 The elimination of eighth priority may have no
effect on these rulings, because the courts had not accorded the claims eighth priority in
the past. If, as argued above, these cases are wrong, the impact of the 2005 Act’s
elimination of eighth priority will be substantial.
The 2005 Act contains two new Chapter 11 dischargeability exceptions. First,
individual debtors do not receive a discharge up front on the effective date of the plan.466
Instead, the discharge is held in abeyance until all payments under the plan are
completed.467 A new provision allows the bankruptcy court to grant a “hardship
discharge” even if the debtor does not complete all payments required by the plan, if
creditors received more in value under the plan than they would have received in a
Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date of the plan, and modification of the
plan would not be practical.468 If the government’s claim for the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes were to be properly treated as a general unsecured claim against
the estate, this new provision would provide some protection in the event the debtor fails
to make the payments called for by the plan, but would still permit the discharge of
amounts not provided for in the plan (or in the case of a hardship discharge, even
amounts provided for in the plan and not paid if the hardship standards are met).
However, if the courts treat the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes as a
personal obligation of the debtor, as they did in non-electing individual cases prior to the
2005 Act,469 the new provisions would appear not to impact year-of-bankruptcy tax
claims because they would already be excepted from the Chapter 11 discharge.
Second, the 2005 Act excepts certain corporate fraud claims from the previouslyunlimited Chapter 11 discharge. Corporate debtors cannot discharge tax claims with
respect to which the corporation made a false return or willfully attempted to evade or
defeat taxes.470 As long as the debtor did not commit tax fraud, the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy taxes remains dischargeable in corporate Chapter 11 cases.
C.

Using a Chapter 11 Plan to Delay Payment of NonDischargeable Taxes.
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Even if the government’s tax claim is excepted from discharge, the debtor may
still be able to use the bankruptcy case to delay payment or limit the amount of the
government’s claim. What happens, for example, if the government’s claim is allowed in
a certain amount under the plan, and the government later seeks to hold the debtor
personally liable for additional amounts? In Snyder v. United States,471a Michigan
District Court held that the government was bound, under principles of res judicata, to the
amount of the claim set forth in the plan, and thus could not recover the additional
amounts from the debtor. Similarly, in In re Martin,472 a California Bankruptcy Court
held that the government could not seek to enforce a non-dischargeable tax claim outside
of the provisions of the plan where the government had participated in plan negotiations
and had agreed to the plan terms.473 Other courts have held that the government can seek
more than is specified in the plan if the government’s claim is not dischargeable, even
where the amount specified in the plan was based on proofs of claim filed by the
government.474 The government was involved in actual negotiations with the debtor in
those cases restricting the government’s ability to collect non-dischargeable taxes.
The courts have also been unclear about the debtor’s ability to use a plan to
provide additional time for paying nondischrgeable taxes. One California bankruptcy
court ruled that a debtor, under a provision in a confirmed plan of reorganization, could
enjoin the government from collecting non-dischargeable taxes during the plan term.475
A California district court disagreed with the first court’s reasoning, suggesting that the
plan could not impair the rights of a creditor holding a non-dischargeable claim, or at a
minimum the court would have to make specific findings that the collection activity
would jeopardize the plan's success or frustrate the debtor's rehabilitation before the
government’s rights could be impaired.476 More recently, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel focused on the need for the debtor “to prove that [the injunction] is
necessary to allow the debtor to successfully reorganize and to perform the terms of the
Chapter 11 plan.”477 While one commentator has read the cases to suggest that a plan
could modify the government’s collection rights “regardless of whether the taxing agency
actually consented,”478 the cases certainly suggest that requests by the debtor to modify
the government ability to collect non-dischargeable taxes will not be easily granted.
471

213 B.R. 321, 323 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
150 B.R. 43, 46 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993).
473
See also In re Matunas, 261 B.R. 129, 133 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2001) (the government could not seek to
collect 1993 taxes which had not been preserved under the terms of a post-confirmation stipulation that was
based on the terms of the debtor’s plan of reorganization).
474
See, e.g., DePaolo v. United States, 45 F.3d 373, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1995) (the government filed proofs
of claim for non-dischargeable taxes in the wrong amount, and the court allowed the government to recover
additional amounts from the debtor because the claim was not discharged.); In re Sage, No. 01-3288, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2896, at *7, 89 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 783 (D.N.J. 2002) (same); In re McConahey, 192 B.R.
187, 190-91 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996) (same with respect to non-dischargeable employment tax claim filed in
wrong amount).
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In re Mercado, 124 B.R. 799, 800 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
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In re Wood, 240 B.R. 609, 616-17 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
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In re Brotby, 303 B.R. 177, 190 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003); see also In re Bartleson, 253 B.R. 75, 80-84
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (because plan failed to specifically provide that government would be enjoined from
collecting non-dischargeable taxes outside of plan, no res judicata issue could apply).
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C. Richard McQueen & Jack F. Williams, TAX ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 10.11,
p. 10-22 (2nd Ed., 1999)
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D.

Claims for Interest and Penalties on Non-Dischargeable
Taxes in Chapter 11.

Dischargeability is also important with respect to post-petition interest and
penalties not provided for under the plan. The basic bankruptcy principle is that claims
are determined as of the petition date,479 and unmatured interest is not allowed.480 The
Bankruptcy Code allows only oversecured creditors to include in the amount of the claim
post-petition interest.481 In a Chapter 7 case, all prepetition creditors are entitled to
recover post-petition interest at the legal rate after all other claims are paid in full.482 In
this way, all general unsecured creditors are treated equally, whether their contracts
provided for interest or not. Therefore, it has long been the general rule that the
government cannot include in its claim against the estate post-petition pre-confirmation
interest.483
In Chapter 11, there is no provision for the payment of post-petition preconfirmation interest to unsecured creditors, although the best interests of creditors test
might require the payment of interest if prepetition interest would have been paid in a
Chapter 7 liquidation occurring on the effective date of the plan.484 Whether the estate
must pay post-confirmation interest under a plan is considered above.485 However, the
Bankruptcy Code only addresses the government’s ability to recover interest as part of its
claim against the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Code does not address whether the
debtor remains personally liable for interest if the government’s claim is not
dischargeable.
Prior to the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court held in
Bruning v. United States486 that post-petition interest on a nondischargeable tax debt
could be collected from the debtor and was itself excepted from discharge, because the
interest was part of the tax under applicable non-bankruptcy law.487 Bruning has been
followed after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code by courts in every circuit.488
479

See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2005) (“[T]he court . . . shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful
currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition.”).
480
11 U.S.C. § 502(a)(2).
481
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (interest is allowed to the extent the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of
the secured creditor’s claim); see also United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 235 (1989)
(allowing secured tax claimant to recover interest under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)).
482
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5).
483
See New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 332 (1949).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii); Kitrosser v. CIT Group/Factoring, Inc., 177 B.R. 458, 467-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)
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See discussion supra beginning at note 389.
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192 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 317 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 376 U.S. 358 (1964).
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Id. at 829 (“The Bankruptcy Act expressly excepts taxes from discharge and the clear language of the
revenue statute adds interest to the tax. The result is that interest added to the tax is excepted from
discharge.”)(Footnote omitted).
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See, e.g,. In re Tuttle, 291 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (following Bruning, and stating “Although a
few bankruptcy courts have held Bruning inapplicable to Bankruptcy Code cases, those decisions
subsequently were reversed.”); In re Cousins, 209 F.3d 38, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2000) (Bruning survived
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code); Pardee v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 218 B.R. 916, 921 (9th Cir.
1998); In re Johnson, 146 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1998); Leeper v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency,
49 F.3d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing in dicta that Bruning remains good law); In re Shumate,
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Therefore, although the government will generally not be entitled to recover post-petition
interest and penalties as part of its claim against the bankruptcy estate, if the
government’s claim is excepted from discharge it may pursue the debtor after bankruptcy
to recover post-petition interest and penalties.
E.

Chapters 12 and 13.

Any debt excepted from discharge under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is
also excepted from the Chapter 12 discharge.489 Because the prepetition portion of yearof-bankruptcy tax claims should properly have been entitled to eighth priority,490 and
because all eighth priority claims are excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1),491
a Chapter 12 debtor should not have been able to discharge the prepetition portion of
year-of-bankruptcy tax claims.492 Because a Chapter 12 debtor is, like a corporate debtor,
unable to make the split-year election, the corporate cases applying eighth priority to the
pre-petition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes would likely apply under Chapter 12.493
Prior to the 2005 Act, Chapter 13 differed from Chapter 12 in providing a “superdischarge” under which some taxes excepted from discharge in Chapter 7 under section
523 could be discharged under a Chapter 13 plan.494 Notably, taxes excepted from
discharge under section 523(a)(1) were not excepted from the Chapter 13 discharge.495
At first blush, it would appear that priority tax claims could be discharged in Chapter 13.
However, a careful analysis shows that the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy
taxes could not really be discharged in Chapter 13, assuming that the government’s tax
claim was properly granted eighth priority under the post-petition assessability rule. This
is because all priority tax claims must be paid in full under a Chapter 13 plan,496 and a
debtor could receive the super-discharge only if the debtor completed all payments under

No. 90-2026, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 407 at *14 (4th Cir. 1992) (dicta); Klingman v. Levinson, 877 F.2d
1357, 1362-63 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Burns, 887 F.2d
1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. River Coal Co., 748 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1984); In
re Boccio, 281 B.R. 171, 175 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002).
489
See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(2)(2005).
490
See discussion supra beginning at page 29.
491
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).
492
Note however that the courts have ruled, incorrectly in this author’s opinion, that the government’s
claim for year-of-bankruptcy taxes incurred by taxpayers who do not make the split-year election is not
entitled to priority under section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii). See discussion supra beginning at page 29. These
courts have reasoned that the taxes arise post-petition, do not constitute claims against the bankruptcy
estate, and are not covered by the Chapter 7 discharge. Presumably, under the theory adopted by these
courts, since the government’s tax claim would not be “provided for by the plan,” nor allowed under
section 503 or disallowed under section 502, the Chapter 12 discharge would not discharge these claims.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a).
493
See discussion of In re Michaelson supra note 397.
494
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Repealed 2005).
495
Id.
496
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).
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the plan.497 Therefore, the discharge would apply only after the priority tax claim is paid
in full – rending the discharge mostly498 irrelevant.
Chapter 13 also contained a separate hardship discharge provision applicable
when all payments under the plan were not completed, but the hardship discharge did not
discharge any debts excepted from discharge under section 523(a).499 Therefore, under a
proper reading of the statutory rules,500 the debtor had no real ability to discharge
prepetition taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, assuming that the government timely
acted to protect its interests.501
The 2005 Act creates uncertainty concerning the proper treatment of the
prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes under Chapter 13. Because year-ofbankruptcy taxes will no longer be eligible for eighth priority treatment (unless the debtor
files bankruptcy on the last day of his or her tax year), the prepetition portion of year-ofbankruptcy taxes should constitute general unsecured claims against the bankruptcy
estate,502 and should be dischargeable in a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 case – if the debtor
can comply with the other requirements for confirming a plan.503 As a general unsecured
creditor, the government has significantly less protection than it had as a priority creditor.
However, Chapters 12 and 13 contain some protections for general unsecured
creditors. Similar to the requirement in Chapter 11,504 in order to confirm a Chapter 12 or
497

11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (“As soon as practical after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan
. . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge.”).
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As discussed supra after note 415, it is possible that post-petition interest on the tax claim could be
discharged because the requirement to pay priority claims in full does not specifically require full payment
of the claim together with interest. However, the best interests of creditors test in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4),
or the cramdown requirements in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1), could require the payment of interest in certain
circumstances.
499
11 U.S.C. § 1328(c)(2).
500
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taxes pro-rata based on time. See discussion supra beginning at note 179 .
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See discussion infra note 534.
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an independent ground for non-dischargeability. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C).
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Both the Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 discharge apply broadly to “claims” addressed in the plan. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1228, 1328.
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See supra note 387.
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Chapter 13 plan, a debtor must meet a best interests of creditors test by showing that
objecting creditors will receive at least as much in present discounted value under the
plan as the creditor would receive in a liquidation occurring on the effective date.505 In
addition, the debtor must show either (a) that the creditor will receive full payment of the
claim with interest506 (at the applicable non-bankruptcy rate),507 or (b) that all of the
debtor’s projected disposable income during the three (or with the court’s permission
five)508 year plan period will be used to make payments to unsecured creditors.509 In a
Chapter 12 case, the debtor can meet the requirement by distributing property of a value
equal to the debtor’s projected disposable income for the three to five year period is
distributed to creditors.510 Chapter 13 appears to require the debtor to use the projected
disposable income to fund the plan.511 “Projected disposable income” is defined
somewhat differently in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13, but the basic requirements are quite
similar.512 Therefore, debtors who do not have enough projected disposable income to
pay all general unsecured claims over the plan period should be able to pay only part of
their year-of-bankruptcy taxes, and discharge the balance, in a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13
plan.513
One difficult problem that has arisen in Chapter 13 cases concerns the timing of
the plan. A Chapter 12 plan must be filed within 90 days after the order for relief.514 A
Chapter 13 plan must be filed within 15 days after the Chapter 13 petition is filed (or
within 15 days after the case is converted to Chapter 13).515 If a debtor files bankruptcy
early in the tax year, the amount of tax for the year, and hence the allocable portion for
the prepetition and post-petition period, may not be established at the time the plan is
filed because the year has not ended and the return is not yet due. Most of the litigation
over timing has focused on a special rule contained in Chapter 13, which allows the
government to file a claim for taxes which “become payable” while the case is
pending.516 The claim for taxes which “become payable” post-petition while the case is
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pending is treated as if it had arisen prepetition for purposes of allowance.517 The
meaning of the words “becomes payable” has vexed the courts.518
Moreover, because the language of the section applies at the option of the taxing
authority, debtors attempting to file claims on behalf of the taxing authority in order to
provide for payment over the plan term rather than upon demand or levy have not been
successful.519 The section only allows the government the option of filing a claim for
post-petition taxes which become payable during the pendency of the case to obtain
treatment under the plan. It does not require prepetition claims which become payable
post-petition to be treated as post-petition claims, as some courts have held.520 The debtor
should be permitted to file a proof of claim on behalf of the government for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes if the government fails to do so under
general bankruptcy principles.521 The special rule allowing the government to file a
claim for a tax that become payable post-petition does not in any way impair the normal
rules applicable to prepetition claims.
All of this begs the question of how the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy
taxes can be treated under the plan when the amount will not be known until after the end
of the year, when the return is filed. This same issue occurs with respect to any claim
that is contingent or unliquidated at the time the plan is proposed. The general rule in
bankruptcy is that contingent and unliquidated claims must be estimated by the court
when the fixing of the claim would unduly delay the administration of the case.522 The
debtor should seek to have the amount of the claim determined for purposes of allowance
and treatment in bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court should then estimate the claim by
apportioning the debtor’s projected tax liability. Admittedly, this is not an ideal solution.
It would be far better to have the debtor file a split-year return so that the actual partialyear tax liability can be easily determined and properly treated. Congress, however, has
chosen to preclude Chapter 13 debtors from making the split year election, so there is no
other method for making the allocation.
What happens if the court’s estimate of the claim turns out to be wrong?
Presumably, if the court’s estimate is too high, the debtor would be eligible for a refund
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under applicable non-bankruptcy law.523 If the court underestimates the tax liability, the
government can recover the additional amounts only if the government’s claim is not
discharged by the plan. Because (prior to the 2005 Act) the prepetition portion of yearof-bankruptcy taxes should have been entitled to eighth priority under the post-petition
assessability rule,524and because all eighth priority claims are excepted from
discharge,525the claim would not have been discharged by confirmation of the Chapter 12
plan, 526 and the government should have been able to recover from the debtor any
additional amounts owing. In a Chapter 13 case, however, the government would be
bound by the court’s estimation of the claim, because even tax claims excepted from
discharge under Chapter 7 under section 523(a)(1) could be discharged in Chapter 13.527
The 2005 Act has compounded the problem by eliminating eighth priority for
year-of-bankruptcy taxes, thus transforming what should have been an eighth priority
non-dischargeable claim into a non-priority dischargeable general unsecured claim.528
After the 2005 Act, the court’s estimate of the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy
taxes should now be binding on the government, and any balance not paid under the plan
should be discharged upon the completion of plan payments529 – unless the claim is
otherwise excepted from the Chapter 13 discharge, which it will rarely be.530
Dischargeability is important in situations other than the court’s underestimation
of the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes. Unless a claim is excepted from
the Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 discharge, the plan’s proposed treatment of a claim is
binding on the creditor.531 Thus, without an exception to discharge, if the plan proposes
to pay less than the full amount of the claim, the creditor will be bound by the plan’s
proposed treatment unless the creditor successfully objects to confirmation.532 Similarly,
if the plan mentions a claim but does not provide for payment, the debtor does not have to
pay the claim.533 Most importantly, if a Chapter 13 plan proposes to pay allowed claims,
but the government fails to timely file a proof of claim, the claim need not be paid and is
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discharged when the debtor pays allowed claims in accordance with the plan.534 The
government has up to 180 days after the order for relief to file a claim for taxes.535
Because priority tax claims are discharged under Chapter 13,536 the government’s failure
to file a timely claim results in a permanent loss of tax revenue if the debtor completes
plan payments and obtains a regular discharge.
This special loophole for unfiled claims should not have applied in Chapter 12
cases prior to the 2005 Act, because the government’s claim for the pre-petition portion
of year-of-bankruptcy taxes should have been entitled to eighth priority under the postpetition assessability rule, and therefore excepted from discharge under section
523(a)(1)(A). Since all claims excepted from discharge under section 523(a) are also
excepted from the Chapter 12 discharge,537 the government should have been able to
collect the taxes from the debtor even if it failed to file a proof of claim. After the 2005
Act, however, the government’s claim for pre-petition year-of-bankruptcy taxes will no
longer be entitled to eighth priority and will thus no longer be excepted from discharge
under section 523 (unless the debtor files bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year). The
government’s failure to file a claim in cases subject to the 2005 Act should result in
dischargeability. Courts may well result to the flawed reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court
in Wilkoff to avoid this result.538
The 2005 Act contains a new rule giving the government additional time to file a
proof of claim for tax returns that the debtor is required to file post-petition. The new
rule treats the government’s claim as timely if filed within 60 days after the debtor files a
return under new section 1308.539 Section 1308 requires the debtor to file tax returns “for
all taxable periods ending during the 4-year period ending on the date of the filing of the
petition” by the time of the first meeting of creditors.540 Presumably, the prepetition
portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes is a “period” that ended on the petition date, even
534
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In re Elstien, 238 B.R. 747, 756 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (“If the plan provides for a debt, but the creditor
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570, 580 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d, 167 B.R. 698 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), aff’d, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir.
1996); In re Richards, 50 B.R. 339, 341 (E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Rothman, 76 B.R. 38, 41 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1987) (tax claim discharged even where taxing authority did not know how much claim was at
bar date – should have filed a motion for extension of time to file a claim); In re Hunt, 59 B.R. 718, 720
(Bankr. D. Me. 1986); In re Goodwin, 58 B.R. 75, 77 (Bankr. D. Me. 1986). Note that Congress amended
section 502(b)(9) in 1994 to make it clear that late-filed claims are subject to discharge, overruling earlier
cases like In re Hausladen, 146 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992). Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
535
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though the tax year had not ended on the petition date. However, the statute only applies
“if the debtor was required to file a tax return under applicable non-bankruptcy law.”541
Since it would be rare that the debtor would have been required to file a return for yearof-bankruptcy taxes by the time of the first meeting of creditors (even if it is extended),
the statute appears to be inapplicable to year of bankruptcy taxes. Therefore, the general
rule requiring the government to file a claim within 180 days after the order for relief542
appears to be the applicable rule for the prepetition portion of year of bankruptcy taxes.
This 180 day deadline puts the government in a difficult spot. If the government
fails to file a claim, the Chapter 13 plan should effectively discharge the liability for
prepetition year-of-bankruptcy taxes. Yet, the government may not know how much the
claim is at the time of the filing deadline because the debtor may not have yet filed a
return. In addition, the government may wish to continue to argue, as it has previously
argued, that year-of-bankruptcy taxes constitute post-petition debts that are not
discharged. The government may be able to avoid the Catch-22 by filing a protective
claim. The protective claim could say something like this:
The government files this proof of claim to protect its rights in the
event the court determines that the government has a prepetition
claim for taxes owing on the debtor’s prepetition income earned
during the calendar (or fiscal) year in which the debtor filed
bankruptcy. It is the government’s contention that it has a postpetition claim against the debtor for all taxes incurred in the year of
bankruptcy, and that this claim will not be discharged by any
provision of the Bankruptcy Code. However, if the court
determines that the government has a prepetition claim for some
portion of the taxes incurred by the debtor in the year of
bankruptcy, the government hereby asserts a claim in an
unliquidated amount for such taxes. The claim is unliquidated
because the debtor has not filed a tax return for the year in which
the debtor filed the petition initiating this case.
A timely-filed protective claim should protect the government’s rights. However, those
rights have been severely curtailed by the 2005 Act, since the government’s claim for the
prepetition portion of year of bankruptcy taxes can no longer be entitled to eighth
priority. Therefore, the debtor should be able to treat the tax claim in the same manner as
any other dischargeable general unsecured claim.
V.

CONCLUSION.

It is fair to assume that most debtors who file bankruptcy will owe income taxes
for the year of bankruptcy. With more than one million bankruptcy cases filed each
year,543 the laws providing for the treatment of year-of-bankruptcy tax claims affect many
people. Laws that affect so many people should be clear and easy to apply.
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Unfortunately, this article illustrates just how complicated and confusing it is to
determine how the government’s claims for income taxes incurred by the year of
bankruptcy will be treated.
The treatment of taxes owing by the debtor in the year of bankruptcy is
straightforward only if an individual debtor in a case under either Chapter 7 or 11 makes
the election to split the year of bankruptcy into two tax years, because the separate returns
establish the amount of taxes for the prepetition and post-petition periods.544 Equally
importantly, when an eligible debtor timely makes the split-year election, the priority
rules will properly treat the government’s claim for taxes shown on the prepetition return
as an eighth priority claim, and properly treat the taxes shown on the post-petition return
either as an administrative priority claim (if the income is usable by the bankruptcy
estate), or as a personal obligation of the debtor (if the income belongs to the debtor free
of creditors’ claims under the debtor’s fresh start).545 All is right in the world if the
election is made.
However, not every debtor makes or is eligible to make the split-year election.
The treatment of tax claims in the year of bankruptcy becomes highly confusing and
uncertain whenever an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 or 11 case does not make the
split-year election, and whenever a debtor is unable to make the election – either because
the debtor is not an individual, or because the individual debtor has filed a petition under
Chapters 12 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.546
Prior to the 2005 Act, the courts struggled to develop a coherent theory for the
treatment of the government’s claim for taxes incurred in the year of bankruptcy, but
failed miserably. For individual Chapter 7 debtors who do not make the split-year
election, the courts concluded that the government’s claim for the entire year’s taxes
constitutes a personal obligation of the debtor and not an obligation of the debtor’s
bankrutpcy estate.547 The courts also recite this rule in Chapter 11 cases, but then to
avoid the Chapter 11 discharge provisions somehow transmute the non-estate obligation
into a claim that must be paid by the estate under a plan of reorganization.548 In reaching
these results, the courts simply ignore the broad definition of a “claim” contained in the
Bankruptcy Code, and the long line of cases outside of the tax area interpreting when a
bankruptcy “claim” arises.549 A proper analysis would require the courts to recognize
that the government’s claim for taxes on prepetition income arises when that income is
earned, even though the claim is unliquidated because the precise amount of taxes cannot
be determined, and even though the claim is unmatured and contingent because future
events occuring on or before the end of the year may offset the tax liability.550 Under the
non-tax cases, the courts would be required to allocate the year’s taxes between the
prepetition and post-petition periods on the basis of time.551 To reach their conclusion
that the government’s claim is cognizable only outside of bankruptcy, the courts simply
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ignored the rules that have been consistently applied in bankruptcy outside of the tax
sphere.552
For corporate debtors, the courts have held that the taxes must be divided between
the prepetition and post-petition periods, with the prepetition taxes entitled to eighth
priority.553 The courts have been unable explain precisely how the annual tax liability is
to be divided between the prepetition and post-petition periods, and have differed on the
theory for granting eighth priority rather than first priority to the taxes.554 Some courts
have held that even though all of the year’s taxes are deemed to arise post-petition, the
post-petition assessability rule applies to subordinate the government’s claim to eighth
priority555 (even though the courts have unanimously held in other contexts that the postpetition assessability rule does not apply to post-petition taxes556). Other courts have
suggested that the prepetition portion of the year’s taxes arises prepetition, not postpetition, and therefore falls within the eighth priority post-petition assessability rule.557
No court has adequately explained how under the statutory language such different
results can arise in corporate and individual cases.
The 2005 Act has eliminated eighth priority for taxes incurred in the year of
bankruptcy unless the debtor makes a split-year election or files bankruptcy on the last
day of the debtor’s tax year.558 It is unclear whether the 2005 Act will have any effect on
non-electing individual debtors. If the courts continue to follow the “non-claim” theory
of the individual Chapter 7 cases,559 the changes made by the 2005 Act will likely have
no effect because the government’s claim was not previously entitled to priority. If the
courts re-examine the “non-claim” theory, as they should,560 the 2005 Act could result
either in the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy taxes being treated as first priority
administrative expenses, or as dischargeable general unsecured claims.561
The changes made by the 2005 Act will wreck havoc under either of the theories
used in corporate cases. By moving language in the statute, Congress has made it clear
that eighth priority can only be granted to claims for tax years ending on or before the
petition date.562 The tax year in which bankruptcy is filed will end on or before the
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petition date only if the debtor happens to file bankruptcy on the last day of the tax year
(or for individual debtors when the split-year election is made, in which case the
prepetition partial tax year will end on the petition date). The change made by the 2005
Act make it impossible for the courts to apply the post-petition assessability rule to
corporate year-of-bankruptcy taxes whenever the debtor files bankruptcy in the middle of
a tax year.563 With the 2005 Act’s elimination of eighth priority, it would appear that
those courts treating the prepetition portion of the year’s taxes as arising prepetition
(which is the proper analysis under the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a “claim”) 564
will be required to treat the government’s claim for pre-petition year-of-bankruptcy taxes
as a dischargeable general unsecured claim, while those courts treating the government’s
claim as arising post-petition565 will have to struggle to determine whether the
government’s claim for taxes on income earned before the estate was in existence will be
treated as first priority administrative expenses “incurred by the estate,”566 or as a nonpriority post-petition claim (which would have no special protections in Chapter 11, and
would presumably be subject to discharge).
The situation for Chapter 13 debtors and the government is even more confusing.
If the courts follow the theory of the corporate cases, as the court in In re Michaelson
did,567 then after the 2005 Act the government will likely have a dischargeable general
unsecured claim for the prepetition portion of year-of-bankruptcy cases. Under the
theory in Michaelson,568 if the government fails to file a proof of claim, it will likely
receive no distribution. On the other hand, if the courts follow the theory of the nonelecting individual debtor cases, as the court in In re Wilkoff did,569 then after the 2005
Act the government will not have a claim against the estate at all, unless the government
elects to file a proof of claim under section 1305(a). If the government elects to file a
proof of claim under section 1305(a), and the theory of Wilkoff is adopted, then the
government’s claim will be non-priority and dischargeable.570 Thus, under Michaelson
theory the government must file a claim to protect its rights, while under the Wilkoff
theory the government will forefeit substantial rights by filing a claim. Until the situation
is resolved, maybe the government’s only course of action is to rely on alternative
pleading. The government could file a protective statement saying that it does not elect
to file a proof of claim under section 1305(a) if the court follows the theory of Wilkoff,
but herewith files a proof of claim if court follows the theory of Michaelson.571
Regardless of how the courts interpret the 2005 Act, this article points out the
need for Congress to re-examine the statutory rules. The existing statutory rules are
overly complex and vague, forcing debtors to decide whether to make the split-year
election without being able to understand the consequences of doing so. The uncertainty
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has created in the past, and will create after the changes made by the 2005 Act,
unnecessary litigation over the meaning of the law. Equally important, the ambiguities in
the statute have caused the courts to interpret the existing tax rules in ways inconsistent
with the rules applicable to all other bankruptcy claims.
In enacting a new statute, Congress should focus on when the government’s
claims should be given priority over other creditors, and when those claims should be
non-dischargeable. If Congress feels that the government’s claims for recently-incurred
taxes should be given priority over other general unsecured claims, it should make the
law clear and easy to apply by specifying an easily-determinable time period for priority.
Similarly, if Congress feels that the government’s claims for recently-incurred taxes
should also be made non-dischargeable, along with claims due to the debtor’s fraudulent
conduct, it should enact provisions to accomplish these objectives. The law would be
greatly clarified and simplified if the priority and non-dischargeability rules were written
to stand by themselves without referencing each other and without referencing the
complex non-bankruptcy rules of limitations on assessment. The cross-references serve
only to complicate the law and create anomalous results. In addition, Congress should
require all debtors to file separate returns for the pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy
periods. It would then be a simple matter to treat the pre-bankruptcy tax liability as a
priority or general unsecured claim in the same matter as all other pre-bankruptcy
liabilities, and to treat the post-bankruptcy tax liability as an administrative claim if the
income was available to the estate, and as a non-bankruptcy personal obligation of the
debtor if the income belonged to the debtor as part of the debtor’s fresh start. Until the
statutory rules are fixed, the parties and the courts will have to do the best they can with a
badly flawed statutory framework.
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